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Abstract 
Evaluations have gained popularity for improving public policy measures, programmes 
and institutions in the field of science, technology and innovation (RTI). Though the     
frequency and quality of evaluations have increased, in terms of impact indicators and 
methodological diversification, concerns have been raised about their effectiveness to fuel 
change in policy making. This raises the issue of the low absorption level of evaluation 
findings by policy making in general and in Austria in particular.  
Recent research emphasises the need for a holistic perspective on the benefits and useful-
ness of evaluations in order to allow a more thorough consideration of complex             
interdependencies and effects that can occur at different levels and in different forms. 
While previous research has put much emphasis on the conduct of evaluations and their 
implementation, there are less empirical studies that address institutional or contextual ex-
planations when it comes to the effects of evaluations. This study aims to contribute to the 
narrowing of this gap in the literature by investigating how individual and composite actors 
(such as organisations), as well as, the policy itself are affected by policy evaluations, 
drawing attention to the factors and mechanisms that shape evaluation effects. 
Making use of the concepts of “policy learning”, actor-centred institutionalism and recent 
research in the field of evaluation utilisation for the analysis, this study developed a con-
ceptual framework that proposes three groups of conditioning factors and mechanisms: 
Actors and their interactions, the institutional context, and the evaluation itself. A multiple 
case study approach, using evaluated programmes in the Austrian research, technology and 
innovation (RTI) policy scene, was employed to examine the effects of evaluations at   
various levels, the conditioning factors and mechanisms, as well as, the ensuing pathways 
of effects.  
Results indicate that evaluations generate a wide range of diverse effects, beyond individu-
al learning, and clearly and visibly impact programme development. Several contextual 
aspects shape evaluation effects. The current structures and practices endorse evaluations 
as routine, which may reduce chances of broader learning, and distance the evaluation and 
the possibility to learn from it from an interested audience. The thesis concludes with   
implications for theory and practice, and suggestions for paths of future research. 
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Kurzfassung 
Evaluierungen haben für die Verbesserung öffentlicher politischen Maßnahmen, Pro-
gramme und Institutionen im Bereich Forschung, Technologie und Innovation (FTI) an 
Popularität gewonnen. Während Häufigkeit und Qualität von Evaluierung beständig zu-
nehmen, auch im Hinblick auf die Berücksichtigung von Wirkungsindikatoren und metho-
discher Diversifizierung, wachsen die Bedenken hinsichtlich des Beitrags von Evaluierun-
gen zu Politik- und Maßnahmenentwicklung. Dies wirft die Frage des geringen Absorpti-
onsgrades von Evaluierungsergebnissen im Allgemeinen, sowie in Österreich im Besonde-
ren, auf. 
Neuere Arbeiten betonen die Notwendigkeit einer gesamtheitlichen Sichtweise auf den 
Nutzen und die Nützlichkeit von Evaluierungen, um eine tiefergehende Betrachtung kom-
plexer Wirkungszusammenhänge und Effekte, die auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen und in 
unterschiedlichen Erscheinungsformen auftreten können, zu ermöglichen. Während sich 
die bisherige Literatur insbesondere der Evaluierung selbst sowie deren Umsetzung      
gewidmet hat, existieren weniger empirische Studien, die Institutionen und kontextbezoge-
ne Erklärungen untersuchen, wenn es um die Nutzung und den Einfluss von Evaluierungen 
geht. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es diese Lücke einen Schritt weit zu schließen, indem untersucht 
wird, wie Evaluierungen auf individueller und kollektiver Ebene (wie Organisationen) so-
wie auf Ebene der Politikmaßnahme Einfluss ausüben, mit Fokus auf die Faktoren und 
Mechanismen, die diese Effekte beeinflussen können. 
Basierend auf Konzepten wie „Politiklernen“, akteurszentrierter Institutionalismus sowie 
neuerer Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Evaluierungsnutzung entwickelt diese Arbeit einen 
konzeptionellen Rahmen, welche auf die Untersuchung von drei Gruppen von bestimmen-
den Faktoren und Mechanismen abstellt: Akteure und ihre Interaktionen, den institutionel-
len Kontext und die Evaluierung selbst. Im Zuge einer Multi-Fallstudien-Analyse von  
Programmen aus dem FTI-Bereich werden die Effekte von Evaluierungen auf unterschied-
lichen Ebenen und vor dem Hintergrund beeinflussender Faktoren und Mechanismen un-
tersucht sowie Wirkpfade beschrieben.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Evaluierungen eine breite Palette von unterschiedlichen, über 
individuelles Lernen hinausgehenden Effekten generieren konnten, und einen klaren und 
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nachvollziehbaren Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des Programms hatten. Eine Vielzahl an 
kontextbezogenen Aspekten beeinflussten diese Effekte. Die bestehenden Strukturen und 
Praktiken führen dazu, dass Evaluierungen als Routine eingesetzt werden, was die Mög-
lichkeit von Änderungen auf Basis breiter Lernprozesse reduzieren sowie eine Distanz 
zwischen der Evaluierung (und den damit verbundenen Lernmöglichkeiten) und einem 
interessierten Publikum hervorrufen könnte. Die Arbeit schließt mit Implikationen für die 
Theorie und Praxis, und diskutiert Vorschläge für Wege der zukünftigen Forschung. 
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1 Introduction 
In light of the heightened interest in evidence-based policy and practice, evaluations have 
gained popularity on a global scale. They aim to assess how well a specific policy, pro-
gramme, practice, etc. works, keeping an attentive eye on its outcomes and impacts, with 
the intention of informing responsible bodies, focusing on improving future practice.    
Today, evaluations are widely recognised and accepted as a part of strategic policy advice, 
and a growing future demand for evaluations is predicted.  
While the function of accountability is increasingly at the forefront of evaluations, con-
cerns have been raised about the actual consequences of evaluations and their effectiveness 
to fuel change in policy making. It is well covered in the literature (e.g. Patton 1997, Sand-
erson 2000, Weiss 2004) that the learning from and the effects of evaluations tend to be 
unsatisfying, and evaluations rarely, at least at first sight, contribute to policy making. This 
raises questions concerning the reasons for the low up-take of evaluations. While they are 
seen as important pieces of policy advice, they are only one part of the picture, and may 
not play the same role for all decision-makers and related actors.  
Recent advances in public policy research have reacted to this insight by putting more em-
phasis on the interaction and bargaining between diverse actors in policy fields and deci-
sion making, and on how the results of evaluations are shaped by institutional settings, as 
well as, constellations, interests and agendas of involved actors (e.g. Kevenhörster 2006, 
Scharpf 1997, Nutley et al. 2002, Stone et al. 2001). In this light, new perspectives have 
become more prominent in evaluation research, challenging the notions of utilisation in 
exchange for a broader view on the influence of evaluations (e.g. Kirkhart 2000), arguing 
that evaluations feed back into the decision making process at many levels of policy    
making. 
The research on the use of evaluations has largely focused on the instrument itself, its de-
sign, its implementation and on other attributes to explain the up-take of findings (see e.g. 
Leviton and Hughes 1981, Cousins and Leithwood 1986, Shulha and Cousins 1997, John-
son et al. 2009). Whilst acknowledging the increasing importance of context-related factors 
(e.g. Shulha and Cousins 1997), they have received less attention in evaluation research, as 
have the role of actors, interactions amongst them, and institutionalised rules. This study 
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attempts to narrow this gap in the literature by investigating how individual and composite 
actors (such as organisations), as well as, the policy itself are affected by specific evalua-
tions, drawing attention to the factors and mechanisms that shape evaluation effects. By 
studying the effects of evaluations on actors and subsequent policy-decisions, it enables a 
deeper understanding of how learning from evaluations takes place, and how learning in-
sights find their way into policy design and implementation. 
In the following, a brief overview of the study and its set-up is provided. Section 1.1     
explains the study’s objective, research questions and the general research approach. Sec-
tion 1.2 gives an overview of the empirical research context. Section 1.3 discusses the  
relevance of this study from a scientific and practical perspective. Finally, Section 1.4 out-
lines the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Study Objective and Approach 
This study explores how evaluation processes and results can contribute to policy          
development in a certain policy field, with special emphasis on factors and mechanisms 
that condition the effects of policy evaluation on actors and the policy making process. It 
aims to shed light on the relationship between research and public policy making, especial-
ly with regard to the up-take of research and policy advice in form of evaluations. Special 
attention is paid to the role of actors, the interactions amongst them, and the institutional 
context, to explain variance in evaluation influence. The following research questions, 
which include the policy field of interest, i.e. research, technology and innovation policy 
(RTI), will guide the study: 
 What effects of evaluation processes and results on the RTI policy making process in 
general, and on the behaviour of actors in particular, can be discerned? 
 Through which pathways do evaluation processes and results affect RTI policy mak-
ing? 
 Which factors and mechanisms condition the effects of evaluation processes and results 
on the RTI policy making process in general, and on the behaviour of actors in particu-
lar? 
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The effects of evaluations are investigated in terms of policy learning (e.g. Biegelbauer 
2013, 2007). Policy learning can be triggered due to various dimensions and may manifest 
itself at various levels. This study addresses learning at the individual and the composite 
actor level, as well as, at the policy level. 
Furthermore, the study builds on advances in actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz and 
Scharpf 1995, Scharpf 1997, 2000), newer perspectives in the evaluation literature (e.g. 
Kirkhart 2000, Henry and Mark 2003) and research that uses institutional perspectives to 
assess evaluation consequences (e.g. Lethonen 2005, Højlund 2015). Actor-centred institu-
tionalism combines an actor-focused perspective with an institutional perspective, treats 
both actors and institutions as equally important, and offers a systematic approach for ana-
lysing the interactions between actors in institutions. Recent research on the effects of 
evaluations considers concepts that are more complex, emphasising a perspective that goes 
beyond narrow categories such as “use” to encompass broader, long-term, intended or un-
intended “influences” of evaluation processes and results. Research that employs          
institutional theory to explore the effects of evaluation in specific policy areas is used as 
guide in framing the study. In combining these perspectives, a conceptual framework is 
developed to analyse and discuss the effects of evaluations. It identifies patterns of such 
effects, and factors and mechanisms that shape them.  
Against the backdrop of this conceptual framework, an empirical analysis of actual evalua-
tion processes and results will be conducted. This will be done based on a multiple case 
study design with cases from the Austrian research, technology and policy scene. Yin 
(1989, p. 23) defines a case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context”, stressing the importance of contextual conditions. 
Eisenhardt (1989) adds that case study research is particularly appropriate when little is 
known about a specific phenomenon and new perspectives are required.  
Three cases of evaluations are investigated. The selection of these cases is based on a   
literal replication logic (Yin 1994) to assess the effects of evaluations from multiple per-
spectives in a setting that is largely the same for all cases. Multiple data sources are used in 
order to enable triangulation of evidence. These sources are comprised of evaluation re-
ports, supplementary documents, and a total of 31 interviews with Ministry and Agency 
representatives, evaluators and external stakeholders, such as interest groups and relevant 
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industry experts of the Austrian research, technology and innovation policy scene. Data 
was analysed via qualitative content analysis (Mayring 1983).  
1.2 Research Context 
The study was carried out by taking evaluations from the field of research and technology 
policy (RTI) in Austria as the case in point. There is a pragmatic and a conceptual argu-
ment to be made for this choice.  
The pragmatic reason is that the author has been working as an evaluator in the field of 
research, technology and innovation policy for more than a decade at the time this work 
was completed and can therefore build on enhanced field access and a thorough insider 
understanding. Such insider familiarity, however, entails its own dangers of professional 
myopia, and thus requires explicit methodological strategies to ensure transparency and 
validity of results, as will be elaborated on in Section 5.1.  
The conceptual reason is that RTI policy in Austria offers an especially good opportunity 
for investigating the effects of evaluations from an actor-centred institutionalist perspec-
tive. This is because evaluations in Austria generally meet high standards, while actors and 
institutions are complex and manifold: 
 Austria has a well-developed RTI evaluation culture and a comparatively large evalua-
tion capacity amongst its key players. Therefore, the attributes of evaluations, such as 
quality, relevance and credibility, which previous research has shown to be decisive 
factors for prompting policy learning, are not viewed as to be major issues. This pro-
vides a suitable background for focusing on the less-well understood issue of how ac-
tors and institutions shape the effects of evaluations. 
 With regard to actors and institutions, Austria provides a rather vivid scene. There are 
many diverse actors with sometimes unclear responsibilities and varying expectations. 
Recent years have seen rising concerns about the efficient use of evaluation results and 
recommendations. One of the first major criticisms in this regard was expressed in the 
2008 CREST report on Austria (CREST 2008), which analysed the design and imple-
mentation of national policy mixes. While acknowledging the development of a com-
prehensive evaluation culture and the widespread use of evaluations in recent years, it 
voices concern about “whether the results of these evaluations fed adequately into     
  Evaluations, Actors and Institutions 
5 
future policy formulation” (CREST 2008, p. 18). Further critical discussion about up-
take issues and potential solution ensued and has continued until today. This situation 
makes Austrian RTI policy an appropriate opportunity to investigate evaluation effects 
from an actor-centred institutionalist perspective. 
1.3 Relevance of this Study 
This thesis provides insights into how learning from research and evaluations takes place, 
and how learnings find their way into policy design and implementation. The research 
findings contribute to the existing literature in several ways: First, previous empirical re-
search on evaluation effects is extended by conceptually identifying and empirically exam-
ining effects at the individual and composite actor level, as well as, at the policy level. The 
study shifts attention from the evaluation itself to the involved actors and the institutional 
context in which they act to explain evaluation use and influence. Second, it adds to the 
conceptual understanding of pathways through which policy evaluations may exert their 
effects on policy making. Third, the results add to current research (e.g. Højlund 2015) that 
calls for a deeper exploration of non-use, instead of explaining use from an evaluation re-
search perspective.  
Insights from this study may also provide useful knowledge for improving evaluation prac-
tice, and for how evaluation could be better linked to policy improvement. Study results 
may also be used to guide future research on the influence of evaluation processes and re-
sults in other contexts, for example, in other countries and/or specific policy fields. Con-
clusions may also feed into the discussion about the actual use of evaluation findings in 
policy formulation and implementation in the Austrian R&D and innovation system.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives background information about the in-
creased interest in evidence-based policy making and the rise of evaluations in public poli-
cy making. It briefly sums up the state of the art and indicates the gaps in research that this 
work aims to fill.  
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In Chapter 3, the conceptual framework for this thesis is put forward. Section 3.1 is dedi-
cated to the development of a conceptual basis for understanding various levels, dimen-
sions and pathways of effects. Section 3.2 introduces the key factors and mechanisms that 
condition learning and effects in the literature, which are used as basis and guideline for 
the subsequent analysis. Section 3.3 concludes with an overview of the conceptual frame-
work and the focal points of analysis for the empirical study. 
Chapter 4 introduces the policy field and the empirical setting. Section 4.1 gives an over-
view of the policy field that is used as the empirical setting, namely research, technology 
and innovation (RTI). Section 4.2 explores the policy culture in Austria, discusses overall 
policy and decision making procedures, describes the current research, technology and 
innovation governance and the application and up-take of evaluations in this field.  
Chapter 5 describes the methodology and forms a link between the conceptual part and the 
empirical part in the form of single case study descriptions. Section 5.1 outlines the multi-
ple case study design to be used for the empirical analysis, explains the overall research 
approach and gives insights into the case study selection, discusses issues of data analysis 
and presents the steps taken to assure the quality of research results. Section 5.2 presents 
insights from the empirical work at the individual case level. Three case studies were con-
ducted: The programmes TAKE OFF, Headquarter Strategy and Intelligent Transport Sys-
tems and Services plus, termed IV2splus. Each case is described by addressing the pro-
gramme background, the conduct of the evaluation, and the post-evaluation situation. At 
the beginning of each single case description, an overview of the main empirical findings 
is presented. These are subsequently used and further developed in chapter 6 for the cross-
case analysis. 
The core of the study is Chapter 6. Section 6.1 explores the effects of evaluation at the in-
dividual level, the composite actor level and the policy level. Section 6.2 outlines and dis-
cusses the factors and mechanism that condition these effects, and Section 6.3 concludes 
with some characteristics of pathways of effects. 
The above insights and findings are summarised in a concluding Chapter 7. Section 7.1 
summarises the key findings from the cross-case analysis, Section 7.2 discusses the main 
conclusions and provides answers to the research questions, while Section 7.3 focuses on 
the contribution to the literature, the potential policy implications and strengths and on the 
weaknesses of this study. In Section 7.4, some future research directions are identified.  
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter provides the background and context for the conceptual and empirical       
investigation of effects of evaluation in a particular policy field. It builds on literature from 
research utilisation and evaluation research, political science and institutionalism. Section 
2.1 deals with evidence-based developments in public policies and the increasing interest 
in evaluations as a vehicle for policy learning. It explores the various functions and       
features of evaluation and discusses international trends in this area. This is followed by 
Section 2.2 which reviews the literature on the relationship between research and policy 
making. It explores various concepts of evaluation use, discusses advances in the literature 
that argues for a shift towards the influence of evaluations and addresses recent develop-
ments in public policy making and governance. Section 2.3 reviews and discusses the con-
ceptual underpinnings and main lines of development in institutionalist theorising in the 
social sciences. It also introduces the framework of actor-centred institutionalism. Section 
2.4 summarises key concepts and themes arising from the literature review, and sets path 
for Chapter 3, which will develop a detailed conceptual framework to guide the empirical 
analysis. 
2.1 Evaluations Between Accountability and Policy Learning 
The relevance of research, including evaluation research, for policy decisions has received 
a considerable amount of attention in recent years (e.g. Head 2008, Lee and Kirkpatrick 
2006, Stone 2002, Sanderson 2002). The complexity of policy issues in areas such as ener-
gy, environmental issues, genetics, food and health (Stone et al. 2001) and the exuberant 
growth of specialist knowledge in many policy areas has created a high demand for well-
informed decision making (Shapira and Kuhlmann 2003a, Gottstein and Matz 2004, Do-
brow and Goel 2004, Stone et al. 2001). Governments and policy-makers increasingly use 
research evidence to develop and improve laws, regulations and policy measures. These 
developments have been accompanied by changes in public policy and administration, in-
cluding a renewed emphasis on accountability and performance (Shapira and Kuhlmann 
2003), in what is termed as New Public Management. Governments are increasingly ex-
pected to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of policy initiatives, and to transpar-
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ently account for impact, which might be termed as seeking “value for money” (Georghiou 
1995). This development has been especially observable with research, technology and 
innovation policy, the basis for the empirical investigation of this work. 
In light of stagnant or diminishing budgets and rising public expectations, policy makers 
turn to researchers and experts for assessing “what works” (Davis et al. 2000). Terms such 
as “evidence-based policy”, „information-based policy” or “fact-based policy” have be-
come popular (Pawson 2006, Clarence 2002, Nutley 2003, Nutley et al. 2007, Head 2008, 
Trostle et al. 1999, Jacobson et al. 2005). Originally developed in areas such as medicine 
and health care, evidence-based policy making remains a somewhat ambiguous term. A 
fairly comprehensive definition that will be used in the course of this study is offered by 
Stone et al. (2001, p. 31). For these authors, evidence-based policy means identifying all 
existing evidence, assessing it through systematic reviews, establishing additional evidence 
by scientific means if existing evidence is insufficient, collaborating with research users 
(e.g. policy maker), and presenting and disseminating findings in a systematic manner to 
impact the practices of individuals and organisations. 
Evaluations have become an integral part of evidence-based policy making. They are in-
creasingly used to support public decision making (see e.g. Patton 2002). Originating from 
the US, evaluations started to emerge in public management during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Wollmann 2003). At that time, public spending increased considerably as new social and 
educational programmes were launched. Following growing questions about the impact 
and outcome of these interventions, evaluations addressed these questions in a scientific 
way, providing accountability and information about efficiency.  
A second wave of public-sector reform and evaluation started in the mid-1970s in the wake 
of a world-wide economic and budgetary crisis (see e.g. Krippner 2011) which led to 
budgetary retrenchment and increasing calls for cost efficiency (Furubo and Sandahl 
2002). One early definition of evaluation in the literature from this period is given by Rich 
(1979, pp. 11-13). According to him, evaluation in policy decision making can be under-
stood as … 
“… the process of assessing whether or not desired or undesired outcomes have 
been reached, of specifying or explaining the outcomes that were reached, and of 
suggesting new strategies and/or definitions of future problems. [Evaluation] … 
also represents the time at which one moves from formulating and implementing 
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ideas/programs (the action phase) to the point of assessing/judging what the suc-
cess of this program was and whether it should be continued in the future”. 
The shift towards control and effectiveness against a background of decreasing public ex-
penditures triggered a third wave of evaluations in the late 1980s and 1990s, heavily bor-
rowing from the views and strategies of the so-called New Public Management movement 
(Rothwell 1985). In Europe, several reform initiatives were launched under the banner of 
New Public Management, aiming to move away from the traditional Weberian concept of 
bureaucratic administrative systems to a “managerial state” (Clarke and Newman 1997). 
Private sector management knowledge and the principles of modernisation and perfor-
mance gained weight in public sector leadership (e.g. Meyer et al. 2013), a development 
that has been termed as the Neo-Weberian state (e.g. Bouckaert 2004).  
Most notable in this context have been the organisational decentralisation of administrative 
responsibilities and structures to appointed bodies, e.g. public enterprises and agencies 
(Hood 1991, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), a process that is often referred to as “agencifica-
tion”. The main motivation of the process is to be seen in enabling horizontal and vertical 
specialisation, efficiency, service innovation and responsiveness to customers (Verhoest 
2013).  
Shortcomings of this New Public Management-style-agencification are discussed in the 
literature under the umbrella term “post-New Public Management” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011). Concerns are expressed about how to deal with the “wicked” societal challenges 
(e.g. climate change, health, mobility, energy, etc.) and the limitations of a fragmented 
public sector to address cross-cutting policy issues (Verhoest 2013). Efforts in this regard 
have been labelled “joined-up government” and “whole-of-government” (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007). 
The growing interest in evaluation has also contributed to a rise of in-house governmental 
assessment activity, and to increased evaluation output and related knowledge production. 
The external commissioning of experts to conduct evaluations has become a regular prac-
tice, fostering further specialisation and professionalisation. To promote and support eval-
uation capacity building, sometimes more generally referred to as evaluation tradition or 
“culture” (e.g. Owen 2003, Edler et al. 2008), internal and external evaluators in national 
and international contexts and policy fields have become connected in expert networks or 
so-called “evaluation societies”, such as the American Evaluation Association, the Europe-
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an Evaluation Society, the UK Evaluation Society, the French Société Française d'Évalua-
tion, the German Gesellschaft für Evaluation e.V., the Swiss Evaluation Society or, which 
will be introduced later in more detail, the Austrian platform Research and Technology 
Policy Evaluation. For some national or supranational contexts and policy fields, for in-
stance RTI policy at the EU level, it is safe to state that evaluations have become firmly 
institutionalised, in the sense of being prescribed and legally binding, with pre-defined 
standards and checklists for an effective, professional practice. 
The increased sophistication of evaluations worldwide has not only brought a refinement 
and proliferation of methods, since its early days, it has also led to the term being stretched 
(Weiss 1972), in some cases perhaps overstretched to cover any area of performance 
measurements, and to be used interchangeably with terms such as audits, impact assess-
ment, monitoring, etc. For the purpose of this study, to avoid confusion of terms and for 
the practical research task of delineating the basic population of evaluations from which 
the cases to be investigated will be sampled, a definition of evaluation that is based on its 
various functions will be used. This definition will be developed in the following. 
Functions of Evaluations 
Policy processes are traditionally considered to evolve through a chronological sequence of 
discrete stages, a perspective that is reflected in the well-known “policy cycle” concept 
(Lasswell 1956). It builds on the idea of a policy system that processes inputs (e.g. demand 
from citizens, information, etc.) from its environment, which are then transformed into 
outputs (e.g. laws, policies, programmes)1. Since the early work of Anderson 1975, Jones 
1977 and Jenkins 1978, the concept has been expanded during the past decades. The basic 
typology distinguishes the stages of agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, 
implementation, and evaluation (eventually leading to termination; see also Fig. 1). While 
this clearly oversimplifies a complex process, the policy cycle remains of central relevance 
in public policy analyses, as it provides a starting point and heuristic device for investigat-
ing complexities in the public policy making process. Jann and Wegrich (2008, p. 57)   
                                                 
1  This view was strongly influenced by Easton’s (1953) input-output concept, according to which the     
policy system remains a black box between political inputs and outputs. See also Lasswell (1956). 
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argue that the policy cycle has improved the understanding of “the complex preconditions, 
central factors influencing and diverse outcomes of the policy process”.  
Fig. 1: A simplified Version of a Policy Cycle 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Anderson (1975, p. 26), Jones (1977, pp. 10-12). 
 
Evaluations can be key events in the “lifetime” of a policy, in particular through providing 
different perspectives. In their basic forms, they can be “forward-looking” or anticipating 
(ex-ante), accompanying the policy (interim, monitoring) or “backward-looking” (ex-post). 
While ex-ante evaluations support the planning of a policy, ex-post evaluations are pre-
dominantly result-oriented and concluding. They may start immediately after the policy 
has been terminated, or years later. Interim evaluations are process-oriented and accom-
panying, addressing the development of the policy, allowing for corrections and adjust-
ments to improve it (Scriven 1991, Stufflebeam 2001, McDavid and Hawthorn 2006). 
Scriven (1991, p. 20) introduced the concepts of formative and summative evaluation: 
While formative evaluation aims at improving a policy, summative evaluation seeks to 
establish whether or not certain objectives have been achieved. It is often prescribed that 
ex-ante, interim and ex-post evaluations should be aligned systematically when develop-
ing, formulating and implementing a policy (e.g. Kuhlman and Holland 1995). This high-
lights the issue of time and timing, most likely one of most important aspects that are to be 
considered when developing a policy or programme and a key factor when it comes to ex-
plaining the up-take and use of evaluations. 
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In this thesis, evaluation shall be defined as the systematic application of research pro-
cedures to investigate particular policy interventions, which fulfils two main functions (as 
synthesised from Scriven, 1991, Chen 1996, Majone 1989, Barré 1999; Luukkonen 2002, 
Frederiksen et al. 2003, van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006, Holzinger 2002, Patton 1997, 
1998, Chelimsky 1997): 
 First, from a technical rational perspective, to assess to what extent the goals and ob-
jectives of particular policy interventions are being or have been achieved, with the in-
tention of informing actors about “what works” in order to improve future practice 
(Patton 2002). This may be termed the policy learning function. 
 Second, from an interpretative perspective, to reduce actors’ uncertainty and assist 
them with sense-making, by providing legitimate interpretations of and facilitating 
communication about the workings and merits of policy interventions. This may be 
termed the accountability function. In the evaluation context, accountability serves as 
means to secure legitimacy.  
Despite increasing demands for determining accountability and legitimising past actions, 
policy learning has become a strong theme, especially in political science literature (e.g. 
Bennett and Howlett 1992), but less so in evaluation research. Also in this study, the main 
focus will be put on the policy learning function of evaluation. In what follows, research 
on the policy learning function of evaluations shall therefore be reviewed in some depth. It 
is noted that this literature is vast and spans across many disciplines. More comprehensive 
reviews can be found, for example, in Biegelbauer (2013), Bothfeld (2008), Stone et al. 
(2001), Bandelow (2003), Bennett and Howlett (1992) and van der Knaap (1995). 
Research on learning in politics and policy making has flourished since the 1960s, most 
famously through the work of Deutsch (1969) as well as Argyris and Schön (1978), who 
took a systemic perspective for their research. This perspective has been expanded in re-
cent years, in particular since the 1990s, by putting more emphasis on multiple actors, 
agendas and various forms of learning (see e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992, van der Meer 
and Edelenbos 2006). Several important conceptual developments need to be highlighted 
in this regard. 
First, Sabatier (1988) has pointed out the importance of advocacy coalitions for policy 
learning. By policy learning, he means, following Heclo 1978, “relatively enduring alter-
ations of thought or behavioural intentions which result from experience and which are 
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concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives” (Sabatier 1988, p. 133). 
In what he terms advocacy coalitions, actors are aggregated who share a set of normative 
and causal beliefs, and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time. 
Second, Hall (1993) has developed the notion that political learning actually involves a 
form of social learning, in the sense of policy making as “a form of collective puzzlement 
on society's behalf” (Heclo 1974, p. 306), and in the sense of society learning as a whole. 
This kind of social learning is defined as “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or tech-
niques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated 
when policy changes as the result of such a process.” (Hall 1993, p. 278) This may result in 
learning at three levels: First-order change involving adjustments to the settings of basic 
instruments of policy (e.g. minimum lending rate, budget sizes); second-order change in-
volving changes of policy instruments (e.g. the introduction of a new system of monetary 
control); and third-order change involving shifts in policy goals (e.g. from Keynesian to 
monetarist macro-economic policy). Finally, Rose (1991, see also Rose 1993 and Stone 
2001) has put forward the concept of lesson-drawing, designating a possible outcome of 
policy learning. It means that ideas and knowledge about policies can be transferred to 
other situations, to another time or to another place. Policy-makers learn from the experi-
ence of others and from how they responded to a specific situation, to better deal with their 
own challenges and obstacles. 
For the purpose of this study, policy learning will be defined as the “change of policy rele-
vant knowledge, skills or attitudes, which are the result of new information or the assess-
ment of past, present or possible future policies” (Biegelbauer 2013, p. 50, see also Biegel-
bauer 2007). It is understood as a social process that is mediated by actors’ orientations and 
capabilities, interactions with other actors, and shaped by institutional conditions. This 
definition helps to narrow down the focus on the actual policy. It features a reflexive di-
mension, as the effects of a policy are reflected upon by the actors. Attention is put on the 
“assessment of policies”, thus covering evaluations.  
Following this definition, policy learning may occur during the process of an evaluation 
and in the course of follow-up activities after the results have been delivered – two parts 
which are clearly distinguished in this study. The term “evaluation process” is used to refer 
to the conducting of an evaluation, encompassing the full range of evaluation activities 
such as evaluation planning and design, data collection, analysis, drafting conclusions, and 
making recommendations. In contrast, the term “evaluation result” refers to the output of 
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an evaluation process, e.g. an evaluation (interim) report. Other relevant dimensions for the 
analysis, such as time and intent, will be discussed in the conceptual framework developed 
in Chapter 3. 
Features of Evaluations 
The functions of an evaluation, e.g. enhancing accountability and facilitating learning, can 
be reflected in the goals and questions that the evaluation seeks to answer. They usually 
address the necessity, design, implementation, efficiency and impact of a policy or pro-
gramme (e.g. Rossi et al. 2003). The focus of the evaluation design can be narrowed down 
to one single aspect or expanded to cover all areas. In case of impact assessments, for in-
stance, ex-ante evaluations aim to grasp the likely effects of proposed policy measures in 
advance. Ex-post evaluations are used to examine outputs and impacts in retrospect, i.e. 
after the implementation of the policy, with enough time elapsed. Implementation focused 
evaluations may assess the effectiveness of the organisation and administration of the poli-
cy, impact focused evaluations may look beyond the narrow context of the respective poli-
cy or programme, for instance, at its contribution to other policy areas or, in general, social 
betterment.  
Evaluations can, and are increasingly expected to consider multiple stakeholder perspec-
tives (e.g. provider vs. beneficiary of a programme), which has strong implications for data 
sources and data collection, the methods of analysis, and conclusions (Caracelli 2000, 
p. 178). Recent research emphasises the growing importance of stakeholder claims (John-
son et al. 2009). 
The evaluation approach, which might vary considerably towards particular aspects, such 
as being utilisation-focused or participatory, is tightly connected with the evaluation de-
sign. The typical starting point in a policy evaluation is the general logic of the intervention 
that is assumed to underlie the policy (also known as logic model or chart, as well as, theo-
ry of change, see, for example, McLaughlin et al. 1999, Ruegg and Feller 2003, Ruegg and 
Jordan 2007). It depicts linkages and interdependencies between inputs (e.g. financial and 
human resources), actions (e.g. measures, support), outputs (i.e. the immediate result of an 
action, such as the number of persons who received support), and outcomes (i.e. the chang-
es that occur directly or indirectly as a result of inputs, activities, and outputs, such as in-
creased knowledge; see e.g. Coryn et al. 2011).  
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The investigation itself may be designed to be more or less participatory (e.g. Patton 1997), 
that is to say, involving greater or lesser numbers of stakeholder or respective groups, to a 
more or less intensive degree. Stakeholder participation is also increasingly viewed as im-
portant for the utilisation of evaluations.  
In terms of methodology, data is typically collected using a mix of methods such as inter-
views with programme management, beneficiaries or stakeholders, case studies or surveys, 
or by drawing on existing data like internal and external statistics and monitoring data. For 
data analysis the full spectrum of methods from the social sciences can be used. Methods 
that are used especially often in evaluation research include peer reviews, input-output 
analyses, cost-benefit analyses, network analyses, econometrics, benchmarking, matching 
pair comparisons, group comparisons, and simulation approaches.  
Evaluations are today widely recognised as a part of strategic policy advice for improving 
public policies and are often associated with good governance and transparency – so much 
so that they have become a “pervasive phenomenon” (van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006, 
p. 210) in public administration, even more so because of their diversification in terms of 
design, assessment approaches, and methods used (van Langenhove 2010, p. 85). Follow-
ing Dahler-Larsen (2012), this development has led to more routinised and ritualistic eval-
uations in recent years, having become somewhat institutionalised in public policy. In this 
context, policy learning seems to be a bigger theme in the policy science literature than in 
evaluation research.  
Striking an appropriate balance between providing accountability and promoting policy 
learning through evaluation can be difficult (e.g. Lethonen 2005). The emphasis on either 
one of them depends on various factors, most notably, on the objective of the evaluation 
and information requirements, or in other words, on the uses that the evaluation is intended 
to have. For example, evaluations that are mainly geared towards accountability often re-
late strongly to the goals of different stakeholder groups (such as policy-makers or the ad-
ministration). This may entail a lack of a singular clear purpose and a display of conflicting 
perspectives, which may in turn hamper the policy learning effects of such evaluations.  
The dilemma and balancing act between accountability and policy learning has been a re-
current topic in research on evaluation use, and shall be at the focus of the following sec-
tion. To illuminate this issue, the idea of a research-policy-link based on a linear, one-way 
information dissemination process as suggested by the standard policy cycle will be      
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expanded into a broader perspective on policy making processes and participating actors. 
Recent developments in utilisation research that emphasise interaction and exchange will 
be explored, discussing different types of evaluation uses, new perspectives that call for a 
broader view on the consequences of evaluations, as well as, related conditioning factors 
and mechanisms. 
2.2 Evaluation Utilisation and Policy Making 
The literature on research utilisation, which emerged in the 1970s, following concerns re-
garding the actual use of evaluation findings (Weiss 1972, Alkin et al. 1979, Patton 1997), 
was long dominated by the idea of direct instrumental use to inform decision makers (see 
e.g. Mark and Henry 2004, Oliver 2008). It was argued that relevant findings would lead 
immediately to “specific actions such as program continuation, expansion, revision or ter-
mination” (Mark and Henry 2004, p. 36; see also Caracelli 2000). In part, this can be 
traced back to the early work of Caplan (1979), who introduced one of the most prominent 
explanations for research knowledge use and transfer, suggesting a linear process between 
two distinctive communities (researchers and policy makers), where research knowledge is 
directly translated into the decision making process (Epstein et al. 2005, p. 7).  
Weiss (1977, 1979), a leading scholar in evaluation research, extended Caplan’s view by 
examining the processes through which research may influence public policy making more 
closely (see also Nutley et al. 2007, p. 7). It was in particular Weiss (1979), who, in con-
trast to Caplan (1979), argued that research may not have a direct influence on policy mak-
ing at all. Instead, policy making is characterised by numerous interactions and indirect 
links between the various actors involved. Her work helped to better understand evaluation 
utilisation as a multi-dimensional phenomenon2, based on the interaction of different    
dimensions, encompassing instrumental use3, political or strategic use4, sometimes referred 
                                                 
2  Weiss (1979) identified and outlined seven ways, termed models, how research knowledge may enter the 
policy making process. The knowledge-driven model and the problem-solving model deal primarily with 
the instrumental use of research. The interactive model, the political model, the tactical model, the        
enlightenment model, and the intellectual enterprise model address the strategic and conceptual use of   
research. These models are discussed in detail in Weiss (1979, pp. 427). 
3  Instrumental use means “using evaluation results as direction for decision making" (Weiss et al. 2005, 
p. 13). Findings and recommendations are directly, observably translated into policies or programmes.  
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to as symbolic use, as well as, conceptual use5. Weiss (1977) refers to the latter as “en-
lightenment”, not leading to immediate decision making and action, but shaping policy 
choices indirectly, often informally, by e.g. learning about a programme and its implemen-
tation through an evaluation (Mark and Henry 2004). Enlightenment adds a temporal per-
spective to conceptual use, assuming that insights and ideas from evaluations may take 
time until they result in the questioning, challenging and altering of practices (Weiss 
2004). 
Several studies suggest that direct, instrumental use of research findings is rare6 and typi-
cally limited to the technical, operational level, whereas indirect, conceptual use and en-
lightenment are more common (Weiss 1972, 1980, 1998; Nutley 2003, Lehtonen 2005, 
Leviton and Hughes 1981, Stamm 2003, Patton 1997, 1998, 2002; Cousins and Leithwood 
1986). Research-based knowledge expands rather slowly, policy issues are complex, and 
evaluations are only one further piece in the mosaic of information and advice that policy 
maker use for strategic planning and decision making (e.g. Head 2008). Effects, in parti-
cular in the medium to long-term range, are difficult to tie back specifically to one single 
evaluation.  
The reasons for not drawing on evaluation findings may be perfectly rational and without 
malign intentions, encompassing a perceived lack of quality and new insights, irrelevant 
recommendations, an excessive length or inaccessible language of the report, or other, un-
expected events, such as an unforeseen termination of a programme (e.g. Stone 2001, 
Crewe and Young 2002, Alkin and Coyle 1988, see also Sandison 2005). The issue of time 
and timing, e.g. crucial decisions may have been delayed or already taken place, which is 
often referred to as (missed) “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon 1984), is amongst the 
most prominent explanations. Hence, many researchers conclude rather dryly that evalua-
                                                                                                                                                    
4  The most important forms of political use are symbolic use, meaning evaluations are used to justify deci-
sions that have already been made and to obtain legitimation (Weiss et al. 2005, Kirkhart 2000), and tac-
tical or strategic use, referring to a selective use of evaluation results in order to e.g. defend vested posi-
tions or interests (Huberman 1978).  
5  Conceptual use refers to a “gradual sedimentation of insights, theories, concepts and ways of looking at 
the world” (Weiss 1977, p. 534-535). 
6  “Pure instrumental use is not common. […] Decision makers pay attention to many things other than the 
evaluation of program effectiveness. They are interested in the desires of program participants and staff, 
the support of constituents, the claims of powerful people, the costs of change, the availability of staff 
with necessary capacities, and so on. Expectations for immediate and direct influence on policy and pro-
gram are often frustrated” (Weiss et al. 2005, p. 13). 
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tions are seldom used as the basis for immediate decisions (Weiss 2004, p. 161), remain 
limited in their capacity to create change (Pawson 2006, p. 10), and more often than not 
end up gathering dust on shelves (Forss et al. 2002, p. 31). 
Conceptualising the Effects of Evaluations: Evaluation Use and Evaluation Influence 
In this light, a growing amount of research has been conducted on the use and conse-
quences of evaluations in recent years, making it “the most researched area of evaluation” 
(Christie 2007, p. 8, Henry and Mark 2003). Non-instrumental uses of evaluations have 
become more prominent in the literature. Patton (1998) adds further spin to the discussion 
by highlighting the aspect of “process use”, arguing that action and learning may take 
place as a result of participating in evaluation procedures, and not only as a result of an 
evaluation, which may be termed as “findings use” (Alkin and Taut 2003, Henry and Mark 
2003). Patton’s work also laid the foundation for new research on utilisation-focused eval-
uation, a more practical perspective that puts the learning needs of evaluation users at 
front. Weiss et al. (2005) put another concept on the map: Imposed use, where funders dic-
tate what an agency does with its evaluation results in order to continue to be funded (see 
also Oliver 2008, p. 19). Other concepts that are discussed in the literature are the         
unintended consequences (e.g. Morell 2005), as well as, the misuse of evaluations (e.g. 
Cousins 2004). It is noted that misuse is, compared to non-use, rather intentional and not 
dependent on the attributes of the evaluation (Alkin and Coyle 1988). 
Reviews of the literature on evaluation use show that much emphasis has been put on defi-
nitions of evaluation use and on examining and cataloguing factors and conditions which 
may inhibit or enhance use (e.g. Fitzpatrick et al. 2004, Rossi et al. 2003, Leviton and 
Hughes 1981, Thompson and King 1981, Cousins and Leithwood 1986, Shulha and Cous-
ins 1997). These factors encompass e.g. the relevance of findings, the role and reputation 
of the evaluator7, methodological credibility and sophistication, communication quality and 
effectiveness (e.g. format, clarity, timing) and a clear dissemination plan. Nutley et al. 
(2007) group the factors that shape the use of research broadly under four umbrellas: The 
nature of the research applied (e.g. quality, timeliness), the personal characteristics of re-
searchers and potential research users (e.g. experience, skills), the link between research 
                                                 
7  For a detailed discussion of evaluator roles and identities see Ryan and Schwandt (2002). 
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and its users (e.g. amount and kind of contact), and the context for the use of research (pol-
icy context, practitioner context, and research context). The active involvement of stake-
holders in the design, communication and reporting of evaluations has also become a major 
topic (e.g. Johnson et al. 2009). It is frequently assumed that strong stakeholder participa-
tion, for instance, in the course of interviews, interim presentations or workshops, supports 
a better utilisation of evaluations. 
While much of the literature can thus be characterised as centring on the conduct of eval-
uations, their design, implementation, and other related attributes, much less, but growing, 
attention has been paid to institutional or contextual explanations when it comes to evalua-
tion use (Burr 2009, Boswell 2008, Lethonen 2005, Højlund 2014a, 2015). Calls for a 
stronger consideration of contextual factors have been voiced for some time now (see e.g. 
Shula and Cousins 1997, van der Knaap 1995, Nutley et al. 2007, Balthasar 2006, Peck and 
Gorzalski 2009, Sanderson 2000). However, explanations of evaluation use that look at 
institutions and context are scarce. Wells (2004, p. 8) makes this clear by stating that 
“[e]vidence-based policy making places too much emphasis on the role of causal processes 
in improving policy effectiveness and insufficient emphasis on the institutional and organi-
sational context in which policies are made and implemented”. 
Recently, research on the effects of evaluations has begun to look beyond the narrow cate-
gory of evaluation use, and to expand the view towards what is termed as “evaluation in-
fluence”, thus including more subtle, indirect and unintended effects of evaluations (e.g. 
Kirkhart 2000, Henry and Mark 2003, Weiss et al. 2005; see also Lethonen 2005, Poth 
2008, Burr 2009, Herbert 2014). One important shift in this direction has been made by 
Kirkhart (2000), who advocates for a change in focus from “use” to “influence”, which 
allows “to examine effects that are multidirectional, incremental, unintentional, and non-
instrumental, alongside those that are unidirectional, episodic, intended, and instrumental” 
(Kirkhart 2000, p. 7). She defines influence as “the capacity or power of persons or things 
to produce effects on others by intangible or indirect means” (Kirkhart 2000, p. 7), and it 
can be studied alongside three particular dimensions: The “source” of influence (process or 
results), “intention” (intended or unintended), and “time” (immediate, when the evaluation 
ends, or long-term). Patterns of impact may emerge over time and outside the context of 
the evaluation object (see also Moleko 2011, p. 161). The concept of “use”, in contrast, 
suggests a notion of evaluation that is intentional, instrumental, and can be deliberately 
controlled, e.g. by means of dissemination and outreach activities. Patton (1998), Alkin 
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and Taut (2003) view evaluation use as a process in which an evaluation affects intended 
users in intended ways within a specific timeframe. They conclude that “the concept of 
influence adds to the concept of use in instances in which an evaluation has una-
ware/unintended impacts” (Alkin and Taut 2003, p. 9).  
Others followed Kirkhart’s (2000) call for a focus on influence in evaluation research. 
Henry and Mark (2003; see also Mark and Henry 2004) developed and discussed catego-
ries for factors and mechanism which may trigger the influence of evaluations. This ap-
proach is somewhat different from Kirkhart’s: While she suggests using the concept of 
influence as an extension to the concept of use, Henry and Mark (2004) argue that influ-
ence could (also) be used as replacement for use, attempting to provide a more systemic 
view to tell the whole story of change (Mark 2011; see also Herbert 2014). They extended 
the notion of evaluation influence to cover three levels at which influence might occur: The 
individual level of influence concerns the change in the thoughts or actions of actors as a 
result of having participated in an evaluation or having read an evaluation report. The in-
terpersonal level refers to the effect of the evaluation on the relationship between individu-
al actors. The collective level refers to the change at the organisational or inter-
organisational level, as well as, to collective-level policy change as a result of the process 
or findings of an evaluation (Mark and Henry 2004). Henry and Mark suggest mechanisms 
that may underlie the influence of evaluations (e.g. elaboration, persuasion, standard set-
ting, etc.), some of which could be subsumed under more general processes, e.g. learning, 
taking action. This view emphasises the dual role of learning as an outcome of evaluation, 
as well as, the process or mechanism that stimulates other outcomes, e.g. dialogue and dis-
cussion (Mark and Henry 2004, p. 43), also argumentation and debate, etc.  
Within a short period of time, a body of literature (e.g. Cowley and Good 2010, Oliver 
2008, Christie 2007, Lethonen 2005) has begun to emerge that applies the concept of influ-
ence to examine the effects of evaluations. However, the existing research in this regard is 
far from conclusive (e.g. Herbert 2014, Herbert 2011, Allen 2010), paying e.g. insufficient 
attention to interactions and the role of governance in policy making processes. Debates 
remain whether the concept of influence will ever be able to replace the concept of use 
(e.g. Gibbons 2010).  
Somewhat anticipating this development, Weiss (1998) argues that the problems with the 
use of evaluations may not be solved yet, “but we are thinking about it in more interesting 
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ways” (Weiss 1998b, p. 23). Following Herbert (2014) and her comprehensive literature 
review on the topic of evaluation influence, the notion of influence “enables researchers to 
better describe and understand what occurs during and following an evaluation” (Herbert 
2014, p. 413). 
In sum, the effects of evaluations in policy making constitute a well-established research 
area. Research has largely developed around four types of evaluation use (i.e., instrumen-
tal, strategic, conceptual and process use) and focuses on the identification and assessment 
of factors and conditions which may affect potential use. Evaluations have become a 
somewhat ritualised activity in many policy fields. However, institutional and contextual 
explanations of evaluation use or non-use are hardly found. This study attempts to investi-
gate the importance of the institutional context in which evaluations are located, and its 
implications for the use of evaluations. It also draws on the conceptual notion of evaluation 
influence, which includes effects of evaluations in broader terms. Henceforward in this 
study, the term “effects” will be used to designate the deliberate “use”, as well as, the more 
general “influence” of evaluations. 
Policy Making and Governance  
Parallel to the expansion and diversification of research on the utilisation of evaluations, 
literature on the research-policy-link has moved away from the “one-way” information 
dissemination process (see e.g. Wingens 1990, Gibson 2003). Instead, multiple relations 
and interactions between the various actors in a policy making process are examined (e.g. 
Blanco et al. 2009, Nutley et al. 2002, Stone et al. 2001, Sutton 1999, Garrett and Islam 
1998). This shift has been supported by changing views in political science on the overall 
policy making process. The traditional perspective of policy making as a rational problem-
solving and sequential decision making process has increasingly been challenged (see e.g. 
Sutton 1999, Lindblom 1959, Sabatier 1988, 1993, Epstein 2005, de Vibe et al. 2002). The 
important issue raised is that the “divided, dichotomous and linear sequence” of policy 
making (Stone et al. 2001, p. 13), as suggested by the policy cycle, is unlikely. On the con-
trary, policy making is rather a “messy” process (Stone et al. 2001), and the stages may 
overlap, “meshed and entangled in an on-going process” (Jann and Wegrich 2008, p. 44). 
Although still widely applied in public policy research, the idea of policy making as a top-
down process is moving away from the focus, and is increasingly replaced by the idea of 
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policy making as negotiation amongst many interacting actors – results being conditioned 
by e.g. the constellation, interest and power of the involved actors (e.g. Kevenhörster 2006, 
Scharpf 1997, Nutley et al. 2002, Stone et al. 2001).  
Hence, “policy networks” have become a key concept in public policy analysis that pro-
vides a more nuanced view on policy making processes (e.g. Blanco et al. 2009, Rhodes 
2006, Mayntz 2003, Börzel 1998, Kickert et al. 1997). The policy network concept moves 
away from the idea of policy making being unilaterally controlled by governments or pub-
lic bodies to a view that prominently includes actors such as private businesses, interest 
groups and experts. The “transition from government to governance” (e.g. Jann and 
Wegrich 2008, p. 57, Rhodes 1994) has also become a popular topic, meaning the shift 
from government by the unitary state, steered through hierarchy and bureaucracy, towards 
governance by and through interactions between state and non-state actors, where the daily 
process of policy making is increasingly informal and heterogeneous (Rhodes 2006).    
According to Rhodes (2006, p. 426), policy networks can thus be defined as … 
“… sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and 
other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests 
in public policy-making and implementation. These actors are interdependent and 
policy emerges from the interactions between them.” 
In the literature on policy networks and governance, various understandings (sometimes 
also referred to as “schools”, see e.g. Börzel 1998, Rhodes 2006, Blanco et al. 2009) of 
policy networks can be identified. A mostly British and North American group of scholars 
(e.g. Rhodes, Marsh) conceive of policy networks as platforms of interest intermediation, 
and hence, view it as an overarching concept. In contrast, the “German school” (or “gov-
ernance school”; e.g. Mayntz, Scharpf) conceives of policy networks as a specific form of 
governance. From the interest intermediation perspective, networks are interpreted as an 
framework for analysing and describing changes in state/society relations, whereas the 
“governance school” considers networks as particular forms of interaction between the 
state and society based on non-hierarchical forms of coordination (see e.g. Börzel 1998, 
Rhodes 2006, Raab and Kenis 2008). Apart from these two perspectives, various other 
typologies to structure the literature have been put forward, with the boundaries between 
different approaches often porous or overlapping. 
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The concept of governance has traditionally been used to refer to the steering of actions of 
political authorities (Mayntz 2003, p. 27). Recently this has changed. Today, political gov-
ernance is used in both a wider, more general, and in a narrower sense. In its wider mean-
ing, governance refers to “the different modes of co-ordinating individual actions, or basic 
forms of social order”. The narrower view promotes a new, co-operative way of governing 
(Mayntz 2003, p. 27). It encompasses all of the institutional settings and negotiation pro-
cesses between state and non-state actors (e.g. non-governmental organisations, compa-
nies, interest groups, etc.). Here, the influence of special-interest groups in public policy 
making, such as lobbies or other private or public stakeholders, is stressed. In countries 
such as Austria and Germany, social partnership, a system of negotiation between business 
and labour interest organisations, as well as, government, plays a particularly important 
role in day-to-day policy making, an issue that is addressed in the analysis in this thesis. 
The emergence of New Public Management, with growing shifts from a centralised to a 
more decentralised public sector structure (“agencification”), the increased push for      
accountability, as well as, the growing interest in policy learning through evaluations, is 
somewhat contrasted by expanding governance processes that engage wider groups of 
stakeholders. Given the growing complexity in many policy fields, other state and non-
state actors gain more relevance in governance and policy making processes. Evidence-
based approaches may use existing evidence that is derived from, for instance, policy eval-
uations, but the decision making may still be influenced by personal attitudes or institu-
tional boundaries. The field of RTI policy making, which serves as the case in point for the 
empirical analysis in this study, is confronted with high complexity and rapid change. Poli-
cies are formulated on various government levels and connect strongly to other policy are-
as such as science, education or employment. The issue of context, here in particular refer-
ring to policy settings, actors and their roles, and institutional characteristics, is put into 
focus, as it should be taken into consideration when assessing the effects of evaluations.  
Thus, the study at hand will build on concepts and advances in research on the utilisation 
of evaluations and on policy making in three main ways: First, to identify effects of evalu-
ations on policy making and actor behaviour (research question 1). Second, to explore 
pathways of effect that emerge during the evaluation process and after results have been 
presented (research question 2). Third, to explain what factors and mechanisms condition 
the effects of evaluation processes and results on policy making and actors behaviour   
(research question 3). The main focus will be put not on the evaluations as such (e.g. their 
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quality or timeliness of findings), but on the involved actors (e.g. their interests, percep-
tions and preferences), their interactions, and on the institutional context in which they are 
embedded (e.g. policy design, legal frameworks, administrative roles, responsibilities in 
public policy making). 
2.3 Actors and Institutions 
The previous sections of this literature review have discussed the topics of evaluation and 
evaluation utilisation. Since the objective of this thesis is to illuminate the effects of evalu-
ations, and the various factors and mechanism that condition these effects, a framework to 
examine pertinent questions in terms that meaningfully connect to the state of research in 
the social sciences is needed. For this purpose, an institutionalist approach – specifically an 
actor-centred institutionalist approach – is chosen, because it fits well with the specialised 
literature on evaluations and, at the same time, offers a promising perspective to advance 
the understanding of institutional factors that shape the effects of evaluations. To set out 
these conceptual underpinnings, the following sections will provide, first, a rough over-
view of basic concepts of institutionalism. Second, the main lines of development in insti-
tutionalist theorising in the social sciences will be traced. Against that background, finally, 
the main tenets of actor-centred institutionalism, on which the conceptual framework 
builds, will be presented and discussed.  
Basic Concepts of Institutionalism 
Institutionalism represents an elaborate effort to come to terms with one of the most semi-
nal puzzles in the social sciences: What shapes human behaviour? Is it more a function of 
human agency, i.e. the capacity of actors to act independently, according to their free 
choices, or is it more a function of social structures, i.e. relatively stable context conditions 
that restrict and direct human action? The debate about this issue is well known under the 
name of structure versus agency. 
In the attempt to come to a solution, many variants of institutionalist theorising have been 
developed. Some of them lean strongly towards structuralist explanations, such as the phe-
nomenological approach in sociological institutionalism, developed by John Meyer and 
colleagues (see e.g. Meyer et al. 1987; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Others confer relative-
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ly much freedom of choice on actors, such as rational choice institutionalism or theories on 
institutional entrepreneurship in sociological institutionalism (e.g. DiMaggio 1988, Rao 
1998). At the same time, many attempts have been made to reconcile structure and agency 
and develop more balanced, or circular, conceptualisations. 
Even though institutionalist approaches are highly diverse, they all have two basic con-
cepts in common: Institutions, as the term “institutionalism” implies, and actors. Institu-
tions stand for the aspect of social structures that explain human behaviour. Actors stand 
for the aspect of agency, i.e. the ability to act, more or less autonomously. Beyond these 
broad commonalities, however, definitions of institutions and actors vary considerably 
amongst strands of institutionalism, and indeed are a frequent issue of contention. For ex-
ample, institutions may be defined as taken-for-granted and enduring sets of practices (e.g. 
Greenwood et al. 2008) or, quite contrarily, as human-devised rules of the game of society 
(e.g. North 1994). Actors may be understood in naturalist terms, as human individuals who 
may join together with others to form composite actors (e.g. Lawrence et al. 2011). Con-
versely, actors may also be understood as fundamentally contingent: Human individuals, 
organisations and nation states are placed at one and the same conceptual level as social 
constructions. From such a perspective, actors themselves are conceptualised as institutions 
(e.g. Meyer and Jepperson 2000). 
It is hence appropriate to say that institutionalism is not an integrated theory with a wholly 
coherent body of thought. It could rather be described as a long-standing area of inquiry 
with a shared interest in the explanation of human behaviour and in the stability or change 
of social structures. To clarify the conceptual underpinnings that will be used in this study, 
it therefore makes sense to provide a reiteration of the main lines of development in institu-
tionalist theorising, and then to focus on the specific approach of actor-centred institution-
alism that will used in this study. This will be done in the following. 
Lines of Development in Institutionalist Theorising  
In the development of institutionalism in the social sciences, two main strands are usually 
distinguished: So-called “old” (e.g. Selznick 1966) and “new” (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 
1991) institutionalism. Until the 1950s, “old” institutionalism dominated much of the liter-
ature. Research focused primarily on the emergence and development of political and for-
mal-legal structures (Peters 2011, Enserink et al. 2013, Evers 2004, Peters et al. 2005). 
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During the 1960s and 1970s, research emphasis in the social sciences and especially in 
political science, shifted away from institutionalist concerns and instead put the study of 
political behaviour, in particular the observable behaviours of individuals and groups, cen-
tre stage. “Behaviouralism” was thus introduced to political analysis (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992). 
Scholars such as March and Olsen (1984, 1989) criticised the reductionist and utilitarian 
character of this approach, which largely neglected organisational structures and normative 
and symbolical causes of individual behaviour. As a response to the increasing dominance 
of behaviourist, individualist, and rationalist approaches, “new” institutionalism (a term 
coined by March and Olson, 1984), was thus launched to refocus on the role of institutions 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, March and Olsen 1984, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). New 
institutionalism draws attention to formal and informal rules that guide and constrain actor 
behaviour. As March and Olsen (1989, p. 159) put it: 
“… political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or in-
stead of, by calculated interest; politics is organised around the construction and 
interpretations of meaning as well as, or instead of , the making of choices; rou-
tines, rules and forms evolve through history-dependent processes that do not re-
liably and quickly reach unique equilibria; the institutions of politics are not sim-
ple echoes of social forces; and the polity is something different from, or more 
than, an arena for competition among rival interests. In short, the organisation of 
political life makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history”. 
Following this reasoning, new institutionalism seeks to understand the relationship be-
tween individual agency and social structures more adequately. It argues that actors are not 
only driven by their self-interest and by the “logic of consequentiality” but also by “struc-
tures of meaning” that enable actors to act “according to prescriptive rules of appropriate-
ness” (March and Olsen 1989, pp. 160-161; 2005, p. 4). This “appropriateness” is based on 
the “collection of values by which decisions and behaviours of members are shaped”    
(Peters 1996, p. 205; see also Ginosar 2012). Here, the importance of informal institutions 
is highlighted, which can constrain political behaviour in much the same manner as formal 
legal requirements (March and Olsen 1984). The interplay between formal and informal 
institutions is sometimes referred to as the “rules of the game” (North 1990, p. 3). Organis-
ing them into a structure or pattern draws on the concept of “institutional logics” (e.g. 
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Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton et al. 2012, Friedland 2013), which encompasses 
collective beliefs (or “belief systems”), rules and related practices that shape the percep-
tions and preferences, i.e. “world views”, of and construct meanings for actors. While they 
provide frames of reference for sense-making, they also, in particular, work as blueprints 
for organisational practices (Friedland and Alford 1991). 
Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish between three main perspectives of new institutional-
ism: Rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism. Rational choice institu-
tionalism puts weight on the “logic of consequentiality” and the idea that actors are ration-
al, self-interested and follow their preferences within institutions. The institutional context 
is constructed based on rational choices, thus constraining actors by narrowing down the 
possibilities for action. By contrast, sociological institutionalism focuses on the “logic of 
appropriateness” as basis for action within institutions. Institutions are defined as cultural 
constructions that reflect norms and values, i.e. “code of conduct”, “ways of doing things”, 
and determine the identity of individuals and groups. In other words, they are a “relatively 
enduring collections of rules and organised practices” (March and Olsen 2006, p. 5, and 
e.g. Barnes et al. 2003, p. 279), underscoring the importance of informal rules and norms. 
Put simply, the “logic of appropriateness” is epitomised in the question: What would a 
person like me to do in a situation like this? Historical institutionalism takes a middle 
ground between these perspectives. It incorporates a broad definition of institutions and 
focuses on the history and genesis of institutions and their consequences in the present 
time, thus suggesting path dependency and persistence of institutions (e.g. Thulstrup et al. 
2005). It also emphasises “critical junctures” in time from which directions may change to 
shape institutions or policies. 
As has been shown above, many concepts are shared across institutionalism, resulting in 
some overlap between different strands of institutionalist thinking (e.g. Thelen 1999). The 
core assumption that unites new institutionalists, however, is that institutions matter in 
shaping social and political outcomes (Peters 2011, Hall and Taylor 1996). Peters (2011, 
19pp) delineates four common features of new institutionalism. First, institutions are a 
structural part of a society or polity. This structure consists of formal (e.g. based on legal 
frameworks) and informal (e.g. a set of shared norms) institutions. Second, institutions 
show some stability over time. Third, the institutional structure affects individual          
behaviour, implying some sort of constraint on actors. Finally, the institutional structure is 
associated with some sense of shared values and meaning amongst actors.  
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An important feature of institutions is that they reduce uncertainty, thus, in context of gov-
ernment activities, enhancing legitimacy of policy decision making and public spending. 
Accountability, for instance based on evaluation, becomes what might be referred to as a, 
laid down in the form of rules, standards, and structures, underpinning ceremonially adopt-
ed, “rationalized myth” in institutions’ instrumental rationality (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
This perspective is well documented in the evaluation literature under the terms “political” 
or “symbolic” evaluation. The study at hand, however, does not consider evaluations as 
institutions in themselves. They are understood to rest on diverse sets of institutions, which 
for example stipulate why, when and how to evaluate (e.g. Gläser et al. 2002). Institutions 
help to secure legitimacy and accountability, and evaluations are but one way of how this 
is done. 
The conceptual framework of this thesis builds on actor-centred institutionalism put for-
ward by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) and Scharpf (1997). It is a variant of institutionalism 
that draws in particular from rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism 
(e.g. Thulstrup et al. 2005). According to Scharpf (1997, p. 43), … 
“… the primary business of interaction-oriented policy research within the 
framework of actor-centred institutionalism is to explain past policy choices and 
to produce systematic knowledge that may be useful for developing politically 
feasible policy recommendations or for designing institutions that will generally 
favour the formation and implementation of public-interest-oriented policy”. 
Notably, actor-centred institutionalism gives equal weight to strategic actions of actors, 
who communicate and interact with each other, and to the shaping effects of institutional 
structures. In the following, after some clarification of its theoretical underpinnings, the 
basic tenets of actor-centred institutionalism will be outlined and the features that are spe-
cific for actor-centred institutionalism discussed. 
Actor-Centred Institutionalism 
In actor-centred institutionalism, institutions are defined as comprising formal (“rules-in-
form”), as well as, informal institutions (“rules-in-use”). According to Scharpf (1997, 
p. 39), actors … 
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“… depend on socially constructed rules to orient their actions in otherwise  
chaotic environments and because, if they in fact perform this function, these 
rules must be ‘common knowledge’ among the actors and hence relatively acces-
sible to researchers as well”. 
The genesis and development of institutions is, as assumed by historical institutionalism, 
path-dependent. Moreover, it is emphasised that institutions may vary not only in time, but 
also in place (e.g. cross-nationally, Scharpf 1997, p. 41). 
Institutions lay out a set of actions that may be chosen and the payoffs for these actions, 
thus affecting strategic choices (Scharpf 1997). The more an institution is able to solve 
problems for the actors, and the fewer gains actors expect from institutional change, the 
more robust an institution tends to be (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 8). However, as Scharpf 
argues (1997, p. 21), human actors are not rule-following automata or marionettes (Werle 
1998, p. 7). Actors are intelligent and have interests and preferences of their own. Depend-
ing on the issue or situation, actors might evade or bend rules that are widely shared by 
others, for instance by the organisation that they represent, and might be willing to risk 
sanctions for violating rules. 
The reasons why institutions matter can be summarised from two distinct perspectives: The 
genesis and the consequences of institutions (e.g. Scharpf 2000). From a genesis perspec-
tive, institutions are understood as path-dependent, thus conveying some sort of order, con-
tinuity, stability, predictability, and security (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991). By 
the same token, this marks institutions as persistent and highly resistant to change. Institu-
tions are taken for granted and may hinder potential change, “because they structure the 
very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 
8). Changing rules, in particular informal ones, such as social norms, is assumed to be vir-
tually impossible.  
However, the narrow focus on regulatory aspects, as it is assumed in actor-centred institu-
tionalism, helps to understand institutions not only as results of evolutionary change. Insti-
tutions can be created and changed by purposeful actions (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, p. 44; 
Scharpf 1997, p. 41; see also North 1990, Gläser et al. 2002). The consequential perspec-
tive draws on the assumption that institutions stimulate, enable and restrict, but do not de-
termine actors’ behaviour (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, p. 45, Scharpf 1997, p. 38). Institu-
tions are only one set of factors that affect the interactions amongst policy actors (Scharpf 
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2000, see also Gläser et al. 2002). They give actors an idea about what they are expected to 
do or – as investigated in this study – about how they are performing (e.g. as assessed by 
evaluations). On the other hand, actors get a better sense of what other actors are doing, are 
planning to do, or are potentially capable of doing.  
As noted by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995, p. 46), an analysis of structures without reference 
to actors is as handicapped as an analysis of actors’ behaviour without reference to struc-
tures (see also van Lieshout 2008). While the institutional context is conceptualised as the 
remote cause for certain behaviours, actors, their orientations and interaction choices are 
viewed as the proximate causes (Scharpf 1997, pp. 38-39). Actor-centred institutionalism 
distinguishes between individual and composite actors. Composite actors are aggregates of 
individuals that have “a capacity for intentional action at a level above the individuals in-
volved” (Scharpf 1997, p. 52). There are two kinds of composite actors: Collective actors 
and corporate actors. Collective actors, such as clubs, coalitions, movements and associa-
tions, are dependent on and guided by the preferences of their members. Corporate actors 
have a high degree of autonomy from the ultimate beneficiaries of their action. Their “ac-
tivities are carried out by staff members whose own private preferences are supposed to be 
neutralised by employment contracts” (Scharpf 1997, p. 54). Corporate actors (in this study 
e.g. ministries, agencies, research organisations) constitute the main actors in policy pro-
cesses (Mayntz and Scharpf, p. 44, Bähr 2010). Following Coleman (1974), Scharpf de-
fines them as a multitude of people who are formally organised, typically “top down”, 
structured by rules and capable of purposeful action. Strategy choices are decoupled from 
individual preferences; actions are undertaken in the name of the organisation. Individual 
actors are expected “to follow the rules adopted by central decision processes and the hier-
archical directives of the leadership” (Scharpf 1997, p. 56). Werle (1988, p. 7) assumes 
that those who act on behalf of a composite actor will evaluate the outcomes of choices 
according to the principles and values of that composite actor.  
Actors are characterised by specific capabilities and action orientations (Scharpf 1997, 
p. 43). Capabilities refer to aspects such as resources (e.g. financial means, personnel, 
knowledge, rights they possess, etc.), specific skills, privileged access to information, and 
technological capabilities. Of particular interest are resources that are created by institu-
tional rules (e.g. competencies, participation rights, veto rights, etc.). Action orientations 
are constituted by the actors’ perceptions and preferences in a specific situation. Percep-
tions refer to the actors’ cognition, their perceived reality, assumed cause and effect rela-
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tionships and optional courses of action. Preferences refer to the motivation of actors, who 
are driven by individual or institutional self-interest, normative orientations and identities 
(Scharpf 1997). In particular, actors are motivated by interaction orientations which indi-
cate how actors relate to each other. According to Scharpf (1997, p. 87) the most likely 
interaction orientations to expect are individualism, solidarity (e.g. aiming at mutual bene-
fits) and competition. 
In contrast to rational choice approaches, actor-centred institutionalism does not assume 
perfectly rational behaviour that maximises benefits and is based on full information about 
options for the choice of strategies. Instead, it draws on the concept of “bounded rationali-
ty” (Simon 1957; see also March 1978 [“calculated rationality”]), which stresses the     
importance of uncertainty (e.g. limited information, time) and cognitive limits (e.g. human 
ability to consider and assess all relevant data) in decision making. Similarly, and of ut-
most importance for the thesis objectives, it is argued that actors’ action orientations can be 
relatively stable, but they may also change through learning and persuasion (Scharpf 1997, 
p. 43). Actors’ orientations, under conditions of bounded rationality, constitute “compel-
ling reasons” for choosing and performing a particular action (Hedstrøm 2005). Conse-
quently, actors do not seek maximal utility, but an outcome that is satisfactory or “good 
enough”. 
Actor constellations encompass the actors involved in particular policy interactions, their 
strategy options, the possible outcomes associated with strategy combinations (“payoffs”), 
and the preferences of the actors concerning these outcomes. While actor constellations 
reflect the various actor preferences and thus the level of potential conflicts, the modes of 
interaction between actors describe how these conflicts can be resolved: Unilateral action, 
negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical direction (Scharpf 1997, p. 72).  
These modes of interaction can take place in different institutional settings: Anarchic 
fields, networks, associations, and organisations. These settings differ in their capacity to 
support various modes of interaction. While unilateral action requires only minimal institu-
tional support, negotiations need certain structures that ensure the binding character of 
agreements. Decisions by majority vote or by hierarchical direction require more formal 
institutional settings. Organisations are able to support all four modes of interaction.  
Two things are important to note here: First, these modes of interaction and institutional 
settings constitute ideal types that are hardly found in real-life politics. Combinations are 
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rather common (Benz 2001, Börzel and Risse 2010). Second, non-hierarchical modes such 
as negotiation may be embedded in hierarchical structures in which state and non-state 
actors interact under what may be termed as the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997, 
Börzel and Risse 2012). It indicates the influence that authorities, e.g. governments, have 
on non-state actors through the “threat” of executive or legislative intervention. They may 
intervene top-down in legislation and related decision making processes, e.g. if negotia-
tions fail. In this study, this is of particular importance due to the increasing delegation of 
legislation in public administration and policy regulation to a growing amount of autono-
mous agencies (“agencification”). 
In sum, actor-centred institutionalism provides a heuristic framework to assess interests, 
motives and circumstances in dynamic policy fields such as research, technology and in-
novation, especially when it comes to informal institutions and their interaction with for-
mal rules and laws. It encompasses a rather broad scope, as it combines an actor-related 
with an institutional perspective and puts the interplay of relevant policy actors into the 
focus of analysis. Attention is drawn to governance, which is understood as an interactive 
process through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and implemented 
(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, Scharpf 1997; see also Börzel 1998, 2010). Governance en-
compasses all of the institutional settings and negotiation processes between state and non-
state actors (e.g. interest groups). 
A central assumption of actor-centred institutionalism is that actors behave intentionally, 
based on their socially constructed preferences and perceptions, within boundaries that are 
created by the institutional setting (Scharpf 2000, pp. 47-51). Simon (2000) summarises 
this as the “inner environment” of people’s minds that shapes actor behaviour, as does the 
“outer environment” of the world in which they act. Actors have their agendas, they inter-
act and make decisions strategically to realise these agendas. They anticipate how their 
own actions affect other actors, what they do and how they might respond. The institution-
al context mediates the interaction. Because institutions are not considered to have a de-
terministic influence, and because there cannot be rules and norms that cover all eventuali-
ties, actors, in particular individuals, possess considerable leeway for action. Actions and 
interactions shape, more or less intentionally, institutions as they are understood in this 
study. 
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2.4 Summary and Relevance of the Literature to this Study 
The importance of evaluations to inform public policy making has increased considerably 
during the last decades, and the demand is expected to grow further. This has been accom-
panied by a growing line of research that raises questions about the actual consequences of 
evaluations, or the lack of such consequences, on public policy making. It is claimed that 
evaluations are often reduced to a routinised exercise in legitimation, whereas the learning 
from and the effects of evaluations have been found somewhat unsatisfying. The concept 
of policy learning helps to shed light on the reasons for the low up-take of evaluations. 
The use of evaluations is among the most researched topics about evaluation, with roots 
dating back to the 1970’s. While the literature on use and utilisation has grown and contin-
ued to offer interesting and novel insights, much of the research has put emphasis on the 
conduct of evaluations, their implementation and other related attributes. Less, but recent, 
attention has been paid to context-related factors, the role of actors, interactions amongst 
them, and institutionalised rules. In this regard, newer perspectives in evaluation research 
argue for a change in focus from the concept of “use” to a broader view on the “influence” 
of evaluations, as well as, related conditioning factors and mechanisms.  
Similarly, policy analyses pay more attention to the interaction and bargaining between 
diverse actors in a policy field. The idea of a research-policy-link based on a linear, one-
way information dissemination process is increasingly challenged. Stages in policy making 
processes are often not in chronological order but rather overlap and feedback from one 
another. Given the growing complexity in many policy fields and on-going shifts from 
centralised to decentralised public control, concepts such as policy networks and govern-
ance have been introduced to support the analysis of public policy making processes.  
While the literature has acknowledged the increasing importance of looking beyond nar-
row concepts and disciplinary boundaries to take a broader view on the effects of evalua-
tion and what shapes them, the existing empirical evidence is still rather scarce. Institu-
tional theory, which seeks to better understand the pressures for and against change,     
provides a useful perspective to advance evaluation research in this regard. Formal and 
informal institutions possess substantial explanatory power with respect to governance, 
steering and accountability. Institutions reduce uncertainty, thus enhance legitimacy of 
policy making – often through evaluations. In this regard, the concept of policy learning 
complements the concept of institutionalism. While institutions are seen as persistent and 
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highly resistant to change, policy learning provides a conceptual lens to capture and ex-
plain policy changes. Institutional theory helps to develop a broad perspective to cover the 
whole policy cycle, in particular the pre-conditions that shape the phase of planning and 
setting-up an evaluation. Actor-centred institutionalism seems particularly well suited to 
the task of assessing and explaining how institutional structures, as well as actor prefer-
ences and behaviours, may change in response to an external impulse such as an evalua-
tion. 
Building on this literature review, the current study attempts to further knowledge and  
understanding of the effects of policy evaluations by examining how they are shaped by 
actor-related, institution-related and evaluation-related factors and mechanisms. It will 
combine building blocks from the concept of “policy learning” in political science (e.g. 
Biegelbauer 2007, 2013), from actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, 
Scharpf 1997, 2000), from newer perspectives in the evaluation literature (e.g. Kirkhart 
2000, Henry and Mark 2003), as well as from research that uses institutional perspectives 
to assess evaluation consequences (e.g. Lethonen 2005, Højlund 2015). These perspectives 
are combined to get a better understanding of the effects of policy evaluations under     
various conditions. 
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3 A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Contin-
gent Effects of Policy Evaluation 
Chapter 2 has introduced the central concepts of functions and features of evaluation, eval-
uation use and evaluation influence, policy making and governance, as well as, on actor-
centred institutionalism, on which this study will draw to analyse the effects of evaluations 
in a specific policy field. This chapter aims to develop of a detailed conceptual framework 
to guide this analysis.  
The framework will be developed in two steps. First, in Section 3.1, the conceptual lens of 
“policy learning” will be presented and discussed to investigate the effects of evaluations 
and to support an understanding of actors’ learning processes that lead to changes in policy 
making. Second, in Section 3.2, factors and mechanisms that may condition the effects of 
evaluation processes and results will be outlined, in particular with regard to policy learn-
ing. Finally, Section 3.3 summarises the main points from the previous sections and paves 
the way for the empirical analysis.  
3.1 Effects of Policy Evaluations 
The first research question of this study, as stated in the introduction, is: “What effects of 
evaluation processes and results on the RTI policy making process in general, and on the 
behaviour of actors in particular, can be discerned?” 
Evaluations can support the development and implementation of public policies by deliver-
ing information and evidence “on performance to enhance accountability” (i.e. fulfilling an 
accountability function) and “of what works to inform policy learning and improvement” 
(i.e. fulfilling a policy learning function; Sanderson 2002, p. 5). The primary focus of this 
study is on the contributions of evaluations to policy learning. Thereby policy learning is 
defined according to Biegelbauer (2007, 2013), as the “change of policy relevant 
knowledge, skills or attitudes, which are the result of new information or the assessment of 
past, present or possible future policies” (Biegelbauer 2013, p. 50). 
The reasons for the focus on policy learning are as follows. First, policy learning is a uni-
fying concept that is explicit and well-established in the literature. It links to recent       
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advances in evaluation research, such as the notion of evaluation influence, and puts focus 
on institutional structures and conditions. Second, it helps to look beyond the technical,     
operational learning, where changes take place only in instruments, shedding light on the 
subtle, gradually emerging ways and dynamics through which learning from an evaluation 
can make a difference. Third, it became clear in the course of the interviews that respond-
ents themselves often bring up the idea of “learning from evaluations”, whereas they have 
more difficulty to relate to the notions of evaluation “effects”, “use”, or “influence”. Final-
ly, continuous learning and change are key themes in the RTI policy field itself. This pro-
vides the opportunity to explore how the importance of learning in the policy field plays 
out in the evaluation of relevant policies. Mytelka and Smith (2002) suggest a strong con-
nection between policy learning and innovation theory, labelling it as an interactive and co-
evolving process. 
The concept of policy learning, as employed in this study, includes the possibility that pol-
icy learning has taken place, but nevertheless, with regard to the specific policy in ques-
tion, no action was taken, no decision was made, no documents were changed (see e.g. 
Biegelbauer 2013). In other words, the definition of policy learning is not restricted to pol-
icy change. It also includes the possibility of, for example, individual actors changing their 
mind-sets, or the involved organisations changing internal practices that are not directly 
related to the evaluated policy. For instance, policy actors may acknowledge learning from 
interviews during the evaluation process or from reading an evaluation report, but opt 
against the implementation of findings, because of a low priority given to this policy in the 
current agenda. The institutional setting may cast a “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997) 
over learning processes, resulting from e.g. political considerations and dynamics at the 
national and international level, the monitoring of delegated policy regulation, (past) deci-
sions in the organisation, etc. (e.g. Dunlop and Radaelli 2011).  
Furthermore, it is important to stress that policy change is complex and determined by 
many factors such as budget constraints or other structural and procedural influences, for 
instance, specialisation, fragmentation of issues, reliance on routines, etc. (Weiss 1983, p. 
221), and evaluations are just one of many sources that are used in public policy making. 
At different points in time, different factors may gain or lose importance. New factors that 
are unexpected, baffling or surprising can come into play at any stage of the policy cycle. 
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Also, it is important to note that learning might be important for some, but not necessarily 
for all processes of change (Hall 1993, Radaelli 2008). Thus, tracing a causal link between 
policy learning and policy changes is a difficult endeavour (Bennett and Howlett 1992). 
The influence of one source such as an evaluation is nuanced and hard to detangle from 
others. 
The research design for this study attempts to cope with these issues by not explicitly ad-
dressing learning, or policy learning, in the interviews, and by not providing a definition of 
(policy) learning to the interview partners, in order to avoid influencing participants' re-
sponses or legitimating replies. Interview partners were encouraged to define learning and 
change for themselves, in relation to their experience with the evaluation process and relat-
ed findings. This allowed them to be more specific about what they noticed or valued as 
learning, to indicate the importance they attached to learning, as well as, the subsequent 
actions they took or chose not to take. Importantly, this helped to drill deeper into the cir-
cumstances and their implications for the up-take and effects of evaluations, i.e. the role of 
actors and the institutional context in which evaluations are located. 
In sum, the analysis of the effects of policy evaluations will be undertaken in terms of poli-
cy learning, focusing on the following aspects: (1) The meanings and explanations actors 
give for their learning from the respective evaluation, (2) the contribution to knowledge, 
(3) the development of skills, (4) the changes in attitudes and (5) how these interpretations 
are reflected in their practices and behaviour. With regard to the latter, a change in practice 
also includes the possibility of adaptations being made without the need for change at the 
level of composite actors. 
Levels of Effects 
Drawing on the literature review, interviews and document analysis, the effects of policy 
evaluations are observed at the level of the individual actor, the composite actor level and 
the policy level. This is to determine whether learning takes place amongst individuals or if 
it goes beyond the individual and affects changes amongst composite actors and at the  
level of the policy itself. The empirical enquiry will aim to not just list and discuss effects, 
but also to identify characteristic patterns of such effects (see the cross case analysis in 
Chapter 6). 
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Individual actors learn based on interpretive processes: Making sense of information and 
comparing it to what they know and have learned in the past (“sensemaking”, e.g. Weick 
1995; see also van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006, Valovirta 2002, Lethonen 2005). In light 
of evaluation activities, actors judge information from a report and from each part of an 
evaluation process against the backdrop of their prior cognitions and motivations, and, ac-
cordingly, may adapt their beliefs and views, and thus their behaviour. This is coherent 
with the tenet of actor-centred institutionalism that actors’ interests are not exogenously 
given, but socially constructed. Knowledge and meaning are acquired through experiences. 
Reality is constructed by human activity and reconstructed when actors interact (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966, Scharpf 1997). For instance, individual learning may occur through 
participation in the evaluation as interviewee, as being interviewed provides the inter-
viewee with a better understanding of why and with what aim the evaluation is carried out. 
Subsequently, learning of individuals may lead to changes at the composite actor level, for 
example, within actor constellations, i.e. within the particular set of actors that are involved 
in a policy making process. When composite actors learn, new shared meanings are devel-
oped (Weick 1995, 2002). By interacting and discussing with each other at a workshop, 
actors may shape the setting of the actor constellation, thus contributing to a change of 
institutional context. Resulting from this, actors might get, for example, a better under-
standing of other actors’ perspectives and motivations and their situation relative to the 
policy in question. Or, to name another example, it may result in the development of con-
flicts, leading to mechanisms that ensure consistency and stability of policies. 
Policy learning may also be reflected in other changes at the composite actor level, specifi-
cally in policy outputs (see e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992). Hence, this study looks specif-
ically into organisational learning and changes of policies. 
While an in-depth analysis of “organisational learning” (e.g. Levitt and March 1988) of all 
relevant composite actors is not within the scope of this thesis, this study aims to take note 
of evaluations as impetus to purposefully change some of the rules that guide organisation-
al practices. Organisational learning is based on routines, i.e. formal and informal rules and 
procedures that guide behaviour (Levitt and March 1998). These routines are history-
dependent, i.e. they build on existing procedures. From an evaluation perspective, they 
may very likely be oriented towards targets such as performance measurement, cost reduc-
tion or customer satisfaction.  
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Learning at the individual level may not automatically progress to the composite actor lev-
el (e.g. Argyris and Schön 1978). Organisations typically develop mechanisms for 
knowledge sharing like strategies, policies or guidelines. These mechanisms support the 
way of how knowledge is captured, shared and utilised, despite the turnover of staff and 
the passage of time. Hence, participating in an evaluation process can lead to changes in 
rules and norms such as organisational practices and procedures. For example, participat-
ing in an evaluation may prompt the organisation to change its standards for preparing data 
for evaluation purposes, or its standards for how evaluation results are disseminated. 
Finally, at the policy level, learning is expected to take place in the form of changes in pol-
icy making processes and policy outputs. For example, an evaluation may contribute to 
agenda setting, the creation of new policy proposals, or the modification of policy pro-
grammes. 
In sum, the analysis will focus on the following aspects: (1) The effects the at level of indi-
vidual actors (e.g. amongst representatives of the ministry, agency, evaluator and external 
stakeholder), (2) the effects at the level of composite actors (e.g. changes of actor constel-
lations, organisations) and (3) changes at the policy level in terms of policy making pro-
cesses and policy outputs. 
Dimensions of Effects 
The effects of policy evaluations at the individual and composite actor level are explored in 
three distinct dimensions: The dimension of source, the dimension of time, and the dimen-
sion of intent (Kirkhart 2000). 
With regard to the source, the effects may occur due to the evaluation process or because 
of the results of an evaluation (usually presented in an evaluation report). This distinction 
is often used in the literature (e.g. Alkin and Taut 2003, Patton 1997, 1998; “process use”) 
when analysing effects of evaluations. Kirkhart (2000), who provides a useful framework 
by exploring the influence of evaluations, suggests the term “source” to differentiate be-
tween the evaluation process and the evaluation results. Taking part in an evaluation pro-
cess, e.g. by being interviewed, attending an interim presentation or making observations 
in group discussions, may foster “learning through experience”, “learning by doing”, 
“learning through action” or “learning by interaction”, forcing deeper thought, getting a 
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new sense of direction or becoming more animated and motivated to work (Lethonen 2005, 
Henry and Mark 2003).  
Changes at the level of composite actors might also result from an evaluation process, e.g. 
following the adoption of preliminary findings. The term “evaluation result” refers to the 
output of an evaluation process, e.g. an evaluation report, which provides feedback about 
policy development and impact, and is typically presented at the end of an evaluation pro-
cess. Previous research has shown both sources, i.e. evaluation processes and results, to 
instigate policy learning, but seems to point towards evaluation processes as the more in-
fluential factor. 
When investigating the effects of policy evaluations in the temporal dimension, it is appar-
ent that effects may occur immediately while the evaluation is being conducted, as soon as 
the findings have been presented (“end-of cycle”), or a longer time after the presentation of 
findings (Kirkhart 2000). The temporal dimension of effects is related to the general issue 
of time and timing in the evaluation design and the policy cycle, comprising, for example, 
“windows of opportunity” (Kingdon 1984) or “critical junctures” of when to evaluate, 
when impacts are visible, when opportunities arise and decisions are possible etc. Further-
more, timing plays a crucial role with regard to the emergence and dynamics of actor con-
stellations and institutions, during the evaluation process and in the course of follow-up 
activities. 
The dimension of intent differentiates whether a particular effect of an evaluation was in-
tended or unintended by actors (Kirkhart 2000). Intended effects are those which have been 
explicitly stated as purposes at the beginning of an evaluation, and which then actually 
materialise. For example, an evaluator may have been instructed to raise certain topics dur-
ing the interviews to make programme administration more aware of them. Unintended 
effects are often unforeseen and occur through unexpected pathways (Kirkhart 2000, 
p. 14). For example, a programme administrator may improve his data collection or data 
provision skills. Or, to provide another example, an unintended and cumulating effect of 
evaluations may be “evaluation fatigue”, as actors experience an overload of evaluation 
exercises and related requests. Also “trickle down” effects of evaluations fall into this cat-
egory of unintended effects, as evaluation findings add to the accumulation of knowledge 
amongst those running the programme at the ministry or agency (Weiss 1998a, Biegelbau-
er and Griessler 2009, Biegelbauer 2013). 
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Tracing the effects of an evaluation in the temporal and intentionality dimensions poses a 
methodological challenge. These dimensions are even more difficult to analyse in combi-
nation (e.g. an intended immediate effect, or an unintended effect that materialises a long 
time after the evaluation). In this study, the methodological challenge is tackled the follow-
ing way: 
 To analyse the temporal dimension of effects, a twofold approach was taken. First, the 
focus was restricted to immediate effects and end-of-cycle effects. An assessment of 
long-term effects was considered beyond the scope of this study, because it would have 
required monitoring policy developments over a longer period of time. Second, to iden-
tify immediate and end-of-cycle effects, the interview data was coded with regard to in-
terviewees’ perceptions of effects in the course of time: For what point in time does the 
interviewee report what kinds of effects?  
 To analyse the intentionality dimension, particular attention was paid to programme 
and evaluation related documents: Which objectives of the evaluation are stipulated in 
these documents? The information from these documents was triangulated with inter-
view data. 
To sum up, the analysis examines three dimensions of evaluation effects: (1) The source of 
policy learning, i.e. from the evaluation processes or from the evaluation result, (2) the 
time of policy learning, i.e. during the evaluation or immediately after the evaluation, and 
(3) the intentionality of policy learning, i.e. whether a particular policy learning effect was 
explicitly intended at the outset of the evaluation. 
Pathways of Effects 
The second research question that guides this study is: “Through which pathways do eval-
uation processes and results affect RTI policy making?” 
The changes at the level of individual and composite actors provide the possibility to dis-
cern typical pathways of effects that link evaluation to outcomes. In the newer evaluation 
research literature, such pathways of effects are also referred to as influence pathways8 (see 
                                                 
8  The term is used by Henry and Mark (2003) to refer to the interconnection of influence that might link to 
a chain reaction of events. Here, attention is directed to the multiple levels on which evaluations may   
exert their influence, e.g. the individual, the interpersonal and the collective level.  
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e.g. Henry and Mark 2003, Mark and Henry 2004). However, a clear and comprehensive 
conceptual definition of such pathways is absent in the literature. 
In principle, pathways refer to the multiple processes through which evaluations can realise 
their effects, i.e. influence policy making. Obviously, there are various types of effects at 
multiple levels. Pathways designate the ways of how these effects occur. It is impossible 
for actors to completely foresee and control such pathways. In every evaluation, the      
specific pathways evolve step by step. However, certain factors and mechanisms condition 
their development, and thus potentially foreshadow them. Actors can create conditions that 
are conducive to the emergence of particular pathways (e.g. organise a workshop to facili-
tate the transfer of evaluation results). This study shall inquire into these conditions, such 
as particular activities, events, programme features, actors’ agendas, and so on. 
In this study, pathways are understood as patterns of interactions and communications con-
cerning a particular evaluation. Pathways are a dynamic concept. They are sets of linked 
processes through which evaluations achieve influence in policy making. In the evaluation 
literature, interaction and communication is commonly referred to as “dialogue”, which 
strongly links to the concept of “process use” (Patton 1997, 1998; see also Valovirta 2006, 
Lethonen 2005). Opportunities to interact, communicate and learn may emerge in the 
course of events such as kick-off meetings, collaborative research, data collection activities 
like interviews, but also meetings, workshops, presentations, follow-up activities, public 
lectures, etc. Hence, pathways of effects can be detected in communication and utilisation 
strategies for evaluation, in institutional arrangements (e.g. governance, organisational 
standards and practices), and in the access to information about results of an evaluation 
(e.g. when a final report is published online). The nature of these events is shaped, inter 
alia, by the function und purpose of the evaluation, which is reflected in the evaluation 
design.  
Pathways of effects can emerge throughout all stages of an evaluation, including planning 
and set-up, the evaluation process as such, and follow-up activities. The planning and set-
up phase may entail first interactions and learning processes amongst actors that prepare 
evaluation questions. Planned interfaces (notably meetings and other events) stimulate in-
teraction and communication. Follow-up activities may seek to integrate newly learned 
behaviour into established patterns. The relevance and effectiveness of institutions, as well 
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as, the strategic choices that composite actors can make, is particularly apparent during 
these initial and final stages. 
By using case studies, pathways will be discerned through which evaluation processes and 
results may achieve effects. The aim is to illuminate which conditioning factors and mech-
anisms tend to give rise to what kinds of pathways of effects. Three groups of conditioning 
factors and mechanisms will be investigated: Actors and their interactions, the institutional 
context, and the evaluation itself (see also de Vibe 2002, Lethonen 2005, Højlund 2015). 
They are discussed in the following section. 
3.2 The Contingence of Effects: Conditioning Factors and Mechanisms 
The third research question is of this study is: “Which factors and mechanisms condition 
the effects of evaluation processes and results on the RTI policy making process in general, 
and on the behaviour of actors in particular?” 
Evaluations usually aim to promote some kind of policy learning, but this learning does not 
always occur, or does not always occur in the way major actors intended (e.g. Nutley and 
Homel 2006). Evidence from evaluations is not more or less “objective” than other kinds 
of knowledge, and policy makers usually draw on multiple sets of knowledge from several 
evidentiary bases in decision making. Every piece of evidence must be interpreted (Clar-
ence 2002, p. 4), and so must be the process through which the evidence has been obtained. 
Evaluations are thus just one impulse in the policy making process and may not play the 
same role for all actors (Bennett and Howlett 1992).  
Different actors usually have different views (e.g. van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006), and 
thus tend to experience an evaluation and interpret its results in different ways. Learning 
might unfold as sought-after by the evaluators or commissioning agency, or learning might 
take different, unexpected routes. These processes of experience, interpretation and mean-
ing-making are mediated by actors’ preferences and perceptions, i.e. action orientations, 
and are shaped by the institutional context in which they act and interact.  
Against the theoretical backdrop of actor-centred institutionalism, a variety of potential 
conditioning factors and mechanisms can be tentatively identified. They are summarised 
below in three main groups. First, there are actors with their action orientations and      
capabilities. This aspect highlights the interactions between ministries, agencies, policy 
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advisors and other stakeholders. Second, there is the institutional context. It encompasses 
the formal and informal institutions that govern the conduct of policies and evaluations. 
Third, there is the design and other related attributes of the evaluation as such, which obvi-
ously matter as well. 
Actors and Their Interactions 
An important departure point for explaining the effects of an evaluation is to identify 
which actors participate in this evaluation and the respective policy making processes, and 
what sets of interactions take place between these actors. Actors are characterised by their 
orientations, which are mediated by their perceptions and preferences (e.g. interest, moti-
vation, priorities, world views, etc.), and available resources and capabilities (e.g. 
knowledge, financial means, personnel, rights they possess, privileged access to infor-
mation, etc.). Individual actors are expected to act in tune with the social role or roles they 
possess within the composite actor, but may possibly pursue self-interested goals that may 
conflict with composite actor goals (Scharpf 1997, p. 61). 
Types of actors that are typically involved in policy making and evaluation processes, also 
because they are assumed to be the primary learners, include: Policy-makers and political 
institutions, administrators and administrative institutions, scientists and research institu-
tions, and representatives of the general public (e.g. interest groups and members of the 
target population; Pattyn 2012, Widmer 2005, Weiss 2004, Bennett and Howlett 1992). To 
guide the empirical investigation, this study will rely on a simplified policy setting (see 
Fig. 2) that puts focus on interactions between the following four types of actors: 
 First, attention is drawn to those actors who are considered to have decision making 
authority over the policy and who are typically the main audience for evaluations (also 
termed “intended user” of evaluation, Patton 1997). They are the representatives of pol-
itics and administration, i.e. bureaucratic authorities (Biegelbauer 2013, p. 56). In light 
of the underlying case studies, they are depicted in Fig. 2 as the ministry, which is the 
policy owner, and hence responsible for the implementation of respective instruments 
and measures, and which commissions the evaluation. Usually, an individual takes re-
sponsibility for this programme, referred to as the “programme officer”. Ministries are 
assumed to have a strategic responsibility for governing a certain field or several fields, 
e.g. education or health, and for implementing overall government policies. 
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 Second, the empirical setting of the study context requires that the analysis prominently 
includes the agency that is entrusted with policy mandates to operate the policy pro-
grammes in question.  
 Third, learning amongst other stakeholders such as intended beneficiaries (e.g. compa-
nies, universities), interest groups and industry experts needs to be taken into account. 
These external stakeholders have proprietary interests in programmes. It has been 
pointed out that external stakeholders can vary with regard to their enthusiasm to par-
ticipate in evaluations, as well as, their capacity to meaningfully contribute to evalua-
tions (e.g. existing skills, expertise, resources; see e.g. Appleton-Dyer et al. 2012). 
 Finally, the policy advisor, evaluator or the respective team of evaluators who conduct 
the evaluation, needs to be included as a key actor. Evaluators certainly have their own 
perceptions, world views, motivations, and strategies for enhancing policy learning. 
However, the role of evaluators is strongly conditioned by the functions and goals  
stipulated for the respective evaluation. One issue where this often becomes apparent is 
the degree of stakeholder participation in an evaluation. For example, the terms of ref-
erence9 may require an evaluator to strongly involve stakeholders. Conversely, the 
terms of reference may be unspecific concerning the degree of stakeholder participa-
tion, and evaluators may – based on their own preferences – propose a more or less 
participatory approach. The commissioning agency – based on its preferences – may 
then approve of this, or not. Evaluators differ also with regard to their competence, 
reputation, and interaction styles (for example rather detached or a “critical friend”; 
e.g. Appleton-Dyer et al. 2012, see also Mark and Henry 2004, Johnson et al. 2009). 
In light of the current research in political science, policy making is understood as a con-
tinuous process occurring in a certain policy area, typically composed of several non-
sequential stages, in which policies are negotiated, formulated and implemented by       
relevant state and non-state actors (see Fig. 3). The process of implementation ends with a 
certain output, e.g. a new or adapted programme, which is subjected to evaluation. The 
process and the result of an evaluation are understood as specific outputs which feed into 
the policy making process. Hence, evaluations are not restricted to a particular stage of the 
                                                 
9  Terms of reference involve a written document that describes the scope of work and responsibilities with 
regard to the evaluation. They typically set out the aims and objectives, background information on the 
evaluation object, the rules of operation, the required qualifications as well as technical information on 
e.g. the form of deliverables and timelines. 
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policy making process. The whole process, from agenda setting to policy implementation, 
can be affected by evaluations. 
Fig. 2: Policy Setting  Fig. 3: Policy Making Process 
 
 
Actors may connect, communicate and interact with each other in various circumstances 
and at various stages of the policy making process, aiming to formulate, shape and imple-
ment public policy. They may seek to solve policy problems in a specific situation by in-
teracting with other actors. This is supported by evaluation which aims to promote learn-
ing, but also to facilitate cooperation and coordination amongst stakeholders. In actor-
centred institutionalism, this situation is described as actor constellation. The actor constel-
lation depicts the relatively stable picture of actors’ relations regarding a policy, highlight-
ing that behaviour of policy actors does not only depend on their own orientations and ca-
pabilities, but also on those of other members of the constellation. This entails that issues 
might be seen from similar or different vantage points, and that actor strategies may be 
converging, diverging or independent (see also van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006). 
In an actor constellation, according to actor-centred institutionalism, various modes of in-
teraction are possible. The dominant mode of interaction in the policy settings examined in 
this study can be characterised as what Scharpf (1997) calls “negotiated agreement”: Com-
posite actors mostly act in line with the corporatist and social partnership tradition in Aus-
tria. They usually do not take unilateral action, or try to simply overrule the other by means 
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of majority votes or hierarchical directions. Despite their varying perspectives, they share a 
relatively large set of common rules and norms. All actors agree that communication and 
dialogue are important. 
Policy change depends on the preferences and capabilities of those with decision making 
authority over the programme, i.e. the ministry, the agency or both. Multiple actors have 
multiple views and interests, in particular with regard to the outcome of an evaluation. It is 
expected that if evaluation findings do not, fully or in part, reflect actors’ strategies and 
expectations, learning and associated effects will be narrowed down (e.g. Cousins and 
Leithwood 1986, Hofstetter 2003).  
Institutional Context 
It is a central tenet of actor-centred institutionalism that actors and the interactions between 
them are shaped by the institutional context. This context encompasses shared formal and 
informal rules and norms that stimulate, enable or restrict – but do not determine – actors’ 
behaviour in a specific situation (Scharpf 1997). This means that institutional context can 
be a stimulating or a constraining factor for policy learning. It, however, has not yet re-
ceived much attention in the evaluation literature. 
Formal institutions are sets of written rules and procedures (e.g. laws, regulations, codes of 
conduct, standards, etc.), whereas informal institutions are unwritten rules formed by social 
norms (e.g. customs, conventions, expectations). The institutional context is an opportunity 
structure for individual and composite actors, a corridor for action. It provides information 
about what actors do and what they can expect from others. Thus, actions become compre-
hensible and, to some extent, predictable for others, which is an important requirement for 
interaction (e.g. Nölting 2004). When entering a situation that is governed by these rules, 
actors are required to consider them when deciding about their behaviour. In most cases 
formal and informal institutions are closely related, even closely linked, but there might be 
instances where both are in conflict with each other. Previous research has shown that in-
stitutions are more often guardians of stability than drivers of change. Change tends to be a 
difficult endeavour (North 1990), because actors tend to rely on existing institutions 
(Scharpf 1997, p. 41) and screen out dissonant information (Sabatier and Weible 1999, 
p. 194; see also Henry and Mark 2003). 
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In this study, a distinction is made between the wide and the narrow institutional context. 
In a wide sense, the institutional context encompasses the legal and policy framework con-
ditions. Factors that condition policy learning effects may lie within the realm of the politi-
cal and administrative system, for example, the legal structure, the roles and responsibili-
ties in the governance framework, the discussion and political culture10, the policy style11, 
the evaluation history and culture12, as well as, the stakeholder engagement. 
In a narrow sense, the institutional context frames the actor constellation and interactions 
with respect to the specific policy setting of the case studies, i.e. the support programmes 
under scrutiny. In addition to the more general policy and legal framework conditions, this 
narrow perspective sheds light on the specific practices at the policy level, e.g. how evalua-
tions are prepared and carried out, how findings are disseminated, and what resources are 
available for these activities. 
Within the institutional context, some conditions may be relatively stable, whereas others 
may evolve quickly, for example, as a result of changes in politics, socio-economic condi-
tions, or technologies (see also Sabatier 1987, Lethonen 2005). This aspect is particularly 
relevant for the RTI policy field, which is under scrutiny in this study. Developments in 
this field not only have strong impacts on other policy areas, they are also conditioned by 
changes in in other policy fields. Moreover, the RTI policy field is affected by multiple 
layers of governance, from the local, regional and national to the supranational such as the 
European Union. There are an increasing number of transnational actions, for example, 
R&D cooperations of enterprises in various countries. Overall, the RTI policy field is   
rather dynamic. Windows of opportunity are, therefore, often short, and policy decisions 
tend to be made quickly. 
As Scharpf (1997, p. 38) argues, an analysis that accounts for the all the varieties in the 
complete institutional context would be neither feasible nor helpful for achieving specific 
                                                 
10  Traditionally, political culture is defined as “the set of subjective orientations to politics in a national 
population. [It refers to] “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations 
of its population” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 13). 
11  Policy styles are understood as the routines, choices and practices of actors that characterise policy mak-
ing. Richardson et al. (1982, p. 12) has developed a typology of policy styles alongside two dimensions: 
i) anticipating, proactive vs. reactive and ii) consensual vs. imposing decisions. Van Waarden (1995) has 
extended this concept by classifying six sub-dimensions defining a policy style. 
12  According to Weiss (1999, p. 480), each country has a historical tradition and experience with policy 
evaluation which conditions its use for policy decision making. 
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research objectives. Thus, the analysis of the institutional context needs to be fitted to the 
research questions. It will therefore focus on the following aspects: (1) The policy context 
and governance, (2) specificities of the RTI policy field, (3) RTI policy decision making 
processes, (4) main functions and objectives of evaluation in the RTI policy field, how they 
are commissioned, conducted and typically used and (5) rules, norms and principles that 
guide composite actors, particularly the agency and ministry. These aspects are intertwined 
with those outlined above for the actors. They work together as a combination of formal 
(e.g. following standards, laws) and informal (e.g. sharing and discussing results) institu-
tions and practices. 
Attributes of the Evaluation 
Much research has been devoted to examining which attributes of evaluation may inhibit 
or enhance evaluation use (e.g. Saunders 2012, Fitzpatrick et al. 2004, Rossi et al. 2003, 
Leviton and Hughes 1981, Thompson and King 1981, Cousins and Leithwood 1986, 
Shulha and Cousins 1997, Johnson et al. 2009, Hofstetter et al. 2003, Lethonen 2005 and 
Appleton-Dyer et al. 2012). In light of this research, the following aspects can be discerned 
as particularly important: (1) The evaluation approach, (2) the perceived quality of the 
evaluation, and (3) the favourability of findings. These aspects will therefore also be inves-
tigated in this study. 
The first aspect, the evaluation approach, encompasses the evaluation design and methods, 
as well as, the organisation and implementation of the evaluation process and follow-up 
activities. The evaluation approach usually reflects the purpose of the evaluation in the 
policy cycle, e.g. whether the evaluation is formative or summative. The purpose of the 
evaluation is usually stated in the underlying policy document and the terms of reference. 
Evaluation questions are formulated in accordance with this purpose. For this study, cases 
of interim formative evaluations were chosen. Considering the multitude of possible evalu-
ation approaches, the emphasis of the analysis lies on the existence of utilisation-focused 
approaches that promote the use of evaluation throughout the process, as well as, of partic-
ipatory evaluation. In this study, this is defined as the involvement of different stakehold-
ers during or after an evaluation, and the extent of involvement, e.g. from being inter-
viewed to being invited to meetings to discuss preliminary or final results. 
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The second important aspect of evaluation attributes is the quality of the evaluation, as 
perceived by relevant stakeholders. In particular, the quality of the evaluation report and 
the recommendations put forward by evaluators are relevant in this regard. High quality 
encompasses aspects such as relevance for the needs of intended target groups, clarity and 
comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, appropriate methods and sound analyses, credibil-
ity and accuracy (e.g. scientific plausibility, technical sophistication), timeliness (e.g. time 
spent on the assessment, delivery of findings), practicality of recommendations, and the 
overall way of how results are communicated (e.g. dissemination strategy). 
A third important aspect is the extent to which the evaluation findings are “favourable”. 
Whether an evaluation comes to rather positive or negative conclusions makes a differ-
ence. The notion that failure is a more effective means of perusing learning is well-
established, in particular in the organisational learning literature (e.g. Cyert and March 
1963, Levinthal and March 1993, Sitkin 1992). While success may signal that “all is well” 
(Sitkin 1992), an undesirable outcome or failure may trigger questioning of existing 
knowledge and understanding. Consequently, following Henry and Mark (2003), and 
Lethonen (2005), findings that show a growing problem, are critical, controversial or pre-
dominantly negative, tend to affect policy change more than other results. 
3.3 Towards Studying the Effects of Evaluations 
The conceptual framework outlined so far draws on the concept of policy learning, ad-
vances in evaluation research, and actor-centred institutionalism. It combines these per-
spectives in order to provide a comprehensive explanation for the effects of evaluations, 
the pathways of these effects, and the factors and mechanism that condition these effects. 
Actor-centred institutionalism provides a heuristic that puts focus on the interplay of rele-
vant policy actors with various interests which are shaped by the institutional setting in 
which they interact. Evaluations are understood as important pieces of policy advice, but 
the effects of evaluations may also be shaped by strategic priorities and institution-based 
considerations. 
Hence, this study shifts attention from the evaluation itself to the experiences of policy 
actors with evaluations under the condition of existing institutions. The experiences of in-
dividual actors may create new resources and capabilities or shape the composite actor of 
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which they are a part, i.e. an organisation such as a ministry or an agency. Evaluations are 
conceptualised as interaction processes between institutionally constrained, intentional 
actors. Institutions (e.g. formal and informal rules) shape the actors’ perceptions and be-
haviours. Each actor, also the evaluator, has his/her own perceptions and preferences and 
his/her specific institutional contexts, which may overlap more or less widely with that of 
other actors. Actors may, thus, very well choose not to change their behaviours in response 
to an evaluation. 
Fig. 4 shows a graphic representation of the conceptual framework. Policy evaluation is 
viewed as an impulse in the policy making process, potentially affecting policy making in 
general, and actor behaviour in particular. This impulse is assessed in terms of policy 
learning at the level of individual and composite actors as well as the policy level, and is 
explored alongside several dimensions. Pathways of effects may emerge in the different 
stages of an evaluation, including planning and set-up, the evaluation process as such, and 
follow-up activities. 
Fig. 4: The Conceptual Framework 
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Policy learning and change, which may align in a chain of events or pathways, are shaped 
by specific factors and mechanisms. They can be actor-related, e.g. the resources and ca-
pabilities that are available to actors. Furthermore, the course of actions and interactions is 
structured by institutional factors throughout the conduct of an evaluation, in a wider sense 
e.g. the policy context, governance and discussion culture; and in a narrower sense the in-
teractions amongst actors in a specific constellation. In turn, they may shape how actors’ 
interests and strategies are defined and prioritised. In addition, evaluation-related factors, 
which refer to how an evaluation is designed, implemented and communicated, may be 
perceived in different ways by various actors (e.g. its quality, timeliness, credibility). By 
analysing the perceptions, learning and changes in the actions of various actors in response 
to evaluations, it is possible to gain a better understanding of how evaluations can contrib-
ute to policy development.  
The purpose of this framework is to provide a support structure and guidance for empirical 
analysis, by highlighting the areas that warrant attention when assessing the effects of 
evaluations on policy making and actor behaviour. It needs to be made clear that the     
research in this study does not constitute a test for the validity of this framework. The 
framework is generic, based on the bodies of research literature indicated above. It spells 
out the major concepts that have been found relevant in previous research, and puts them in 
relationship to each other. It, however, does not make any statements about the exact na-
ture of the relationships between these concepts, e.g. in which specific ways and to what 
magnitude they will influence each other. 
This chapter outlined the conceptual framework that will be applied to the analysis of the 
effects of evaluations. The next chapter will discuss the policy field that underlies this 
study, namely RTI policy making, and describe the current situation in Austria, the empiri-
cal case in point.  
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4 Policy Field and Context 
Chapter 3 has introduced the conceptual framework that is used in this study to discern 
effects of evaluations, pathways of effects, and to identify factors and mechanisms that 
condition the effects of an evaluation and lead to pathways of effects of one kind or anoth-
er. This chapter proceeds to establish the basis for empirical investigation.  
Section 4.1 will introduce research, technology and innovation (RTI) as the policy field 
that is used as the empirical setting for the analysis, and will discuss current developments 
and the role of evaluations in this field. In Section 4.2, the focus will be narrowed down to 
the RTI scene in Austria, the focal point of the empirical case study analysis. It provides 
background information about the relevant actors, in particular about their capabilities, 
perceptions and preferences, the actor constellation, as well as, the institutional context. 
4.1 Research, Technology and Innovation Policy  
Innovation is a big buzzword in public policy debate (e.g. Borrás 2003, Fagerberg et al. 
2013, Grande and Prange 2003), in particular when it is attached to other fashionable no-
tions such as disruptive, social or sustainable innovation. The view that innovation is vital-
ly important, and that its causes and effects need to be thoroughly understood, is tradition-
ally linked to the work of Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1934). He emphasised that a welfare-
enhancing economic development is based on revolutionary innovation, defined as a new 
combination of knowledge and resources (Schumpeter 1934, 64pp).13 Without innovation, 
he argues, economies would become static, structurally immobilised, and subject to decay. 
Following this so-called Schumpeterian understanding, innovation today is usually concep-
tualised as novelty leading to value creation in the market. On this basis, the Oslo Manual 
(OECD 2005b), widely known as the benchmark for innovation surveys, provides more 
nuanced but narrower definitions of innovations. They encompass “the implementation of 
a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing 
                                                 
13  According to Schumpeter (1934, p. 66), innovation consists of any of the following phenomena: i) the 
introduction of new goods, ii) the introduction of new methods of production, iii) the opening of new 
markets, iv) the use of new sources of supply and v) implementation of a new forms of organisations. 
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method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations” (OECD 2005b, pp. 16-17). This definition puts the focus on the process 
of innovation, which usually stems from research and development, commercialisation and 
diffusion activities. 
The concept of innovation and its determinants are garnering increasing policy attention, 
and are the subject of much academic research.14 This development has not only been  
driven purely by academic interests, but also, importantly, by developments and actors 
outside academia (Fagerberg et al. 2013). The oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the advent 
of a transformation process characterised by de-industrialisation, rapid internationalisation 
and the shift to a knowledge-based economy prompted governments to focus on research 
and technology. This was accompanied by the development of policy instruments and       
structures that were more aligned with the new challenges, aiming to strengthen competi-
tiveness to foster economic growth (Borrás 2003, Biegelbauer 2013, Kuhlmann and Edler 
2003a, 2003b, Suthersanen et al. 2007).  
To move the topic of innovation up on the European agenda and to foster innovation-
enhancing reforms, specific goals and objectives were presented and adopted by the Lisbon 
(2000) and Barcelona (2002) Councils.15 Funds for EU research programmes were raised 
and complemented by further measures to develop a European Research Area (ERA). The 
Horizon 2020 initiative is the latest instrument, implementing the “Innovation Union”, 
which is one of seven flagships initiatives16 of the Europe 2020 strategy, aiming at realising 
the ERA, securing Europe’s global competitiveness and addressing the challenges facing 
our society (“Grand Challenges”)17, by supporting research and innovation. 
                                                 
14  For detailed information on the nature of innovation see Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010), on the genesis of 
innovation see Laperche et al. (2008) and Fischer (2003). 
15  While the Lisbon Council has been the cornerstone for the European Research Area (ERA) and set out 
long-term perspectives aiming to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based eco-
nomic area in the world by 2010, the Barcelona Council emphasised an increased spending target for 
R&D (3 % of GDP). 
16  They are: The “Innovation Union”, “Youth on the move”, a “digital agenda for Europe”, “Resource   
efficient Europe”, an “industrial policy for the globalisation era”, an “Agenda for new skills and jobs”, 
and the “European platform against poverty”. 
17  These flagship initiatives provide a new perspective on R&D and innovation as they address the growing 
societal challenges (termed as “Grand Challenges”) of our time, such as climate change, health, mobility 
and transport, energy and food security, and endorse them as the key focal points for research promotion 
on the European level. Horizon 2020 began on 1 January 2014, and runs until 31 December 2020. 
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While the rise of an innovation agenda has broadened the goals of political action at the 
EU level, increasing attention was also drawn towards developing an institutional context 
that enhances innovation processes (Borrás 2003), discussing the role and potential of  
public structures and the promotion of R&D and innovation. Traditionally, the rationale for 
public RTI funding is obtained from market failures (Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Rothwell 
1985), meaning that the market cannot sufficiently mobilise R&D resources or is not able 
to set priorities that would serve the public good (e.g. health-related topics, environmental 
protection, security issues, etc.). The risks and uncertainties that are related to R&D and 
innovation activities and the necessary investments into knowledge generation may be too 
high for many private businesses, in particular for smaller ones.  
Public support, e.g. in the form of tailored R&D funding and subsides, seeks to address 
these so-called “failures”, aiming to stimulate innovation, thus the competitiveness in 
companies. However, the market failure perspective has been increasingly challenged, par-
ticularly because it views innovation as a linear process while neglecting the systemic 
character of innovation processes. More recent work casts doubt about R&D subsidies 
such as tax incentives as major determinant of a country’s innovativeness (e.g. Gaillard-
Ladinska et al. 2015, Straathof et al. 2014, Appelt et al. 2016). It is increasingly argued that 
measures should aim to overcome “systems failures”18, which may result from fragmenta-
tion and a lack of linkages between innovation actors, as well as, rigidities and mistakes of 
innovation players (e.g. Arnold 2004a, Jacobsson and Johnson 2000, Klein Woolthuis et al. 
2005, Wanzenböck et al. 2013) – which may also justify policy intervention. Newer trends 
such as “Open Innovation” (Chesbrough 2003) that aim to leverage intellectual resources 
from external sources, challenge business models, and thus the support of innovation and 
related measures.  
The range of RTI-related policies and measures has expanded quickly (Krupp 1985), com-
prising laws and regulations, as well as, initiatives, procedures or programmes that share a 
common motive or objective19. In recent years, innovation policy efforts have shifted from 
simple structured R&D support to setting research priorities and offering a variety of struc-
                                                 
18  Several typologies of “systems failures” exist. Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005), for instance, distinguish four 
categories: (Physical, knowledge and financial) infrastructural, institutional (hard and soft challenges), in-
teraction and capability failures. 
19  For an overview of innovation policy topics, related instruments and associated evidence for their impact 
see Edler et al. (2013). 
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tured instruments (e.g. PRO INNO 2009, Hollanders et al. 2008, Edler et al. 2013). Topics 
such as the promotion of technology diffusion and transfer, developing human resources, 
the cooperation between science and industry, or the assistance with the commercialisation 
of ideas and how to protect them, e.g. by means of intellectual property rights, have gained 
weight in innovation policy making.  
RTI policy represents an interdisciplinary area, not just consisting of relevant policy in-
struments and strategies, but also encompassing the relevant institutional context and or-
ganisations, connecting to other policy areas and to international developments. For the 
purpose of this study, innovation policy will therefore be defined as follows (Kuhlman and 
Edler 2003a, p. 620; 2003b, p. 28): 
“… the integral of all state initiatives regarding science, education, research, 
technological development and industrial modernization. […I]nnovation policy is 
a broad concept that contains research and technology policy and overlaps with 
industrial, environmental, labour and social polities.” 
Specifically, RTI policies involve “progress in science and technology, information      
exchange and knowledge transfer, and industry collaboration and commercialisation, for 
these purposes of enhancing the performance of regional and national economies” 
(Cozzens 2003, p. 55). They are expected to “contribute to higher productivity and growth 
and to the creation of more and better jobs” (Papaconstantinou and Polt 1997, p. 9). 
While R&D and innovation have become crucial for economic growth, and respective sup-
port systems are increasingly recognised as important, critical discussions about challenges 
and potential pitfalls in RTI policy are only just beginning.20 Innovation is a complex pro-
cess, and its success is connected to various factors such as the strength of the knowledge 
base, R&D and technology transfer efforts, qualification of human resources, interactions 
between players, the role of framework conditions, etc. (e.g. Borrás 2003, Dutfield and 
Suthersanen 2004, Suthersanen et al. 2007). This insight is encapsulated in the so-called 
National Innovation Systems (NIS)21, a notion that profoundly challenges the scope, insti-
tutions and instruments conventionally used by RTI policies. Growing tensions in policy 
                                                 
20  For a more detailed discussion on challenges in the RTI area see Larédo and Mustar (2001), Larédo 
(2003) and Wessner (2007). 
21  For detailed information on the concepts of Innovation Systems see Edquist (1997); Edquist and Johnson 
(1997) and of National Innovation Systems see Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993). 
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systems caused by competing rationales, short-termism, fragmentation, as well as, compe-
tition and personal ambition, may hinder policy intervention and learning (OECD 2005a). 
In light of this, RTI policy has become increasingly targeted and prioritised to address 
global problems and future challenge areas. This so-called “mission-led” approach began 
in the middle of the 20th century and went through several development phases (e.g. indus-
trial policy, systems-oriented approach) in recent decades, some of them coexisting in pri-
oritisation policies at present (e.g. Gassler et al. 2008). Since the 2000s, a “new mission 
orientation” (Gassler et al. 2006) approach has gathered momentum putting more emphasis 
on societal needs and challenges, and thus connecting to the efforts of tackling today’s 
“Grand Challenges”. This new strand of missions has been adopted in several European 
countries, alongside attempts to form the European Research Area (ERA) and advanced 
policy rationales (Georghiou et al. 2008). Austrian RTI policy objectives are also typically 
tied to the objectives of other policy areas such as energy, health, environment or educa-
tion. 
Given these challenges, recent work in the transition literature (Weber and Rohracher 
2012) suggests addressing, aside market and systems failures, the needs of goal-oriented 
transformative change occurring in innovation systems. In advancing the work of Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) and others, they add “transitional failures” of directionality, policy 
coordination, demand articulation and reflexivity. This perspective stresses the broader, 
evolutionary nature of transformative change, indicating the limitation of policies tackling 
market and systems failures, which “are confined to addressing structural deficits” (Weber 
and Rohracher 2012, p. 1042). In recent conceptual work by Frenken (2016), it is also ar-
gued that societal challenges may not be adequately addressed by current RTI policies that 
build on the notions of market or systems failure. He suggests taking a complexity-
theoretic perspective that draws, besides others, on the country-specific space of opportuni-
ties and barriers for innovation. Subsequently, challenges are to be translated into concrete 
objectives, around which a dedicated “temporary innovation system” is build (Frenken 
2016, pp. 10). 
The flexible applicability of the term innovation, encompassing an increasing number of 
types and forms in various industries, is yet another issue. Questions are raised about, for 
instance, what “being innovative” actually means in practice, how R&D and innovation is 
defined in the context of funding instruments (Straathof et al. 2014), and how it can help to 
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develop businesses and subsequently the economy’s performance. This links to issues with 
the measurement of R&D and innovation (OECD 2005b), like for instance RTI indicators 
or subsequent rankings, which are often found to be misleading or incomplete. Over the 
years, studies have pointed out that innovations may not be of benefit to all groups within 
society (e.g. Rothwell 1985, Soete 2013). Socially harmful innovations have occurred in 
manufacturing (e.g. planned obsolescence) or in the financial sector (e.g. new financial 
products that generate systemic risks). This raises important questions for future policy and 
scholarly work. 
Hence, it seems less surprising that the call for more “evidence” is particularly strong, yet 
challenging, in RTI policy. Besides the growing demand for accountability and budgetary 
constraints, major reasons are the accelerated social and technological change, the increas-
ing complexity of innovation processes, and the continuing interest in innovation and tech-
nology as key factors for economic growth and job creation, in particular in light of tack-
ling the “Grand Challenges”. This has accelerated assessment and evaluation activity, in 
particular by external researchers and experts, aiming to measure the “scientific and tech-
nological quality or the socio-economic impacts of publicly funded research” (Kuhlmann 
1998, p. 1). 
Evaluations are increasingly part of what has been termed, more generally, as “strategic 
intelligence” (Kuhlmann and Edler 2003a, p. 633) in policy making, encompassing the 
collection, analysis and interpretation of evidence that is drawn from various assessments, 
for instance foresight efforts or technology assessments, to make informed decisions on 
priorities and implementation. In some countries, evaluations have become compulsory in 
the legal framework and are installed as preconditions, particularly when public funding is 
involved (e.g. van der Meer and Edelenbos 2006, Ferry and Olejniczak 2008). The intro-
duction of evaluations to the EU research framework programmes (Borrás 2003) and the 
increase in standardisation processes, including guidelines for the proper assessment of 
RTI policies (e.g. OECD 1998), have further contributed to this development. 
RTI evaluations deal with a policy field with high complexity, multiple goals, and with 
linkages to other policy fields such as science, education or employment. The recent trend 
towards more demand-side innovation policies, service innovation, and the increasing in-
terest in achieving societal goals poses major challenges for RTI evaluation. (Edler et al. 
2012) RTI evaluations are often requested to grasp the overall policy context, the dominant 
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actors involved, the role of institutions, and their procedures in conditioning the outcome 
(Gibbons 1984, Rothwell 1985). The diversity of RTI policy instruments requires the   
flexible application of assessment approaches, which take different forms, use a wide vari-
ety of research methods, and cover a broad span of research qualities and immersion 
depths. The upsurge of complex exchange and interaction processes has prompted the de-
velopment of more systemic and integrated approaches in recent years. Narrow or limited 
data resources remain a challenge in this policy field. While the multidimensional nature of 
RTI poses a challenge, in particular when assessing policy aims, it is important to recall 
that relevant evaluations are only a further piece in the mosaic of information and advice 
that policy makers use for strategic planning and decision making. 
Similar to other policy fields, the objectives of evaluations have expanded in recent years 
from legitimating past actions and providing accountability, towards facilitating learning 
and improving future initiatives. Increasing attention is paid to evaluations as a (formative) 
forward-looking “learning medium” in addition to, or even instead of, evaluations as 
backward-looking (summative) performance measurements and judgments as promoted by 
New Public Management.  
Tensions between the functions of accountability and learning are salient: Policy makers 
often tend towards ad hoc judgments and decisions and are concerned with short-term and 
direct impacts of RTI programmes; RTI policies, but also evaluations, usually take a medi-
um to long-term perspective – notwithstanding the high complexity, interdependencies and 
multiple actor perspectives that characterise the field. Impacts of RTI policies and pro-
grammes may be relatively intangible, such as awareness-raising, education or promotion 
of science-industry relationships. 
With the increasing number and quality of RTI policy evaluations, concerns have been 
raised about the consequences of evaluations and their effectiveness to promote change. 
Recent research in the RTI area finds that evaluations have only limited consequences; 
they tend to be incremental rather than radical. The perceived ease of use and the perceived 
usefulness are apparently affected by factors that can be largely attributed to the instrument 
itself. These include providing consistent and relevant information about the effectiveness, 
efficiency and impact of the intervention, demonstrating high quality, transparency of 
methodologies and alignment with the purpose of the evaluation and sponsor demands, 
alongside other factors such as obtaining the compliance and trust of stakeholders and the 
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use of clear and measurable objectives. Embedding evaluations in the policy cycle is 
viewed to be essential. However, it is also argued that usefulness may be somewhat subjec-
tive and, importantly, a context-specific issue (Edler et al. 2010). 
In sum, RTI policy making is facing new challenges: The mounting pressure for accounta-
bility, socio-economic impacts and the growing public demand for more participatory gov-
ernance to shape policy agendas. However, prioritising the accountability function of RTI 
policy evaluations, particularly in the context of funding priorities and mission-oriented 
approaches, may hamper the development of new perspectives, ideas and knowledge, 
hence understanding and learning, in particular at the level of composite actors. Putting a 
strong focus on performance, outputs and impacts may overshadow questions regarding the 
actual relevance or appropriateness of specific RTI policies, providing little insight into 
processes and mechanisms underlying success or failure. For some time now, studies on 
innovation policy call for stronger efforts to promote policy learning (OECD 2005a, Valo-
virta 2006, Gregersen and Johnson 2009, Malerba 2009, Borrás 2011).  
Policy making might benefit from paying more attention to the potential of evaluation as 
an instrument of RTI governance that may facilitate communication between various 
groups of actors. Reaching a consensus and fostering cooperation amongst actors with dif-
ferent interests and motivations may not be part of the very essence of evaluation, howev-
er, evaluation could be a tool to promote reflexivity and shared understanding, and to build 
community in an area of complex challenges and dynamic environments, such as RTI.  
4.2 The Austrian RTI Policy and Evaluation Scene 
Building on current literature, this section outlines the overall Austrian policy context, fol-
lowed by a more detailed description of RTI policy and governance and a discussion of the 
role of RTI evaluations and its impact.  
Political System and Policy Tradition 
Austria is a federation based on a constitution and governed according to the principles of 
representative democracy (Müller 2006). The Austrian government is the central policy 
making body. Since World War II, the political system has been evolving into a (neo-) 
corporatist tradition of negotiation and representation, and also dialogue (Obern-
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dorfer 2006), sometimes referred to as “Austro-corporatism”. Some notable features of the 
overall policy making process in Austria are the gradual transformation from a dominating 
two-party system consisting of the Social-Democratic Party SPÖ and the People’s Party 
ÖVP to a system of three medium-sized parties, including the right-wing Freedom Party 
FPÖ, the considerable weight of administration and social partnership, as well as, the com-
paratively less important role of the parliament. The social partnership is an informal sys-
tem consisting of organisations that represent employers’ and labour interests, such as the 
Federal Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Economic Chamber, and the Federation of Aus-
trian Industries. Although the influence of the social partnership has declined in recent 
years, mainly due to Austria’s entry into the European Union, divergent interests and over-
all social developments, it remains a key actor in policy making. (Markovits 1996, Preger-
nig 2007, Pelinka and Rosenberger 2007) 
Austrian ministries work independently, but report to the chancellor and the parliament. 
Their responsibilities are defined by the Austrian Federal Ministries Act. Within the minis-
tries, responsibilities are distributed between different sections, groups, departments and 
units (Neisser 2006). In light of the long-standing legalistic state tradition (e.g. Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006), Austrian public administration has features of classical Weberian 
“bureaucratic rationality” with a strong emphasis on processes, principles, rules and direc-
tives. Administration is scripted by standardised procedures, mostly regulated by statute, 
and is conduced impartially, following a legal-rational manner (Meyer and Hammerschmid 
2006). Recent decades have seen some arrangements with joint public and private in-
volvement and more informal rules that complement and partly replace the formal ones 
(Griessler 1995, Hammerschmid et al. 2011). Essentially, public administration in Austria 
stands for continuity: Civil servants are appointed, not elected. The minister and his or her 
cabinet work in close cooperation with the hierarchically structured government depart-
ments.  
Since the turn of the millennium, however, the Austrian political culture has seen changes 
in behavioural patterns. The agreement-based orientation, also referred to as concordance, 
meaning that decisions can only be made after all relevant actor groups have had the     
opportunity to express their points of view, has been partly replaced by styles of competi-
tion and conflict (Plasser and Ulram 2002). Reaching back to the 1990s, the relationship 
between politics and administration has also been increasingly fuelled by principles of 
New Public Management. Public administration has begun to adopt an outcome-oriented 
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perspective with target setting, seeking effectiveness, efficiency, and hence output control. 
Features such as outsourcing, cost cutting and privatisation have been quite common. 
(Gerlich and Pfefferle 2006, Neisser 2006, Hammerschmid and Meyer 2005, Ham-
merschmid et al. 2011) 
Of particular importance in the context of this study is the trend towards “agencification”. 
It designates the establishment of (semi-)autonomous agencies, owned, fully or in part, by 
a ministry. Tasks at the strategic level are designated to the ministries, whereas agencies 
are responsible for operational tasks, such the management of RTI support programmes 
investigated in this study. The process of agencification reflects a shift from a centralised 
and input-based towards a more decentralised and outcome-oriented style. It is expected to 
foster professionalisation and increase efficiency, flexibility, performance and “customer-
friendly” responsiveness (e.g. Talbot et al. 2000, Mayer et al. 2009). Agencification has 
been a major trend in Austrian public administration. Considering the various forms and 
legal bases, there were around 175 autonomous agencies in 2009 at the Federal level 
(Hammerschmid et al. 2011). Steering and controlling agencies is based on regulations 
such as contractual relations that set targets, audits and reporting requirements. Otherwise, 
interaction and communication between agencies and ministries are gauged to be intense, 
based on a high level of trust and a strong adhesion to informal contacts and processes 
(Hammerschmid and Meyer 2005, Hammerschmid et al. 2011). 
The move towards New Public Management has reached a new level with the implementa-
tion of new budget principles as part of the Federal budget reform in 2013, making impact 
orientation in policy making, evaluation and budgeting compulsory. The annual Federal 
Budget Act of 2014 refers to this as follows: “Impact-oriented budgeting. […] Each mini-
stry is accountable” (BA 2014, p. 12). Single steps may vary, but policy objectives, as well 
as, desired outputs, outcomes and impacts are to be defined in advance and analysed by 
means of indicators.  
A key element is a regulatory impact assessment approach termed “Outcome-Oriented Ex-
ante Impact Assessment”22, which is to be carried out by ministries and other relevant state 
                                                 
22  Federal Budget Law 2013, Sec. 17, referred to as: Outcome-oriented impact assessment with respect to 
legislative proposals and other projects. Impacts refer to “financial, economic, environmental, consumer 
protection effects as well as the effects on children and youth and the administrative cost to citizens and 
to businesses including in social respects and, in particular, also on actual equality of the genders”. 
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actors that draft regulations and develop policy projects. They are required for new laws, 
ordinances, regulations, international agreements, national and EU legislation, legal 
frameworks and major projects in various policy areas, many of them related to the field of 
RTI. Based on that impact assessment and the indicators developed there, an evaluation23 
has to be conducted at reasonable intervals, but within five years at the latest.  
In sum, the overall Austrian policy style, understood as patterns of interaction, is described 
as being dialogue-oriented, (still) largely consensual and interest accommodating, follow-
ing the principles of agreement, continuity and unanimity (Neisser 2006, Pregernig 2007, 
Biegelbauer 2011). However, the turn of the century has seen a shift towards more compe-
tition-oriented policy making. Public administration tends to be of a legalistic, formal and 
process-based nature, with some informal bargaining and consultation processes between 
state and non-state actors, in Austria often referred to as “stakeholder processes”. They 
assume a central role in overall policy decision making, so much so that they can be re-
garded as political actors in their own right, with a substantial scope for negotiation 
(Pregernig 2007).  
Highlighting the institutional aspects of Austrian policy making, Meyer et al. (2013; see 
also Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006) have identified two dominant institutional logics in 
the Austrian public sector which they term i) the “legalistic-bureaucratic” logic and ii) the 
increasingly applied “managerial” logic that links to the rationalities of New Public Man-
agement. An overview of both logics described alongside different dimensions (e.g. ration-
alities, foci of attention, core values) is given in Tab. A1 in the appendix. 
Policy development and legislation fall within the responsibilities of respective ministries, 
while implementation is more and more delegated to (semi-)autonomous units or agencies, 
establishing performance management, but also fostering decentralisation and fragmenta-
tion. Ney and Schmidt (2001) argue that policy decision making in Austria is a multifacet-
                                                 
23  While this type of evaluation links to some extent to the existing conducts of RTI evaluations as discussed 
in Section 4.2, they may not be confused with each other. RTI evaluations have a longer tradition and 
usually follow a more elaborated approach. They can be used to support this type of evaluation, which, in 
its current form, takes a set of pre-defined indicators and applies, within five years, a rather simple        
before/after comparison. 
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ed process that tends to be of an incremental, short-term nature.24 Policy change takes 
place in small steps, largely oriented towards the lowest common political denominator. 
The number of actors involved in a policy decision process is limited, entry levels are high 
and staff turnover is low. Bargaining positions are largely clear and predictable; surprises 
with regard to preferences and orientations are less common. 
RTI Policy and Governance 
The innovation rationale has gained considerable ground within the Austrian public policy 
arena in recent decades. Starting off with some first support policies introduced by the Re-
search and Promotion Act of 1967, it was the early 1990s that brought a fundamental shift 
in political orientation. Austrian RTI policy started to pick up systematic approaches in 
R&D support activities and was somewhat broadened to include more varieties of support, 
particularly emphasising cooperation between industry and science. New technological 
themes were specifically addressed, large‐scale technology and structural programmes 
were implemented and the portfolio of support instruments was expanded.  
Since then, R&D activities and expenditure have been growing continuously, rising from 
1.4 % in 1993 to an estimated 3.07 % in 2015, well above OECD and EU-28 averages. The 
Lisbon goal of reaching 3 % of GDP on R&D by 2010 has been extended by the new goal 
of 3.76 % to be reached by 2020. This is, amongst other objectives, laid down in the 2011 
RTI strategy by the Austrian government (see BKA et al. 2011). Research shows that there 
is a fundamental consensus amongst relevant national actors that research, technology and 
innovation are crucial and key to boost productivity, economic performance and future 
growth (see, for instance, Elias 2008, Gottweis and Latzer 2006), making the innovation 
rationale a priority for policy makers in line with European policies (Leibfritz and Janger 
2007), and subsequently a cornerstone of various national public development pro-
grammes, related strategies and work plans. 
The evolution of this common perception was accompanied by changes in the organisa-
tional and institutional setting, including the introduction of advisory bodies, major       
                                                 
24  “[M]uch of Austrian policy making is like ballroom dancing: No matter what the precise piece of music, 
the partners follow a set repertoire of steps. Sudden and unplanned changes to these steps are likely to 
lead to little more than to sore toes and a very unhappy partner” (Ney and Schmidt 2001, p. 13). 
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reforms of the university system and the fusion of funding agencies, the latter referring to a 
massive transfer of policy regulation and implementation power to autonomous agencies 
(“agencification”, Pichler et al. 2007, p. 322; see also Gottweis and Latzer 2006, Pichler 
2014, Leibfritz and Janger 2007). While it is assumed that this shift brought some clarity in 
RTI policy making with regard to respective roles, functions and responsibilities in public 
policy making, it is also argued to hamper the distribution of knowledge and information, 
to reduce trust between public administration and agencies and it may lead to the emer-
gence of principal-agent-problems (Aiginger et al. 2009).  
Other factors include Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995, its on-going active participa-
tion in the European Framework Programmes for research and technological development, 
the increasing alignment of science, research, technology and innovation prioritisation pol-
icies with other policies at the regional, national and international level, as well as, related 
priority setting processes and mission-led approaches such as tackling the “Grand Chal-
lenges” as set by the European Union (Schibany et al. 2005, CREST 2008, Mayer 2003, 
Borrás and Biegelbauer 2003, Jörg 2005, Streicher and Mayer 2010).  
The overall (neo-)corporatist system of negotiation and policy decision making in Austria 
is well reflected in the RTI area. Although RTI policy is defined by the government, it does 
not fall within its formal responsibilities, as research, technology and innovation are not 
specifically addressed in the constitution or in related laws (Pichler 2014). Formal embed-
dedness is provided by the Austrian Federal Ministries Act, which defines the scope of RTI 
responsibility for each of the ministries (Neisser 2006).  
Policy making in this area is characterised by a split between law-based and actually exist-
ing RTI competences; by the interplay between various actors, none of which have a coor-
dination role or are otherwise clearly dominant; and by rather vaguely defined lines of re-
sponsibility and competence. Actors of the RTI community are well linked. The high use 
of informal communication complements formal ways of interaction (Gottweis and Latzer 
2006, Streicher and Mayer 2010, Mayer et al. 2009, Whitelegg 2003, 2004). Aside from 
the formal hierarchy between what has been termed as high-level (i.e. elected politicians) 
and low-level (i.e. appointed civil servants, which refers to the administration) politics, it 
can be stated that policy making works largely on a basis of collegial and cooperative   
interaction and dialogue (Biegelbauer 2013, Oberndorfer 2006). An overall picture of the 
key actors in the Austrian RTI policy system is provided in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5: Key Actors of the Austrian RTI Policy System 
 
 
Until 2013, the majority of the Federal research, science, technology and innovation policy 
agendas and the respective budgets were split amongst three ministries (see Fig. 5): The 
Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology; the Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics, Family and Youth and the Federal Ministry of Science and Research. In early 
2014, the two latter ministries merged25 to become the Federal Ministry of Science, Re-
search and Economy26. Reducing the number of ministries responsible for innovation poli-
cies had already been discussed for a while, arguing that this might contribute to lower 
coordination cost and a streamlined funding portfolio between ministries. However, the 
persistence of heterogeneous political cultures, rationales and agendas in Austrian RTI 
policy making should not be underestimated (Aiginger et al. 2009, p. 86).  
In addition, the Federal Ministry of Finance plays a vital role, as it is involved in financing 
policy measures and budget planning, and thus has a strong interest in the performance of 
                                                 
25  This merger, which fell into the time when this thesis was prepared, had no discernible effect on the 
course and analysis of this study. 
26  However, responsibilities within the new ministry are still distributed separately between the administra-
tion areas for “science and research” and “the economy”. 
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and the accountability for public money. It is also responsible for indirect support offerings 
such as R&D taxes and allowances. Depending on the amount of funding, the Federal Min-
istry of Finance approves and releases budgets on the basis of the Outcome-Oriented Ex-
ante Impact Assessment described above, and might request additional information, e.g. in 
the form of evaluations. Hence, the Federal Ministry of Finance works closely with the 
relevant ministry departments in the administration and organisation of policies, but is not 
involved in any policy making roles within the RTI system. 
Considering the empirical analysis of this study, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innova-
tion and Technology is one of the main actors in each of the three empirical cases to be 
analysed, and therefore merits a more detailed description. The Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Innovation and Technology is a central actor in the Austrian RTI area and the 
relevant authority with regard to all matters related to mobility and transport, telecommu-
nication, applied scientific and industrial R&D, technology and innovation, and also link-
ing national to international R&D programmes, in particular at the EU level. It has the 
largest budget of any Austrian ministry devoted to applied R&D and provides the majority 
of national technology programmes. Most of the funding and programmes is outsourced to 
the Research Promotion Agency, one of the three main national intermediaries, besides the 
Austrian Science Fund and the Austrian Economic Service. In sum, they carry out most of 
the implementation and management of national R&D support instruments. 
 The Research Promotion Agency is the national funding agency for applied and indus-
trially oriented research and development. It offers a wide range of programmes, in-
formation and services for all areas of technology and all company sizes. 
 The Austrian Science Fund is the central body for the promotion of basic research at 
universities and public research institutions. It provides programmes that cover virtual-
ly all research disciplines. 
 The Austrian Economic Service, together with the European Recovery Program Fund, 
which was established under the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction after 
World War II, provides business-related financial support, e.g. for start-ups, entrepre-
neurs and innovation projects in companies. 
Because the Research Promotion Agency will be featured as a main actor in the ensuing 
empirical analysis, a more elaborate description shall be provided. It was founded in 2004, 
following a process of agencification and centralisation, strongly grounded on a targeted 
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evaluation, becoming the successor organisation of four other funding agencies27 (see e.g. 
Arnold 2004b). It is organised as a corporation with limited liability, owned by the Repub-
lic of Austria28, and operates on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation 
and Technology and the former Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, since 2014 the 
Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy. The relationship between the Re-
search Promotion Agency and the Federal Ministries is primarily founded on the Research 
Promotion Agency Law29. For the analysis, it seems noteworthy that the relationship     
between the Research Promotion Agency and the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innova-
tion and Technology is traditionally close. There are strong historical ties to the predeces-
sor funding agencies, which are mirrored to-date in the funding portfolio of the Research 
Promotion Agency (e.g. Elias 2008). 
Both the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology, and the Federal Min-
istry of Science, Research and Economy appoint one managing director (e.g. Slipersæter et 
al. 2007). The implementation of the agency’s work is ensured through multi-annual pro-
grammes, as specified in the Research Promotion Agency Law. In addition, ministries may 
contract the Research Promotion Agency, or one of the other agencies, to operate a pro-
gramme which would require a new framework contract30. In one of the interviews for this 
study it was argued that the Research Promotion Agency, although being led by and acting 
for two ministries, may not be regarded as a “state actor” as such, due to its status as corpo-
ration.  
The Research Promotion Agency offers a comprehensive set of instruments and initiatives 
to companies, research organisations and researchers to support applied industrial R&D 
and innovation activities. It comprises a so-called autonomous area, in which it funds RTI 
activities using its own budget, and a contract-based area that is connected to individual 
programmes and budgets provided by, e.g. ministries, the Austrian National Research 
Foundation, Federal States and the European Union. These individual programmes are 
summarised under one roof, the so-called topical or thematic programmes. They aim to 
                                                 
27 These agencies were: The Forschungsförderungsfond, the Austrian Space Agency, the Bureau for Inter-
national Technology Cooperations and the Technologie Impulse Gesellschaft. 
28 Austrian Research Promotion Agency Act on establishing a research promotion agency, Federal Law 
Gazette I No. 73/2004.  
29 Austrian Research Promotion Agency Law (FFG-G) 
30 §§12, Section 1, Research and Technology Funding Act (FTF-G) 
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support national and international “priority topics”, for instance information and communi-
cation technology, energy, mobility, production and security research. For the most part, 
they strongly connect to topics that have been identified as vital for future sustainability 
and economic benefit by European level research strategies. The Agency’s programmes are 
thus often referred to as being “mission-oriented” (although a formal matching to European 
research strategies does not exist). In addition, the Agency also provides a range of support 
services including information and consulting activities, networking opportunities between 
potential national and international partners, assistance with technology transfer activities, 
and advice on European research programmes. The Agency is also the National Contact 
Point for the 8th European Framework Programme HORIZON 2020.  
Austrian RTI policy making and implementation are supported by several advisory bodies, 
of which two stand out: The Science Board and the Council for Research and Technology 
Development. The Science Board deals with research at universities and related affairs and 
reports to the parliament, the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy and di-
rectly to the universities. The Council for Research and Technology Development advises 
the ministries, the government, the parliament and the National Foundation for Research, 
Technology and Development in all questions related to research, technology and innova-
tion. In addition, the Committee on Science and the Committee on Research, Technology 
and Innovation support the linkage between the government and the parliament and assist 
with RTI-related matters.  
Other bodies influencing Austrian RTI policy formulation are, for example, the Ludwig 
Boltzmann Gesellschaft, the Christian Doppler Research Association, the Academy of Sci-
ences, and the Anniversary Fund of the Austrian National Bank. Since 2014, the European 
Research Area (ERA) Council advises the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and 
Economy on the interface of European research policy and the national science, research 
and innovation system. 
The role of social partners, traditionally important in the overall policy making process in 
Austria, but also of universities and related research institutions has gradually decreased 
during the last decades (Pichler et al. 2007, p. 300) in favour of scientific advice from in-
house research, advisory bodies or external sources, and consultants (Whitelegg 2003). 
However, members of the social partnership are formally represented in steering and advi-
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sory committees, for instance at the Research Promotion Agency. Recent analyses (Mayer 
et al. 2009) suggest that they often resort to informal channels of communication. 
Austrian RTI governance, policy making and related funding measures have been the sub-
ject of numerous past studies and analyses (to name but a few: Pichler 2016, Polt et al. 
2015, Leitner et al. 2015, Cuntz 2015, Pichler 2014, Streicher and Mayer 2010, Aiginger et 
al. 2009, Leibfritz and Janger 2007, Pichler et al. 2007, Steger 2006, Jörg 2005, Ohler 
2004, Arnold 2004b). Interestingly, the overall picture has not changed much in recent 
years. While there has been some reorganisation of responsibilities between ministries in 
recent years, RTI governance is still characterised by high complexity, somewhat frag-
mented, and overshadowed by the interdisciplinary and inter-ministerial nature of the poli-
cy field.  
Specifically, it is often argued that strategies and policies at the regional and the national 
level are neither fully aligned with other policies, nor sufficiently coordinated amongst key 
actors. Informal interaction and processes apparently dominate decision making, resulting 
in fragmented governance processes, small-scale interventions and chronic adaptations – 
typically at the level of programmes and similar initiatives (Biegelbauer 2013, Gerhardter 
et al. 2009, Mayer et al. 2009, Arnold 2004b). Prior research suggests that policy learning 
is less systematic, more punctual and generated in silos (Biegelbauer 2013). That is to say, 
learning tends to be confined to e.g. one agency, one department, or one specific group of 
people, and is rarely transferred elsewhere. 
The perceived importance of the policy field, as well as, the lack of clear lines of responsi-
bility shape formulation and implementation of respective policies, frequently causing con-
flict, prevention and paralysis rather than consensual developments (Gottweis and Latzer 
2006). Idiosyncratic interpretations of professional roles and personal identification with 
tasks are quite common in practice. With an emphasis on technology policy, Griessler 
(2003) concludes that policy making is merely a game played by a rather small, inner circle 
of ministry representatives in a largely informal contact system.  
Somewhat mirroring the shift in the overall Austrian political culture, and further intensi-
fied by less clear roles and vague responsibilities, research, technology and innovation pol-
icy making shows signs of a “culture of competition” (Gerhardter et al. 2009, p. 35) for 
“best policies” (Leibfritz and Janger 2007, p. 23) that require legitimation, and hence ac-
countability, lacking a common normative orientation in the entire science and RTI area. 
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Although some of these aspects were tackled in the previously mentioned 2011 national 
RTI strategy31 that outlines a long-term vision and directions for Austria to join the group 
of European innovators by 2020, it is criticised, amongst other things, for its lack of budg-
etary indications and, yet again, unclear responsibilities (e.g. Polt et al. 2015, Leitner et al. 
2015, Cuntz 2015, see also Schuch 2013).  
While the on-going implementation of the 2011 RTI strategy has led to intensive debates 
between ministries and administration, e.g. in the form of sub-committees and working 
groups, social partners and other stakeholders claim that they were only partially included 
in the development process (BFWS 2013). Notably, it appears that the competition for 
“best policies” has recently been stretched to arguments about “best strategies”, which can 
be seen from the growing amount of, partly overlapping, sub-strategies32 in RTI. 
In sum, the institutional set-up of Austrian RTI governance appears fragmented and      
remains in a state of transition. It is characterised by the interplay of various actors in a 
system of complex interdependencies, where it is difficult to draw clear lines of responsi-
bility and competence. RTI policy making is conditioned by law-based, institutional struc-
tures, as well as, informal linkages and relations in the governance system, exchanges with 
scientific communities, applied research institutes and universities, and the, although lim-
ited, involvement of stakeholder groups (Streicher and Mayer 2010, Whitelegg 2003, 
2004). Multi-level governance (i.e. the co-decision making influenced by public actors, 
private actors, as well as, Federal States, and the RTI policy of the European Union) is of 
practical importance in Austrian RTI policy decision making (Ohler 2004). 
                                                 
31 The goal of the Federal Government’s RTI strategy is to increase the R&D intensity to 3.76 % (gross 
domestic expenditures for research and development relative to gross domestic product) by 2020, thus 
advancing into the rank of an “innovation leader”, and improving collaboration between the three sides of 
the "knowledge triangle" (education, research and innovation). For further details see BKA et al. 2011. 
32 As of 2017, examples for RTI-related, national initiatives of the Austrian Federal Government and Minis-
tries since 2011 include: The Future of Higher Education Initiative (planning stage), the Austrian RTI 
Strategy on Bio-Economy (planning stage), the Open Access Strategy (planning stage), the Intellectual 
Property Strategy (2017), the Life-Sciences Strategy (2016), the Digital Roadmap for Austria (2016), the 
Open Innovation Strategy (2016), the Creative Industries Strategy for Austria (2016), the Action Plan for 
a Competitive Research Area (2015), the Location Strategy “Leading Competence Unit” (2014), the  
Austrian Research Infrastructure Action Plan 2014-2020 (2014), the eGovernment Strategy (2014), the 
Austrian Research, Technology and Innovation (RTI) Aeronautics Strategy (2014, 2008), the Broadband 
Strategy 2014-2018 (2014), the Strategy for Cyber Security (2013), the Information and Communication 
Technology Strategy (2013), the Strategy for Austrian Space Activities (2012) and the Austrian RTI  
strategy (2011). 
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Evaluations 
While RTI policy in Austria has undergone major changes, the range of policy measures 
and initiatives has rapidly expanded. An important feature of Austrian RTI promotion is its 
persistent programme orientation, which has led to the development of a large number of 
diverse bottom-up-oriented, structural as well as thematic instruments. The high diversity 
of RTI support measures has increasingly been questioned, addressing issues such as 
transparency, clearness and efficiency. Hence, the terms “funding jungle” (Jörg 2005) or 
“funding super-market” (Aiginger et al. 2009) were coined, indicating a lack of clear    
priorities, resulting in long-term continuity of policies and initiatives. The on-going adapta-
tion and enhancement of existing programmes, rather than the development of new 
measures, meant that some became readily ingrained in the overall Austrian RTI promo-
tion system. Following increased public attention, the expansion of instruments, and the 
growth of RTI expenditures that require legitimation, evaluations have become the instru-
ment of choice to assess the performance of programmes and initiatives. 
Rising from a low point of activity in the early 1990s, Austria has developed a strong eval-
uation culture since then. Austria is viewed as one of the European countries leading in 
evaluation of R&D and innovation policies (Henri et al. 2011), and as a role model for oth-
er countries interested in establishing a proper RTI evaluation culture (CREST 2008, 
Tsipouri and Sidiropolous 2014). An important driver was Austria’s EU accession, which 
introduced new regulations and standards for evaluations, and fostered programme orienta-
tion, the introduction of New Public Management, agencification processes and the incor-
poration of respective laws and regulations (Holzinger 2002, Jörg 2005, Zinöcker et al. 
2007, CREST 2008, Dinges and Schmidmayer 2010). Pichler et al. (2007, p. 323) argue 
that the Council for Research and Technology Development has also been an important 
driver in this development. Over the past years, numerous evaluations have been carried 
out, including a systemic meta-evaluation addressing the Austrian system of research sup-
port and financing as whole (Aiginger et al. 2009).  
The increasing amount of RTI support measures has led to a vast number of a specific form 
of evaluation, namely interim evaluations for formative purposes, representing the majority 
of all RTI evaluations in Austria. Focus is usually put on effectiveness and consistency, 
aiming to adjust or enhance the intervention and its execution. (Polt and Stampfer 2010, 
Dinges and Schmidmayer 2010) In recent years, summative questions that address effects 
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and impacts – that have been achieved so far – found their way into the terms of reference 
of interim evaluations. Ex-ante or ex-post evaluations are less common. This might be  
explained by the long-term continuity of policies and programmes which heavily draw on 
formative assessments to support policy decisions. 
As recent research shows, data collection and analysis in evaluation are frequently de-
signed to be low cost, drawing on descriptive statistics, existing databases and – if availa-
ble – monitoring data. Methods of choice are case studies and expert interviews. Specific 
approaches such as econometric or network analyses are used less often. The majority of 
evaluations is carried out by external experts, predominantly national consulting and re-
search companies. The tender procedure is considered as somewhat restricted, because 
usually only a limited number of evaluators is invited to tender, a procedure that is differ-
ent from other European countries (Dinges and Schmidmayer 2010). 
Shortly after European quality standards were introduced, the platform Research & Tech-
nology Policy Evaluation, an association under Austrian Company Law, was founded in 
1996 to further advance the RTI evaluation culture in Austria. Its main objectives are to 
support the dialogue between respective actors, to encourage high-quality evaluations, to 
present and discuss evaluation approaches, to provide fora for debates about evaluation, as 
well as, training courses and workshops. Members of the platform include the key actors of 
the national RTI policy system, e.g. the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and 
Technology, the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, and governmental 
agencies, but also research institutes and consulting companies. Most notably, the platform 
has developed and published evaluation standards for RTI, which serve as a framework 
and code of conduct for those involved in evaluations. 
While these standards do not represent legal or otherwise formally binding mechanisms of 
any kind, platform members, and hence key evaluation commissioning authorities, have 
committed themselves to comply with these standards. They, therefore, constitute a formal 
institution33. Accordingly, RTI policies should be able “to show how and why investments 
in this field are worthwhile, and they should help to reduce the risk of future interventions 
by introducing feedback loops and learning loops” (FTEVAL 2012, p. 3). The typical  
                                                 
33 “The members of the Platform Research and Technology Policy Evaluation have adopted the standards as 
a set of binding guidelines” (FTEVAL 2012, p. 2). 
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functions are described as legitimation drawn from assumed market and systems failure, 
providing information and learning opportunities for politicians, funding institutions and 
the interested public, as well as, mediation between competing interests and steering of 
future developments. These functions may differ depending on the objective of the evalua-
tion, which should, as suggested by the standards, be made clear and transparent in the 
terms of reference. For interim evaluations, which have been chosen for the analysis in this 
study, the FTEVAL (2012) standards state that the aim is to examine the current status of 
the policy and its management in order to make recommendations on how it can be im-
proved. Expected consequences are changes in organisation and management, and in the 
programme focus and financing, which may also lead, if deemed appropriate, to the termi-
nation of the programme. 
The relevance of evaluations is not only visible from the increased frequency and transpar-
ency of evaluation findings, the latter was fostered by making reports available on the   
internet, and promoting and discussing them in workshops, at conferences and other 
events, but also from changes in the legal frameworks. RTI evaluations have become legal-
ly binding and are embedded in several laws, most notably the 2004 Act for Creation of the 
Austrian Research Promotion Agency, the 2010 Research and Technology Promotion Act, 
the Research Organisation Act, and guidelines for research funding based on these laws 
and for the promotion of commercial-technical research, technology development and in-
novation, generally known as the RTI guidelines34.  
The guidelines state that all subsidy programmes and measures require a written evaluation 
concept, which must include the purpose, aims, and procedures, as well as, deadlines for 
monitoring the achievement of the funding objectives, and suitable indicators. In the up-
dated guidelines that came into force on January 1, 2015, minimum standards to support 
evaluations and other requirements were outlined, and the issue of impact-oriented budget-
ing was highlighted. The guidelines link to the Research and Technology Promotion Act, 
which positions evaluations as a standard and minimum requirement at the legislative   
level. 
                                                 
34 Guidelines for supporting commercial-technical research, technology development and innovation (RTI 
guidelines 2015), which are: RTI thematic guidelines, RTI structural guidelines, RTI human resources 
guidelines in accordance with the Research and Technology Funding Act (FTF-G) of the Federal Minister 
for Transport, Innovation and Technology (GZ BMVIT-609.986/0011-III/I2/2014), and the Federal Min-
ister of Economics and Labour (GZ BMWFW-97.005/0003-C1/9/2014). 
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Despite the well-developed evaluation culture and the increased frequency and quality of 
evaluations over the past years, concerns have been raised about their effectiveness to 
promote change in Austrian RTI policy making. Since the beginning, the organisation and 
implementation of evaluations were influenced by the fragmentation of responsibility in 
RTI and the insufficient coordination with other actors (Holzinger 2002, p. 21). An early 
example is the Austrian Technology Monitoring System (termed ATMOS), launched in 
1990, which was shut down due to unclear communication channels, divergent competence 
distributions and conflicting decision making at the policy level, before a respective evalu-
ation was concluded (Griessler 2003). Others, such as Biegelbauer (2007, 2013), argue that 
programme development is influenced not so much by evaluations, but rather by various 
other internal and external factors and mechanisms. The 2008 CREST35 report on Austria 
questions the actual usage of evaluation results in the R&D and innovation system, sug-
gesting that “more attention should be paid to the framework and mechanisms to ensure 
that evaluation results are translated adequately into policy formulation and implementa-
tion” (CREST 2008, p. 18).  
Dinges and Schmidmayer (2010) assert that some recommendations have found their way 
into minor re-designs of RTI policy measures, in particular emerging from the large and 
growing number of interim evaluations. However, they also criticise the lack of mecha-
nisms that ensure feedback into policy formulation and implementation. In a similar vein, 
Rainer and Smoliner (2012) stress divergent expectations and evaluation needs amongst 
programme officers, agencies and ministries, and a lack of binding mechanisms for imple-
menting results. Furthermore, instances of evaluation fatigue have been reported. Continu-
ously evolving programmes and initiatives accompanied by more intensive and different 
evaluation activities create an “information overload” leading to “paralysis via analysis” 
(CREST 2008, Dinges and Schmidmayer 2010). 
Austria makes a particularly interesting case for empirical investigation, because the attrib-
utes of evaluation, in particular those that prior research has shown to be most critical 
when it comes to prompting policy learning, e.g. quality, relevance and credibility, are, 
                                                 
35 The European Union’s Scientific and Technical Research Committee (Comité de la recherche scientifique 
et technique, CREST) assists the European Commission and the Council in the field of R&D by identify-
ing strategic priorities, establishing mutual consistency between national and European policies, and help-
ing to formulate EU strategy with regard to international cooperation. Part of its activities has been a se-
ries of Policy Mix Peer Reviews that analysed selected European countries. 
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according to prior research, not perceived as major issues. On the contrary, as recent re-
search suggests (Dinges and Schmidmayer 2010), the quality of RTI evaluations is per-
ceived to be high, design and methods used are considered appropriate, and recommenda-
tions are deemed relevant and useful. It seems plausible to assume that this is due to the 
well-developed evaluation tradition, and hence the capacity and knowledge that has been 
built up during the past decades. However, it makes the relatively low absorption level of 
evaluation seem even more puzzling and indicates a need for more attention on factors and 
mechanisms beyond the evaluations themselves, notably on actors, interactions and institu-
tional contexts that could be responsible for the up-take of evaluation results. 
Summarising from an actor-centred perspective, Austria’s RTI scene provides an interest-
ing, but at the same time challenging setting for an empirical investigation due to its still 
evolving institutional landscape, progressing programmes and initiatives, the dynamic, but 
complex interplay between actors and the well-developed evaluation culture. Although 
considered crucial for policy development and change, communication and cooperation 
between actors seem to be (formally) limited and coordination remains an on-going chal-
lenge. While Austria has received praise for its evaluation culture and high standards, crit-
ics stress the inefficient use of evaluation results and recommendations, suggesting a less-
than-rational policy making process. Resonating with the literature’s perspectives, the pri-
mary function of evaluation seems to cluster around justifying and legitimating public ex-
penditures. Research (e.g. CREST 2008, Biegelbauer 2007) suggests that the learning from 
evaluations is unsatisfying. Tighter control mechanisms, such as the recent implementation 
of a regulatory impact assessment approach at the Federal level, have further increased the 
focus on accountability, output and impacts of RTI policies.  
The following section outlines the case study approach taken in this study, its design and 
the methods of data collection and analysis.  
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5 Using Case Studies to Investigate the Contingent Effects of 
Policy Evaluation 
In this chapter, the case study design and methodology that is used for the analysis of the 
cases from evaluated programmes in the Austrian RTI area is outlined and described (see 
Section 5.1). This is followed by a general description of the selected case studies in     
Section 5.2.  
5.1 Case Study Design and Methodology 
A multiple case study design is used in this study, following procedures suggested by Yin 
(1994) and Eisenhardt (1989). Yin (1989, p. 23) defines a case study as an “empirical in-
quiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context”. Eisenhardt 
(1989) adds that case study research is particularly appropriate when little is known about a 
specific phenomenon and new perspectives are required. The advantage of this approach is 
its ability to illuminate the dynamics of the institutional settings in which the phenomenon 
is embedded and has developed over time. It helps to identify and investigate critical as-
pects of particular phenomena such as processes, linkages and interactions amongst actors. 
The research at hand is conducted following Yin’s (2004) suggestion for a case study re-
search design. Building on the research questions set out in the introductory chapter, the 
conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 3 provides the starting point for the analysis. The 
units of analysis are the actions and interactions of policy actors. Following the logic of 
qualitative content analysis as proposed by Mayring (1983), patterns between cases are 
compared. Multiple kinds of data are used, in order to triangulate views and enhance the 
validity of findings, including interviews and documents. The criteria for interpreting find-
ings again come from the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 3, which combines an 
actor-oriented institutional approach with insights from evaluation research. 
Three cases are studied and compared. The logic underlying the selection of these cases is 
detailed below. These cases are public support programmes in the field of RTI provided in 
Austria by a ministry (the Federal Ministry of Traffic, Innovation and Transport) and man-
aged by an agency (the Research Promotion Agency) that have been evaluated in recent 
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years. For the sake of simplicity and ease of reading, the Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Innovation and Technology is termed hereinafter as “the Ministry”, and the Re-
search Promotion Agency is referred to in the following as “the Agency”. The team who 
carried out the respective evaluation is termed hereinafter as “the Evaluators”. 
A multiple case study approach is employed, because it allows both an in-depth, self-
contained examination of each case, as well as, a comparison of findings across cases   
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2003). 
The research comprises two stages: 
 First, the programmes are explored and analysed one by one. The history and current 
situation are described to provide an understanding of the programme, its background 
and the situation after the evaluation, in order to develop a focus for the case compari-
son. This is done in Section 5.2. 
 Second, the programmes are compared with each other in order to gain deeper insights, 
and to explore which factors and mechanisms may condition the effects of evaluations. 
In this light, the case studies are descriptive to the extent that they illustrate a specific 
phenomenon within its context (Yin 2003, p. 5) and explanatory to the extent that they 
provide an in-depth understanding of key issues, aiming to replicate findings and to 
support theoretical generalisation. This is done in Chapter 6. 
Field access has been facilitated through the personal background of the author as a      
researcher and evaluator in the RTI area. He has been involved in several national and in-
ternational innovation, R&D and technology-related studies, as well as, in related industry 
analyses and evaluations of programmes and institutions. Experience and insights gained 
from the practice of evaluation have helped to understand the dynamics of the field, as well 
as, to integrate and interpret findings. It is noted that the author has benefited from person-
al and professional acquaintances, often on first-name terms, in particular with evaluators 
and respective organisations, and from the familiarity with the interests of the community 
of evaluation. This made it much easier to convince potential interviewees that the study at 
hand was worthwhile and merited their cooperation. 
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Selection of Cases 
As argued by Yin (1994, p. 46), a multiple case study design should follow a replication 
logic rather than a sampling logic. Replication logic requires that case studies either pro-
duce similar results to corroborate each other (a literal representation), or contrasting re-
sults, but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). In this study, case selection 
follows a literal replication logic, to assess the effects of evaluation processes and results 
from multiple perspectives in a setting that is largely the same for all cases. Although the 
data collection process revealed some issues that may have pointed to different results (for 
predictable reasons), they were nonetheless helpful for identifying patterns in the data. 
Cases were selected on the basis of the following criteria: 
 All cases deal with strategic R&D and innovation-focused public support programmes 
that have been in existence for more than five years and were provided up until the year 
of 2013, the time of selection. 
 All programmes display comparable goals, objectives and (foreseen) levels of interac-
tion between programme stakeholders. 
 They are provided in Austria under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Traffic, In-
novation and Technology and are implemented by the Research Promotion Agency. 
 They were subject to a formative, interim evaluation not longer than five years ago 
from 2013. Furthermore, the evaluation report has been made available and accessible 
to the public (e.g. via the internet). 
 Their evaluations follow roughly the same design and approach.  
 Evaluations were carried out by different organisations.  
The reasons for choosing programmes that are provided by one specific ministry (i.e. the 
Federal Ministry of Traffic, Innovation and Technology) and run by one specific agency 
(i.e. the Research Promotion Agency), are rooted in the attempt to investigate the institu-
tional context as a set of factors in the course of the evaluation in more nuance. If         
programmes funded by various ministries or run by various agencies had been chosen, it 
would probably have resulted in less interesting empirical results, as the institutional con-
text would presumably have turned out to be the single most important explanatory factor. 
Within each case study, only person-related data were anonymised. Programme-related 
data were not anonymised, because they contain information about the background and 
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historical development of the programmes, as well as formal and informal aspects related 
to the programmes, which were important for the ensuing analysis. 
Based on the abovementioned criteria, 14 potential cases were identified in a first selection 
round in 2013. They were identified from the websites of the Federal Ministry of Traffic, 
Innovation and Technology36 and FTEVAL, the platform Research & Technology Policy 
Evaluation37, as recently evaluated RTI measures, policies or related projects. In a second 
round, several cases were excluded, mainly because they could not be regarded as full pro-
grammes, were owned or provided by more than one ministry, or were assessed by using 
an evaluation approach that was not clearly formative or interim (e.g. ex-ante). Also, eval-
uations in which the author of this thesis was involved were excluded.  
It turned out that the two most challenging selection criteria were i) the time that had 
elapsed since the evaluation had been carried out and ii) getting different evaluator organi-
sations for each case. A short-list of potential cases was drawn up and discussed with the 
thesis supervisors to narrow down the selection. In a last round, the Ministry as the pro-
gramme owner and the Agency as responsible for programme management were contacted 
and asked for potential access to basic information about the short-list of cases (e.g. terms 
of reference, programme documents) and their willingness to participate in this project 
(e.g. through interviews). Resulting from this selection process, the following three pro-
grammes were chosen for the case study analysis: 
 “TAKE OFF” (the name is intentionally capitalised) is a programme that aims to 
strengthen the research, technology and cooperation competence of national key actors 
in the aeronautical sector by promoting strategic research projects and fostering inter-
national R&D cooperation. 
 “Headquarter Strategy” is a programme that aims to support Austrian affiliates of mul-
tinational enterprises to build up strategic R&D activities in Austria. 
 “Intelligent Transport Systems and Services plus” (abbreviated as IV2Splus) is a pro-
gramme that supports cooperative R&D in the field a mobility, traffic and transport. 
Besides being joint programmes of the Ministry and the Agency, the cases are somewhat 
similar in terms of funding provision and long-term horizon (see Tab. 1), as well as, con-
                                                 
36 http://www.bmvit.gv.at 
37  http://www.fteval.at 
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nections to the European Research Area (ERA). Distinctive features include the thematic 
focus, which applies only to TAKE OFF and IV2Splus, the available budget and some 
technicalities with regard to the provision of programmes. For example, Headquarter Strat-
egy is permanently open for submission of proposals, while TAKE OFF and IV2Splus 
launch calls for proposals at specific times.  
While Headquarter Strategy may somewhat stand out compared to the other two pro-
grammes, in particular because it has no thematic focus, the overarching objective of all 
three programmes, including Headquarter Strategy, is to promote strategic RTI research 
projects. This is indicated, for instance, by the strong linkages to national, general and sec-
tor-related RTI strategies and government action plans. A detailed history, as well as, a 
description of the goals and objectives of these programmes, and of the purpose and ap-
proach of the evaluations, is outlined in Section 5.2. 
Tab. 1: Selected Features of the Case Studies 
 TAKE OFF Headquarter Strategy IV2Splus 
Programme Start Date 2002 2004 2007 
Predecessor None None IV2S (2001-2006) 
Successor TAKE OFF 
Competence Headquar-
ter (since 2013) 
Mobility of the Future 
(since 2013) 
Thematic Focus 
Aviation, aeronautics, 
transport and related 
None 
Mobility, traffic, 
transport and related 
Funding incl. Liability,  
Year [in Mio €] 
2008: 9.2; 2014: 6.7 2011: 24.9; 2014: 15.9 2012: 15.8; 2014: 17.2 
Funding Mode Non-repayable grant Non-repayable grant Non-repayable grant 
Eligible Parties 
Companies, higher 
education institutions, 
individual researchers 
Companies 
Companies, higher 
education institutions, 
individual researchers 
Chosen Evaluation 2008 2011 2012 
 
Data Collection 
Following Yin (1989), multiple data sources were used in order to enable triangulation of 
views and evidence, thus improving the reliability and validity of research (see also Denzin 
1978). The primary data collection method was semi-structured interviews. Secondary 
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sources encompassed national and international policy documents, including strategy plans 
and government programmes, legal programme documents and evaluation reports, infor-
mation from web sites, workshop presentations, publications by national RTI-related bod-
ies and other documents and notes of relevance. Magazine articles, newspaper accounts 
and editorials were screened by using computerised databases. In retrospect, casual con-
versations with experts at relevant national conferences, notes from panel discussions and 
on-site observations from when the author met interviewees in their work context also pro-
vided a useful source of information.  
Face-to-face and telephone interviews with programmes’ stakeholders and others individu-
als who receive or use evaluation findings were carried out between May 2013 and Febru-
ary 2014. Interview partners included people from “inside” the programme at the ministry 
and the agency level, as well as, from “outside” the programme, i.e. the evaluation team, 
interest groups and industry experts with knowledge of and prior involvement with the 
programme.  
Interviewees needed to have the competence to answer programme- and evaluation-related 
questions.38 Also, it was important to have interviewees with comparative competence, e.g. 
historical knowledge about the developments of national RTI policy or insights into the 
latest developments in the National Innovation System. Each case study involved multiple 
interviews covering key individuals from the Ministry (e.g. current or former programme 
officers, heads of unit or equivalent), the Agency (e.g. current or former programme man-
agers, heads of unit or equivalent), the team of Evaluators and external stakeholders (e.g. 
representatives of interest groups, industry experts). The latter group of actors were      
approached in order to better understand how external stakeholders come across and use 
evaluation findings. These were particularly contacted who had stakes in one or more of 
the investigated programmes, experience relevant to the research questions, or experience 
with RTI programme evaluations in general.  
The majority of actual interviewees appeared curious and showed interest in the study’s 
results. Only few potentially interesting interview partners could not be reached or refused 
                                                 
38  Pilot interviews with beneficiaries of the programmes, in most cases privately owned businesses, turned 
out to be not very informative, basically because of interviewees’ rather selective and narrow experiences 
with the provision of the programme, low insights into the specific evaluation process and a lack of in-
sights and knowledge about evaluations in general. The idea to directly include beneficiaries in the case 
studies was therefore abandoned. 
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to be interviewed. All of the interviewees agreed to audio-recording. In a few cases,      
recordings were briefly paused at the interviewees’ request, e.g. to search for information 
to support statements, to react to interruptions, etc., but also to share confidential state-
ments. Information from such statements was not included in the analysis, but where it 
seemed potentially relevant to the research purpose at hand, attempts were made to triangu-
late it from other, non-confidential sources. 
The author was kindly provided with names of potential interview partners or was, on-site, 
introduced to staff and subsequently supported by them. No general tendency or bias with 
regard to participation in the interviews could be discerned with respect to particular actor 
groups. While it is recognised that the Federal Ministry of Finance plays a vital role in the 
Austrian RTI system and was often mentioned in the interviews as an important actor, 
there were no interviews carried out with respective representatives.39  
With the exception of TAKE OFF40, it was possible to talk with at least two (or more) in-
dividuals from each actor group per case. In addition, five interviews that pertained to 
more than a single case were conducted, interviewing representatives of the Ministry, the 
Agency, and the Evaluators. They were not primarily case-related, but were carried out 
because of the interviewees’ experience with the programme under scrutiny and the actors 
involved. Also, three pilot interviews with representatives of the Austrian RTI community 
were added to the subsequent analysis. In sum, 23 case-specific interviews were conduct-
ed, as well as eight interviews that were relevant for more or less all of the cases, were 
conducted, totalling in 31 interviews over the course of this study. 
From the 23 case-specific interviews, 17 were conducted in person and six over the (land-
line or internet) phone. In two cases, interviews were carried out with two persons at the 
same time. The interviews that pertained to more than one case were all carried out face-to-
face. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours, were held in German, au-
dio-recorded by a mobile voice recorder, phone or, in case of online conversations by an 
                                                 
39  The reasons for this are twofold: The Federal Ministry of Finance is not involved in RTI policy making, 
and it is usually not regarded as an intended user of or main learner from evaluations in this field.  
40  For TAKE OFF, it was difficult to identify and interview external stakeholders that were aware of the 
evaluation and could have been potential users. Some were reluctant to share their experience with the 
evaluation und the post-evaluation process. To overcome this problem at least in part, the aspects and 
complexity of aeronautics as highly specialised technology and policy area were adressed in those inter-
views that pertained to not just the case of TAKE OFF. 
  Evaluations, Actors and Institutions 
84 
online recording tool, and later transcribed. In the cases of interviews with two persons, a 
clear distinction between statements made by both interviewees, and statements by only 
one of them was made in the interview transcripts and subsequent analysis. On request, 
parts of the interview guidelines were sent to participants prior to the interview, together 
with basic information concerning the overall study objective. To encourage frank re-
sponses, anonymity was guaranteed to interview partners. 
The interviews were guided by semi-structured interview guidelines designed around the 
conceptual framework and insights generated from the literature and other secondary 
sources. The guideline included open questions, pertaining to the programme in question, 
evaluation culture and tradition, potential changes and impacts before, during and after the 
evaluation, interests and agendas of actor groups, and set-up and attributes of the evalua-
tion. The guideline was refined after about five interviews. The final version of the inter-
view guidelines can be found in the appendix (Tab. A3). For each interview the interview 
guidelines were adjusted in parts, to suit the specific role of the interviewee and their insti-
tutional background.  
 To begin with, interviewees were asked specific questions about themselves, their role 
in the organisation they work or have worked for, and the history of the programme. To 
establish a deeper understanding of the programme background, as well as, the evalua-
tion goal, objectives and set-up process, representatives of the Ministry and the Agency 
were asked more specifically about areas of responsibility, respective laws, regulations 
and informal processes, setting up the terms of reference, and actors involved. The 
Evaluators were asked about their suggested evaluation design, how it came about and 
was developed, and the communication with involved actors before, during and after 
the evaluation.  
 All interviewees were asked questions that were aimed at identifying actors’ interests 
and preferences towards the evaluation and delineating interaction processes. They 
were requested to describe the chronological process of the evaluation from their per-
spective and their experience with follow-up processes to reflect on the influence of the 
evaluation, as well as, possible reasons for such effects. In this part, many interesting 
narratives about evaluations, mutual interests and settings were collected, in particular 
about how different understandings and approaches led to learning and development.  
 The last part of the interview guidelines was geared at the contextual conditions at the 
Ministry and Agency, the general (in-house) approach to evaluations and dissemination 
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strategies, as well as, at the general role of evidence-based policy and its facilitators 
and barriers in the research, technology and innovation area. 
Several measures were taken to support the validity of the research (Yin 2003): As dis-
cussed in Section 3.1, the concept of (policy) learning was not explicitly addressed, intro-
duced or pre-defined in the interviews. Questions were kept broad to allow interviewees as 
much freedom in their answers as possible to tell their story about how, where and when 
they have been affected by evaluation processes or results. Perspectives on certain issues 
and perceptions of effects were compared with the other data sources whenever possible. 
In addition to not specifically addressing (policy) learning in the interviews, multiple 
stakeholders and triangulation of interview results, as well as, other sources were included 
that helped to reduce the legitimating of replies, and hence ex-post rationalisation, i.e. the 
tendency to exaggerate moments of learning, because non-learning would be shameful. 
Also, direct questions about the effects of evaluations on policy making were avoided. 
More attention was paid to the circumstances of, as well as, the details and insights about 
the underlying organisation and the programme. Topics that emerged during the course of 
the interviews were explored further, also with subsequent participants.  
Individual learning was assessed by interviewing actors from “inside”, i.e. the Ministry and 
Agency, as well as, from “outside” the programme, i.e. the evaluation team, interest groups 
and industry experts. With regard to the composite actors, i.e. organisations such as minis-
tries and agencies, the interviews also enquired about processes for disseminating or trans-
ferring learning to the organisation. The analysis of effects at the level of policy outputs 
focused on revised or otherwise formulated and implemented policies, drawing on both 
documentary and interview-based evidence of policy learning.  
The fact that all selected evaluations dated back quite some time, in case of TAKE OFF, 
for instance, the evaluation was carried out in 2008, was not found to be a critical issue for 
the interviews held several years later. Contrary to some worries expressed in the literature, 
the majority of interviewees could remember the situation at that point in time, and the 
developments since then, quite well. One reason for that was that interviewees, in particu-
lar in the Ministry and Agency, were still with their organisations, even in the same posi-
tion, as during the time of the evaluation. This opportunity helped to reconcile the existing 
data, and to confirm, complement or refute assumptions and preliminary interpretations. 
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Data Analysis 
Procedures for data analysis mainly follow Yin’s (1994) suggestion for examining, catego-
rising, tabulating or otherwise recombining case study data, and making it the main priority 
for what to analyse and why. By focusing on patterns of evaluation effects and their condi-
tioning factors and mechanisms, attention was drawn to certain parts of the data, while 
some other parts of the data were considered less relevant for answering the research ques-
tions. Data from interview transcripts and documents was collected, stored, compared and 
explored using MAXQDA software. 
The analysis applies qualitative content analysis as suggested by Mayring (1983, 2010; see 
also Kuckartz 2012), which consists of three distinct, but not necessarily sequential, analyt-
ical steps: Summary, explication and structuring. Summarising reduces the text in order to 
create a manageable corpus, e.g. by abstraction or paraphrasing. Thus, data is subjected to 
reduction, abstraction and interpretation. Explication considers additional sources that help 
to explain, clarify and annotate the material, thus providing a deeper understanding of the 
cases. The aim of structuring is to identify patterns in the material. Initial categories were 
derived from the research questions and the conceptual framework. The data was thor-
oughly read, marked and coded into these categories. The passages were then further pro-
cessed, extracted and organised by giving codes to different sections of the text. In the fol-
lowing, codes were related to and compared with each other, and categories were refined, 
regrouped or replaced by new categories that emerged during research. This approach al-
lowed a better comparability of interview statements. Subsequent analytical steps involved 
the identification and interpretation of common patterns and themes, as well as, the explo-
ration of differences and inconsistencies using pattern matching analysis to compare find-
ings across cases and with the conceptual framework. This approach is well justified by 
Yin (1994, 2003). 
The objective of the within-case analysis is to develop an understanding of the individual 
case, to identify and describe characteristics, to establish links between observations, to 
document the findings and compare them to the conceptual framework. Results are then 
examined to identify and discuss patterns, aiming to strengthen the internal validity of the 
case study. The focal point was put on the experiences of actors with evaluations, aiming 
to study learning and changes at the level of individual and composite actors. The relation-
ship between incidents in which evaluation processes and results may exert influence, and 
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subsequent policy-decisions, was of particular interest. These individual “histories” shed 
light on the consequences of evaluations, and which factors and mechanisms influence the 
processing of knowledge generated from evaluation processes or results. As suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989), a detailed and descriptive “write-up” was carried out for each of the 
three cases, which aimed to be as factual and balanced as possible. The write-ups are struc-
tured alongside the research questions and conceptual framework. The individual case 
study reports follow a linear story structure, consisting of descriptive and analytical      
sections. 
In the cross-case analysis, the potential pathways of effects described in the conceptual 
framework were re-assessed to corroborate the results and to develop further explanations 
for the phenomenon of interest, i.e. policy learning effects of evaluations and their condi-
tioning factors and mechanisms. The overall aim was to identify similarities, differences 
and patterns across cases. Following Eisenhardt (1989; see also Yin 2003 “pattern match-
ing logic”), the analytical procedure included reviewing the individual case study reports 
for each programme, comparing similarities and differences between the cases, identifying 
and describing patterns and themes, as well as, corresponding influence factors and mech-
anisms. 
Although the interviews were anonymised for the analysis, they were carried out amongst a 
group of actors where individuals could be identified quite easily. Thus, the analysis had to 
strike a balance between the transparency of results and the anonymity that had been grant-
ed to participants. The following steps were undertaken to achieve this balance: 
 First, no data or information that relates to or is traceable to an individual or a specific 
organisational unit is utilised. An overview of the number of interviewees and organi-
sations in which they work or have worked for is given in Tab. A2 in the appendix.  
 Second, interview partners were assigned codes which consist of an abbreviation and 
two integers. For the description of the single cases studies in Section 5.2, the abbrevia-
tion “isc” (interview single case) is used. The integers indicate a chronological          
sequence: isc03, for example, indicates that the interviewee was the third interviewed 
person of all interviews across cases. For those cases in which two persons were inter-
viewed at the same time, the integers were adapted following the alphabetical order of 
surname. For the cross case analysis in Chapter 6, the abbreviation “icc” (interview 
cross case) is used. Integers follow a random order. This basically means that one      
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interview partner was given two codes in two different parts of this study to maintain 
anonymity. Quotes from the interviews are presented using these codes, without any 
further form of identification.  
 Third, the idea of citing interviews with reference to actor groups (e.g. Ministry, Agen-
cy, Evaluator or external stakeholder) had to be abandoned. To alleviate this issue, 
membership to a group is, when deemed important for interpreting quotes, highlighted 
in the text. This enables, at least in part, a discussion of the interests and agendas of ac-
tor groups without endangering personal confidentiality. 
Quality Assurance and Scope 
With regard to quality control (Yin 2003), the reliability of the research was ensured by 
multiple data sources, a careful development of the interview guidelines, pilot interviews, 
field notes, audiotaping, transcription of interviews and thorough coding supported by 
MAXQDA. External validity was improved by employing multiple case studies (replica-
tion logic) and using the conceptual framework as basis for the data collection (e.g. inter-
views) and data analysis. A potential selection bias might be, as anecdotal evidence sug-
gests, that not all evaluations that have been carried out in recent years in Austrian RTI 
policy have also been published, which has reduced the pool of potential case study candi-
dates. Otherwise, an important selection criterion was that the report has been made avail-
able and accessible to the public to follow the pathways of communication and dissemina-
tion. 
Internal validity was improved by conducting a thorough within-case analysis, cross-
checking with interviews, the literature and other secondary sources, e.g. collecting multi-
ple sources of data and comparing, i.e. triangulating them to obtain more precise or reliable 
information, as well as, through pattern matching between the cases. Validity was also im-
proved by drawing on the experience of the author as an evaluator of national and interna-
tional research, technology and innovation policies, as well as, by discussing preliminary 
findings at doctoral summer schools, seminars and academic conferences, with the mentor 
of this thesis project, and with members of the doctoral committee. 
Concerning the scope of the study at hand, it must be acknowledged that investigating 
complex phenomena such as social processes based on case studies is challenging, espe-
cially when it comes the issues of comparability and generalisability. The scientific objec-
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tive of this study was not to empirically confirm or disconfirm pre-established hypotheses 
or to test or validate the conceptual framework, but to generate new insights, explanations 
and interpretations with regard to the effects of evaluations in a certain policy field. The 
study’s results claim validity for the particular cases in point, but must be considered as 
exploratory in the wider context of RTI policy making, or policy making in general. The 
transferability of findings to other contexts needs to be carefully weighed on a case-by-
case basis. 
5.2 Description of the Case Studies 
In the following, the selected cases are described one by one. They are listed in chronolog-
ical order, referring to the time at which the evaluation at question has been carried out: 
TAKE OFF (2008), Headquarter Strategy (2011) and IV2Splus (2012). First, a brief over-
view of the programme and its development is provided. The history and current situation 
are described to become acquainted with the programme, which is particularly important 
from an institutionalist perspective. Second, the programmes’ evaluation, in particular its 
set-up and conduct, is described and outlined. Finally, the situation that unfolded after the 
evaluation is discussed and main findings with regard to effects are summarised.  
Case A: TAKE OFF 
In 2002, TAKE OFF was launched by the Ministry to support the Austrian aeronautics 
(supplier) industry with regard to its competence in research, technology and cooperation. 
To this day, the overall objective is to foster innovation activities, strengthen human     
capital, and improve competitiveness. In basic terms, TAKE OFF aims to pool the research 
activities of companies and research organisations, which are funded according to specific 
thematic areas.  
The programme was built on an ex-ante assessment of the Austrian aviation and aero-
nautics industry and R&D capacities. The results of this assessment were used to set-up the 
objectives and structure of the programme. These were outlined and described in a pro-
gramme document which was unfortunately not available for this study. According to pub-
licly available information about the programme, on the Ministry’s and the Agency’s web-
sites, the overall objectives are defined as: 
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 Securing and enhancing the competitiveness of Austrian aeronautics research, 
 supporting a safe, efficient, climate protecting and convenient air transport system, 
 educating qualified researchers and technicians, and intensification of ambitious co-
operative research projects, 
 improving the Europe-wide and international transparency and thus strengthening the 
external image of Austrian research and development. 
The further development of the programme was affected by a strategy process that was 
launched around 2006 (isc31) with the aim of developing a national civil aeronautics strat-
egy for research, technology and innovation, later termed as the Austrian research, tech-
nology and innovation (RTI) aeronautics strategy. This was established under the auspices 
of the Ministry in cooperation with several working groups that consisted of the Agency, 
experts and representatives from the aeronautics industry and other related fields, in partic-
ular from the air transport sector. This sector is now recognised in the aeronautics strategy 
and encompasses airports, airlines and air traffic control. Inputs from the strategy process 
were integrated into a revised version of the programme document in 2007. This document 
was also adapted to meet new standards for RTI support programmes imposed by the Min-
istry. The full document outlining the Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy was published in 
early 2008. Altogether, the 2007 programme document revision entailed the following 
changes: 
 Adjustments to cope with the R&D requirements of the Austrian air transport sector, 
 special focus on small and medium-sized companies, also aiming to reach new compa-
nies with an aeronautics background,  
 enhanced portfolio of support instruments, more support for developing human re-
sources, 
 integration of foreign research partners. 
In addition, thematic areas were renewed and extended to address six market segments in 
which the Austrian aeronautics industry exhibits particular strengths: (1) General aviation, 
(2) complex aircraft structures and components, innovative materials and production tech-
nology, (3) cabin equipment (including infotainment), (4) equipment, aircraft electron-
ics/avionics, (5) intelligent aeronautical infrastructure, ground testing and testing equip-
ment, (6) networked air traffic infrastructure and air traffic control applications. 
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TAKE OFF is termed a “mission-oriented programme”, because some of its goals link to 
other policy areas such as security, mobility, energy and environment. While the Austrian 
RTI aeronautics strategy is seen as commitment to implement relevant European research 
agendas
41
 at the national level, TAKE OFF is regarded as a major pillar of the implementa-
tion of this strategy. In basic terms, the Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy provides the 
formal framework for the programme (isc25, isc31). TAKE OFF’s objectives are aligned 
with the objectives stated by the Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe 
(ACARE) (isc08, isc31). TAKE OFF links to other strategies and work plans at the nation-
al level, such as the more overarching “Road Map for an Austrian Aviation Policy”, an 
action plan that aims to facilitate the position of Austria’s aviation industry. The develop-
ment of the latter has been put forward in the Federal Government Programme for the 24th 
legislative period (2008-2013) and is highlighted in the subsequent programme for the 25th 
legislative period (2013-2018). The Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy was reviewed and 
updated in 2014 to provide further guidance on promotional measures until 2020. It partic-
ularly praises TAKE OFF as an important vehicle for future implementation processes. 
The programme is rolled out based on annual calls for participation. Interested parties can 
submit proposals, which are then reviewed by an international expert panel with respect to 
their quality, relevance and innovation potential. Projects can be of various types, e.g. 
stimulation projects such as feasibility studies, cooperative RTI projects, human resources 
development projects or other accompanying measures. The Agency that runs the pro-
gramme is responsible for rolling out the calls, coordinating the projects, quality assurance, 
monitoring, promoting network activities and synergies between projects. Interviewees 
stated that the Agency advises the Ministry, for instance, on what the calls could focus 
(isc08, isc09). In 2008, the year of the evaluation, funding amounted to around € 9 Mio 
(2014: € 6.7 Mio). 
                                                 
41  On the European level, several strategies have been employed since 2000 to support growth and expan-
sion, establishing research agendas and suggesting respective measures in the field of aeronautics, includ-
ing the formation of the Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe (ACARE). Following 
suggestions made by ACARE, several aeronautical research bodies and initiatives were launched in re-
cent years as part of the in EU Framework programmes and the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation 
Programme. In 2011, the long-term strategy “Flightplan 2050” was presented by the European Commis-
sion and supplemented in 2012 by the “Strategic Research & Innovation Agenda”, a document of 
ACARE with more specific suggestions for the implementation of the Commission’s strategy. The    
strategy and the subsequent agenda address issues of research, innovation and economic stimulus, as well 
as, issues related to security, energy and environmental challenges. 
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Programme Evaluation. As foreseen in the programme document, which was stated in the 
terms of reference for the evaluation, the programme was subject to an interim evaluation 
in 2008. The aim of the evaluation was, according to the terms of reference, threefold: 
 To provide an assessment of the structure and the implementation of the programme up 
to date (2002 to 2007), addressing effectiveness and efficiency in order to learn from 
the experiences gained so far, 
 to assess the concept of the programme, in particular its alignment with the goals and 
objectives of the 2007 Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy, and 
 to provide suggestions and recommendations for the programme’s future design, de-
velopment and management. 
The evaluation was carried out in the second half of 2008.42 The evaluation design built on 
the questions put forward in the terms of reference. Due to the recent changes following 
the strategy process that culminated in the establishment of the 2008 Austrian RTI aero-
nautics strategy, the questions were oriented towards the overall concept of the programme 
(isc25, isc31), in particular its linkages with the aeronautics strategy, its recent develop-
ment and administration. Some of the questions were suggested by the Agency and, be-
cause of the strong focus on assessing the alignment with the aeronautics strategy, by se-
lected members of the working groups of the aeronautics strategy. Some other specifica-
tions of the tender were discussed between the Ministry and the Agency (isc09). Data col-
lection and analysis of the evaluation encompassed desk research, interviews, a peer     
review that involved national and international experts, the analysis of monitoring data 
(selected and supported projects) and a network analysis.  
In the set-up phase, the constellation of actors consisted of the Ministry, the Agency and 
the team of Evaluators (isc24). Because of its role as central budget authority and potential 
user of the evaluation results, the importance of the Federal Ministry of Finance was raised 
on several occasions during interviews. The link between the Ministry and the Agency was 
described as a “closed circle” (isc09) due to the narrow thematic focus. It was further de-
scribed as a harmonious relationship (isc08), which corresponds to the interaction orienta-
                                                 
42  After all interviews for this thesis were carried out, a so-called “ex-post evaluation” of TAKE OFF was 
commissioned in the first half of 2014, which continued until early 2015. The ex-post evaluation was not 
discussed in the interviews and findings were not considered in the subsequent analysis. A new call for 
TAKE OFF proposals was launched in late 2015. 
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tion of solidarity in which both get along very well (isc20) and complement and support 
each other (isc24). Areas of responsibility are clearly defined and respected (isc08, isc20, 
isc24). Individuals are on familiar terms with each other, thus less formal ways of coordi-
nation, e.g. via phone or email, were considered important. Preferences with regard to the 
evaluation diverged a bit, as the Agency was keen to follow more quantitative, statistical 
approaches, and desired a more content-related discussion about the specifics of the Aus-
trian situation. Otherwise, the purpose of the evaluation was felt to be a “formal require-
ment” (isc09), carried out “because it was foreseen in the programme document” (isc08).  
With the first meeting that served as kick-off for the evaluation, actors felt that a relation-
ship of trust was quickly established amongst actors. The open and supportive working 
style of the Agency was appreciated by the evaluating team (isc20, isc24). Its role during 
the evaluation was seen as “data provider” and commentator of the interim and final report 
(isc09). Preliminary findings were discussed with representatives of the Ministry and the 
Agency at an interim presentation based on an interim report. The evaluation team was 
primarily responsible for the evaluation process.  
The final evaluation report was presented in January 2009 and was soon after available for 
download from the Federal Ministry’s website. According to this report, TAKE OFF has 
evolved into the central programme for the promotion of research and technological devel-
opment in the Austrian aeronautics industry, thereby closing a gap in the national RTI sup-
port system. Ever since its inception, the programme has stimulated joint research activities 
and cooperation between new and established companies and research institutions. This 
has been an important stimulus for access to national and international knowledge net-
works. Because TAKE OFF takes issues such as climate protection and safety into ac-
count, it addresses social and economic challenges.  
The recently adapted programme concept of 2007, following the alignment with the aero-
nautics strategy, was judged as positive for the further development of TAKE OFF. The 
programme users were very satisfied with the Agency’s programme administration. 
Whether TAKE OFF projects had achieved economic objectives could not be fully meas-
ured, because most of the projects were not yet finished, and project results are expected to 
have indirect and long-term effects. However, it was found that a successful TAKE OFF 
project helped to improve a company’s reputation, differentiation, and competitive ad-
vantage. Recommendations included the expansion of the underlying budget, the launch of 
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flagship projects as suggested by the aeronautics strategy, the fostering of technology 
transfer, in particular at an international level, and enhanced support for potential users. 
Post Evaluation. Results were presented and discussed with representatives of the Minis-
try, the Agency and the Federal Ministry of Finance (isc09, isc24, isc31). However, it was 
argued by a ministry representative that there was not much to discuss due to the lack of 
controversial points. The final report was published online soon after. Ministry and Agency 
representatives considered the evaluation itself to be appropriate, well-crafted and struc-
tured, timely and scientifically justified, and providing the necessary statistical data and 
interviews with relevant actors.  
Within the Agency, the results were reported to the strategy department (isc08) and dis-
cussed with the in-house advisory committee of the aeronautics and space agency. It serves 
as a platform for consultations and as discussion forum for, amongst others, the TAKE 
OFF programme. It consists of representatives from interest groups, associations, universi-
ties and non-university research organisations. Furthermore, the Ministry provided the 
working groups of the Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy with the results, and informed 
selected units of the Ministry about them (isc25).  
The stakeholders, including the Agency, that were involved in the strategy processes lead-
ing to the launch of the Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy, were later engaged in follow-up 
exchanges of expertise and ideas, forming some sort of advisory council, to support further 
development in this area (isc08, isc31). It was noted that they only provided advice on the 
aeronautics strategy, not on TAKE OFF itself (isc25). One of the external stakeholders, 
closely connected to the underlying topics of the programme, remembered being inter-
viewed during the evaluation, but had not heard or read anything about the findings. How-
ever, it was felt by this external stakeholder that the findings would not be of interest for a 
company’s day-to-day business (isc22).  
Effects of Policy Evaluation. In sum, the evaluation was considered generally positive, a 
confirmation that the programme is appropriate and has fulfilled its purpose (isc08, isc09, 
isc31). According to the evaluation, the programme works effectively and expected outputs 
have been achieved – despite the programme’s rather short lifetime. As noted by one 
Agency representative, the majority of the issues pointed out in the evaluation was already 
in the process of being tackled by the calls that were launched during the evaluation 
(isc08). Hence, evaluation results and recommendations were comprehensible, somewhat 
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foreseeable and matched initial expectations without highlighting severe issues that had not 
already been addressed (isc08, isc09, isc31). The minor critical issues raised in the evalua-
tion had already been discussed before and remedies were already being implemented 
while the evaluation was underway (isc31). 
Learning was associated with a stock-taking experience, getting an overview of what had 
been done and achieved, as well as, a reflection on personal work (isc09, isc08, isc25, 
isc31). Learning was mainly centred on the delivery of the programme and its manage-
ment, hence operative issues and the work of the Agency, and on evaluation processes and 
methods in general. Due to the favourable results, changing practices did not seem neces-
sary (isc08). One Agency representative noted that the evaluation helped with maintaining 
the necessary distance (isc08), another argued that “[people] learned how evaluations work 
and what to expect from future evaluations” (isc09). Also, it was felt by Agency represent-
atives that some comments from the stakeholder interviews provide insights into the     
perspective of beneficiaries.  
The post-evaluation programme document was not available for analysis in this study. 
However, interviewees stated that, due to the established favourable alignment with the 
Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy as stated by the evaluation, only minor parts of the pro-
gramme document were adjusted, and some wordings were modified. Specific changes 
were made to the application forms and programme guidelines. An improved questionnaire 
was introduced for potential applications to collect more useful data, for example, on com-
pany details. It was noted that this cannot be credited solely to this specific evaluation; it 
was merely another “push into this direction” (isc08). Also, it was established as a regular 
practice to provide detailed feedback on unsuccessful funding applications (isc08, isc09). 
Case B: Headquarter Strategy 
In 2004, the Headquarter Strategy programme was launched by the Ministry. Its overall 
objective is to attract R&D headquarters of multinational companies to Austria, and to 
strengthen existing international R&D labs, in order to foster a sustainable development of 
R&D competences. Support is available for international companies active in Austria, if 
they plan to set-up or expand their existing R&D units, establish new R&D competences, 
increase their R&D activities, or expand their R&D efforts to new research topics. The 
programme is managed by the Agency as part of its general programmes. Prior to 2004, 
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support for R&D headquarters had already been in place, but critics felt that the selection 
favoured particular companies over others, thus diluting the impact of funding on the total 
RTI system in the long run. Hence, Headquarter Strategy went through changes in its basic 
conceptualisation before it became an actual programme. This development was described 
as an “evolutionary process” (isc05, isc23). 
The Headquarter Strategy programme is regarded as one of Austria’s responses to the in-
creasing challenges of globalisation, the internationalisation of R&D activities and the 
competition for research expertise and industrial know-how (Gassler and Nones 2008). In 
the interviews, representatives of the Ministry underscored that the programme takes ac-
count of the legitimate interests of the government to attract research-intensive firms and 
expand headquarter functions in Austria. Consequently, these interests enjoy a high visibil-
ity in the overall policy making. They are explicitly mentioned in various policy docu-
ments, such as the 2009 “Strategy 2020 – Research, Technology and Innovation for Aus-
tria” and the 2010 “Strategy of Excellence for the Austrian Innovation System”, both put 
forward by the Council for Research and Technology Development, and the 2011 RTI 
strategy of the Federal Government. Also, the programme is mentioned by name in the 
Federal Government Programme for the 24th legislative period (2008-2013) as an im-
portant instrument to strengthen Austria as a location for R&D headquarters. The pro-
gramme for the 25th legislative period (2013-2018) underscores the importance of improv-
ing framework conditions for hosting leading companies, particularly referring to head-
quarters and R&D units. The 2014 so-called location strategy “Leading competence unit” 
of the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy explicitly addresses the role of 
headquarters in further developing the business location Austria.  
Programme funding is organised within thematically open, bottom-up approaches and can 
be allocated for several years based on proposed research plans. Support is provided in 
form of grants (max. 50 % of total costs) directly to the companies. Projects are evaluated 
by experts of the Agency’s general programme scheme. External experts are invited to 
support the assessments when necessary. The funding decisions are made by the Agency 
together with the Ministry. In 2011, the year of the evaluation, funding amounted to around 
€ 24.9 Mio (2014: € 15.9 Mio). It belongs to the group of RTI support instruments with the 
highest amount of funding at the national level. 
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The goals, objectives and design of this instrument were defined in a programme docu-
ment, which was redefined and adapted several times during the years. Since 2009, it is 
complimented by a detailed implementation contract. In particular, the part of this docu-
ment that announces that the programme will be subject to an interim evaluation (in 2009 
at the latest), and that suggests directions for such an evaluation, was substantially extend-
ed over the years. 
Programme Evaluation. The programme document requested that the foreseen evaluation 
should reflect on the programme development and perform an analysis of the concept,  
implementation and impacts of the programme, and should arrive at conclusions and rec-
ommendations for the programme’s future development. In addition, it suggested in great 
detail possible indicators and criteria to measure the achievement of objectives. These ob-
jectives are also mirrored in the detailed terms of reference. Accordingly, the aim of the 
evaluation was: 
 To analyse the design and implementation of the programme, goal attainment and ob-
servable effects, 
 to formulate recommendations for future development based on empirical results. 
The evaluation was carried out mainly in 2010. The evaluation design was built around the 
research questions put forward in the terms of reference. The questions revolved around 
the concept of the programme, implementation processes and organisation, funded projects 
and programme impacts. In contrast to most other evaluations in the RTI policy area, in-
cluding also those of TAKE OFF and IV2Splus, the evaluation design that was proposed 
by the evaluation team used a predominantly qualitative research approach with a design 
featuring a literature and document analysis, the analysis of monitoring data and, most no-
tably, a series of in-depth interviews with experts. 
In the beginning, the actor constellation consisted of the Ministry, the Agency and the 
evaluation team. The Federal Ministry of Finance was mentioned as an important address-
ee of the results (isc13). An earlier version of the programme document mentioned that the 
Federal Ministry of Economics, Family and Youth (since 2014: The Federal Ministry of 
Science, Research and Economy) had also had, at least for a short period of time, some 
stakes in the programme. Because Headquarter Strategy is provided by the Agency as part 
of its own general programmes, the development of related questions was carried out with 
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support from the Agency. The working relationship was described as uncomplicated and 
well established (isc18, isc19, isc13). The interaction orientation can thus be interpreted as 
oriented towards solidarity. When asked for the reason why the evaluation was carried out, 
one ministry representative pointed out that “the programme document requested one, it is 
a standard today” (isc13). 
There were reportedly two to three meetings during the process of the evaluation between 
the Ministry and the evaluation team (isc13), during which preliminary results were dis-
cussed. Otherwise, the evaluation team was in control of the evaluation process and carried 
out their work rather independently from the Ministry and Agency.  
The final evaluation report was presented in March 2011. According to the report, the pro-
gramme was judged to be efficiently implemented in accordance with the Ministry’s regu-
lations and requirements, and effectively integrated into the existing programme portfolio 
of the Agency. The companies which received support judged the programme very posi-
tively, particularly praising the multiple years of funding, the high funding rate and the 
available cooperation bonus for working with research organisations. The majority of the 
supported companies originate from Austria, while only few have their main headquarters 
outside of Europe. However, findings also indicated that direct R&D funding may only 
play a subordinate role for large multinational firms when deciding where to locate an 
R&D facility or whether to expand existing activities. It is argued that investment decisions 
frequently follow strategic objectives, which may be influenced by various factors other 
than funding of any kind.  
In light of this, the evaluation suggested that the programme was not able to generate addi-
tional effects that would have extended beyond the anticipated effects of general pro-
gramme funding available from the Agency. The evaluation therefore concluded that the 
programme should not be continued in its current form. Recommendations revolved 
around the issue of generating lasting contributions of R&D support to multinational com-
panies, for instance by linking project funding more strongly to structural conditions,    
fostering long-term cooperation ventures and revising the funding conditions for the partic-
ipating companies. 
Post Evaluation. Results were presented and discussed with representatives of the Ministry 
and the programme management of the Agency (isc24), but also with its strategy depart-
ment (isc18, isc19). The evaluation team was invited to present the results to the Agency’s 
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own advisory committee for the general programmes (isc14). The members of this com-
mittee were nominated by the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, the Federal Chamber 
of Labour, the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the Chamber of Agriculture. One spe-
cific feature of the committee was that it could make suggestions with regard to the fund-
ing of projects submitted to, amongst others, Headquarter Strategy. In the interviews, one 
of the external stakeholders explicitly mentioned that he became aware of the evaluation 
because of his membership in the committee, but was also informed by the Ministry and 
got notice from personally known companies which were interviewed during the evalua-
tion (isc29).  
The evaluation itself was conceived by the Ministry and Agency to be of overall good 
quality, providing relevant information. It was considered well-articulated, properly per-
formed and timely. While Ministry representatives found the approach well suited for 
providing insights into complex company decision making processes (isc05, isc13), some 
external stakeholders expressed concerns over what was viewed as a “less robust, qualita-
tive approach” (isc29) and over what they perceived as a missing perspective on the overall 
importance of the programme for the business location Austria (isc29, isc28).  
Effects of Policy Evaluation. From the perspectives of the Ministry and Agency, the re-
sults were somewhat anticipated given their experiences in recent years, in particular con-
sidering the “evolutionary process” through which the programme became what it was then 
(isc05, isc23). While some minor details were perceived as new, the overall impression 
that the programme lacks effectiveness in implementation was largely confirmed (isc13, 
isc23). Extensive discussions within the Ministry, within the Agency, and between them, 
followed soon after, resulting in the preparation of new proposals – by both the Ministry 
and Agency – for modifications of the programme following the evaluation results (isc05, 
isc13, isc23). The focus was put on refining selection criteria for participating companies. 
Results were openly discussed and explored, first and foremost, with the advisory commit-
tee for the general programmes, but also with representatives of the Ministry, the Agency 
and other external stakeholders (isc13, isc14).  
Consultation with external stakeholders turned out to be difficult, particularly because of 
their widespread dissatisfaction with the evaluation design and subsequent findings which 
many of them felt to be misleading. Some interviewees reported that the Evaluators were 
later on challenged in a dispute rich in written accusations by some external stakeholders. 
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This was eventually settled by the Ministry, who published the final evaluation report on 
its website soon after. 
This evaluation serves as an example for evaluations that attract attention because they are 
somewhat atypical, and transport a clear-cut message. Although the exact point in time is 
impossible to pinpoint in retrospect, it was probably the presentation to the advisory com-
mittee for the general programmes that incited outrage amongst potentially affected busi-
nesses and their lobbying organisations, and that led to subsequent debates. In light of the 
conceptual framework of this study, this might be regarded as an indirect, unintended ef-
fect of the evaluation. Agency representatives stated that, due to the radical suggestions put 
forward by the evaluation, the report was read very thoroughly. Interviews also indicated 
that this was enhanced by the quick online provision of the final report, 
Learning was related to getting a more complete picture of the programme’s development 
(isc13), widening the knowledge about some details (isc05, isc13), gaining insights about 
the “factual reality of a how companies operate” (isc18), collecting inputs for discussions, 
gaining more experience with evaluation processes and methods (isc13) and a higher 
awareness of the importance of the programme amongst external stakeholders, not the least 
indicated by the intensity of the debates that followed. Hence, learning was primarily con-
cerned with the content and strategic nature, i.e. the relevance of the programme, and less 
with its management, which was judged to be working well. Despite the suggestions made 
in the evaluation, the termination of the programme was at no time considered an option 
due to strategic, political considerations (isc18, isc19, isc05, isc13). 
In the following, the programme underwent a soft re-design process. The post-evaluation 
programme document, which was the only one available from the three cases analysed 
here, clearly and visibly refers to the evaluation as basis for the re-design. Two specific 
changes were made: Cooperation with actors of the national RTI community or providers 
of infrastructure is now obligatory for all companies interested in project funding, and 
some adjustments were made to the cooperation bonus scheme. Thus, the emphasis has 
been adapted towards strengthening and expanding existing R&D labs of internationally 
active companies, as well as, fostering structural effects by focusing on long-term strategic 
cooperative ventures of multinationals with Austrian research institutions. It is also noted 
that the budget for future calls has been considerably reduced, but this reduction is not ex-
plicitly linked to the evaluation findings.  
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Subsequently, the programme was renamed “Competence Headquarter” in late 2011.    
According to some interviews, the new name should convey the now greater emphasis on 
research cooperation and help to differentiate the programme from the general programmes 
provided by the Agency (isc05, isc18, isc19). Some commented on this as better “label-
ling”. Nonetheless, attracting new R&D headquarters to Austria remains the main objec-
tive of Competence Headquarter. 
Case C: Intelligent Transport Systems and Services plus (IV2Splus) 
In 2001, the predecessor of IV2Splus, the IV2S (“Intelligent Transportation Systems and 
Services”) programme, was installed by the Ministry with the aim to establish and expand 
R&D competences in the area of mobility and transportation technologies in Austria. Since 
then, the programme aims to support entrepreneurial competitiveness, in particular by fos-
tering cooperation between science and industry both at the national and international   
level. IV2S was operational until 2006. It was then succeeded by IV2Splus in 2007, which 
was provided until 2012. In 2013, the programme started into its third season, now under 
the name “Mobility of the Future”, and it is set to run until 2020. The programme was op-
erated and managed by various consulting companies43 until 2004, when it was taken over 
by the Agency.  
From the beginning, IV2S was divided into three different programme lines: Railway tech-
nology, automobile industry supplies and telematics and logistics. IV2Splus basically con-
tinued with changes made towards fostering excellence in R&D, expanding national R&D 
competences, focusing on the development of future transport and mobility solutions and 
seeking inclusion of national, as well as, international value chains. The programme lines 
were re-grouped, now consisting of alternative propulsion systems and fuels (A3plus), in-
termodality and interoperability of transport systems (I2V), and innovation and technology 
for evolving mobility needs (ways2go). A new programme line was added, promoting 
basic research for innovations in transport (impuls). Furthermore, the programme’s objec-
tives, its design and implementation guideline were, for the first time in the history of the 
                                                 
43  Up to 2004, the programme management of IV2S was carried out respectively by ETECH Management 
Consulting GmbH, Herry Consult GmbH and Trust Consult Unternehmensberatung GmbH. 
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programme, outlined in a written programme document, at this time “state of the art in 
modernising administration” (isc16). 
The current programme version, “Mobility of the Future”, builds on previous programme 
lines and transfers them into four key thematic areas that address a variety of objectives 
and challenges. They are i) personal mobility, ii) mobility of goods, iii) transport infra-
structure and iv) vehicle technology. Similar to the TAKE OFF programme, IV2Splus and 
its successor Mobility of the Future are considered to be “mission-oriented”, as they seek 
to tackle societal challenges such as climate change, clean transport or resource scarcity, 
thus linking to goals in other policy areas such as security, energy and environment. Con-
sequently, they are strongly geared towards the goals and objectives laid down in a number 
of national and international policy documents and agendas. This spans from Ministry 
guidelines (e.g. the Austrian transport telematics framework plan) and traffic- and envi-
ronment-related objectives of the government to the EU-Transport White Paper, the EU 
Framework programmes, ERA-NET Transport and other environment- and sustainability-
related agendas, most famously the Kyoto Protocol44.  
Funding is provided through non-refundable grants for R&D projects. The programme 
provides regular calls for proposals for each programme line. Call topics aim to cover the 
full value chain of mobility and transportation technologies, where project categories span 
from basic research to demonstration and validation projects. Particular attention is paid to 
cooperative projects, most notably between science and industry. In 2012, the year of the 
evaluation, funding amounted to around € 15.8 Mio (2014: € 17.2 Mio). 
Programme Evaluation. The programme was evaluated twice: In 2006, an evaluation was 
commissioned that covered the developments of IV2S in the time period between 2002 and 
2006. The second evaluation was carried out in 2012 and focused on developments of 
IV2Splus between 2007 and 2011. While the 2006 evaluation was set-up as an interim 
evaluation, the 2012 evaluation was split into three individual tasks (internally referred to 
as the “VALIDUS” project). These tasks were: To perform an ex-post evaluation of IV2S, 
to carry out an interim evaluation of its successor programme IV2Splus and to conduct a 
                                                 
44  The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement created in 1997 under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto, Japan, intended to bring countries together to re-
duce global warming by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The original treaty expired by the end of 
2012, but was extended in a somewhat reduced form following the “Bali Road Map”. 
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contextual analysis addressing the topic of research funding in the fields of traffic and mo-
bility. For a better comparison with the other programmes selected for the case study anal-
ysis in this study, the analytical focus is put on the 2012 interim evaluation of IV2Splus. 
The interim evaluation of IV2Splus was envisaged in the programme document. While the 
document puts goal attainment at the forefront and lists a set of indicators that should be 
used in the foreseen evaluation, the detailed terms of reference put emphasis on the pro-
gramme’s design and its implementation. The following purposes of the IV2Splus interim 
evaluation were stated in the terms of reference: First, it should provide information for the 
experienced public about how public funding is handled and what outcome was achieved. 
The term “experienced public” in the terms of reference refers to pertinent policy decision-
makers, relevant companies and organisations, as well as, beneficiaries and eligible com-
panies that have not been funded so far. Second, it should serve the purpose of learning and 
steering, to allow for critical reflection by the programme owner and those who make 
technology policy decisions. Thus, the evaluation is, at least to a certain extent, viewed as 
“information-oriented learning”, and should provide orientation for the future development 
of policy objectives and the planning of relevant measures. 
Summing up the terms of reference, the aim of the evaluation was threefold: 
 To analyse and assess the appropriateness of the support for research and technology 
that was triggered by IV2Splus,  
 to assess the quality of the implementation of IV2Splus and, if possible, to compare the 
quality of funded projects at a national and international level, 
 to provide decision-makers in the Ministry with analyses and information about devel-
opments, and also hypotheses about the function, systemic features and impact mecha-
nisms of IV2Splus in the research and innovation system. 
The evaluation of IV2Splus was carried out in late 2011 and the beginning of 2012. For 
IV2Splus, the terms of reference put forward pre-selected topics of interest and questions 
that should be addressed in the evaluation, together with a list of possible qualitative and 
quantitative methods that may be applied. The Agency was involved in the set-up process 
in such a way that they were asked to provide first-hand information about what data is 
available and timely (isc26). The proposed evaluation design suggested a broad mixed-
methods approach, building on a literature and document analysis, the analysis of monitor-
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ing data, a workshop that would involve experts from the traffic and mobility sectors, in-
terviews, case studies and a survey amongst programme beneficiaries. Because of the rea-
soning that programme outcomes and impacts can only be grasped years after the funding 
(isc16), the ex-post perspective on IV2S with its focus on outcomes and impacts was less 
sought after (isc10).  
Importantly, it was known prior to the evaluation of IV2Splus that its successor-in-the-
making, “Mobility of the Future”, would be subject to an Outcome-Oriented Ex-ante Im-
pact Assessment, a practice that is compulsory in Austria since 2013 as part of the Federal 
Budget Act (see Section 4.2). In fact, it was stated in several interviews that the IV2Splus 
programme document was legally extended to cope with the preparations for an Outcome-
Oriented Ex-ante Impact Assessment. This impacted the evaluation, which started later 
than anticipated and preliminary results were used by the Ministry for negotiations with the 
Federal Ministry of Finance (isc27). Topics such as goal hierarchies and indicators, ex-
pected difficulties with impact measurements, for instance with regard to societal goals and 
environmental impacts, and specifically the programme’s contribution to reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions, informed the entire evaluation process and follow-up activities.  
The actor constellation consisted of the Ministry, the Agency, the Evaluators and, in the 
early stages, the Federal Ministry of Finance. The Ministry and the Agency worked togeth-
er as a “team” (isc11) that was engaged in a constant, very open, mostly informal dialogue 
and coordination. Compared to the other parts of VALIDUS, the Ministry was strongly 
interested in the current achievements of IV2Splus (isc10, isc17). The purpose of the eval-
uation was summarised as: First, to fulfil a formal obligation that is a condition for the 
continuation of the programme (isc16, isc17), and second, to secure and maintain a high 
quality service (isc17). Interaction orientations with regard to IV2Splus and its different 
programme lines were very much aligned and oriented towards solidarity, both inside the 
organisations as well as between them.  
During the evaluation, communication between the Ministry and the Evaluators promoted 
constant reflection (isc16), but was also considered intense given the different programme 
lines (isc10). The Agency was invited for further preparations in the pre-planning phase to 
discuss specified questions and procedures (isc26), finding itself in the role of data provid-
er and interview partner for the assessment. Preliminary findings were communicated to 
the Ministry on a regular basis (isc11), most notably on the basis of the interim report. Af-
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ter the interim report, communication and dialogue between the Ministry and the Agency 
with regard to the evaluation were rather loose. However, discussions about how to set 
goals and about how to align them in a goal-hierarchy were increasingly held at the Minis-
try during the evaluation (isc10, isc27).  
Timing was felt to be a major constraint. The evaluation was carried out at a time when the 
legal basis of the programme, i.e. the programme document and related guidelines, was 
about to formally expire (isc16). A new programme document was needed for the discus-
sions with the Federal Ministry of Finance (isc26). The majority of the interviewees re-
membered delays in the process, for which the reasons could not be identified in this study. 
Preliminary findings, in particular those taken from the interim report, were used for draft-
versions of the programme document (isc10, isc27). 
The final report was presented in mid-2012. Summary reports of the ex-post evaluation of 
IV2S and the interim evaluation of IV2Splus, but not the contextual analysis as part of 
VALIDUS, were published by the end of 2012. Following the terms of reference, these 
summary versions served the objective of providing information for the experienced pub-
lic. According to the final report, IV2Splus has been successful in encouraging and 
strengthening networking and cooperation between public research institutions and firms in 
the areas of traffic and mobility. It was found to be well positioned and recognised 
amongst Austrian RTI support schemes, in particular because of its sector-specific focus, 
the handling of related challenges, as well as, the combination of goals and measures to 
support and stimulate sector-related policy goals. Economic and scientific impacts of the 
programme could not be fully clarified as the programme was still on-going. Development 
and networking of the community, as well as, extending and strengthening the cooperation 
between science and industry, are judged to be a major strength of the programme. The 
effectiveness and efficiency of programme management and implementation were consid-
ered to be high; aspects that relate to support and advice were viewed very positively by 
programme beneficiaries. 
Post Evaluation. The concluding presentation was attended by Ministry and Agency repre-
sentatives, and findings were discussed in subsequent coordination meetings. While repre-
sentatives of the Ministry demonstrated a deep understanding of issues because of their 
different perspectives (from the different programme lines), their interest was directed to-
wards those aspects that were relevant for their specific field (isc10, isc27). The Agency 
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felt that results were not thoroughly discussed, but stated that the evaluation did not sug-
gest substantial changes to be made in programme implementation (isc26). Interviews  
indicated that certain individuals took part in discussions and decision making processes, 
for instance at the presentation of the final report and during follow-up reflection process-
es. The Ministry was supported by external experts who provided strategic guidance and 
supported the reflection process (isc16, isc17). One external stakeholder expressed interest 
in taking part in such processes, pointing to the perceived closeness to potential beneficiar-
ies (isc30).  
The evaluation itself was referred to by Ministry and Agency representatives as thorough-
ly, professionally executed, with a clear-cut concept and a creative use of mixed methods 
that aimed to uncover the challenges of the evaluation in good time. 
Effects of Policy Evaluation. Interviewees stated that having external experts “as sparring 
partners” (isc17) to review a programme, preparing and discussing results and getting pro-
vided with a written document, is helpful, as one may become routine-blinded in day-to-
day business (isc11, isc17, isc30). The findings were acknowledged as a confirmation for 
the path taken (isc11, isc16, isc17), the findings were comprehensible, and also a motiva-
tion to carry on the good work (isc17). This was further substantiated by the simultaneous-
ly conduced ex-post evaluation of IV2S, which delivered similar (affirmative) results. Ac-
cording to an Agency representative, the evaluation shows that the topic remains present, 
interesting and qualifies for further support. Issues discussed in the evaluation were largely 
known and had already been tackled (isc26). 
Different kinds of learning were derived, such as increased awareness and getting an over-
view, in particular of details about the development in other programme lines (isc16, 
isc17). The evaluation provided orientation and increased alertness with regard to the de-
velopments in the sector, particularly the cross-fertilisation of topics in the mobility and 
traffic sector (isc26, isc17). A Ministry representative specifically mentioned to have 
learned how to prepare an evaluation (isc16). It was also argued that the evaluation helped 
with “thinking outside the box” (i.e. the programme or its underlying document), allowing 
for a more intense reflection on societal goals compared to those that are more technical 
(isc17). Findings from the evaluation were largely expected and easy to comprehend 
(isc17, isc11). According to an Agency representative, not much has changed with regard 
to programme implementation.  
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The post-evaluation programme document was unfortunately not available for the analysis. 
However, some interview partners recalled from a distributed draft version that several 
outcomes of the evaluation were indeed directly transferred into the programme document 
(isc11, isc26, isc16). Amongst them were an internal alignment and (re-)structuring of the 
programme goals into a hierarchy, and suggestions on how to (better) measure them, based 
on suggested target values and indicators. Furthermore, a transformation of the programme 
lines into so-called “thematic fields” was implemented. It was noted, however, that the 
latter cannot be fully credited to the evaluation, as similar steps had already been discussed 
before the evaluation to allow for more flexibility with future calls (isc16). 
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6 Cross-Case Analysis 
This chapter presents the results of the cross-case analysis, which builds on the description 
of the Austrian RTI policy scene as outlined in Section 4.1, as well as, on the individual 
case studies that were presented in Section 5.2. The case of TAKE OFF is referred to as 
“Case A”, Headquarter Strategy as “Case B” and IV2Splus as “Case C”. The cases are 
compared with each other in light of the conceptual framework that was developed in 
Chapter 3, specifically looking for similarities, differences and patterns across cases. Find-
ings are enhanced by triangulation: They are compared to and contrasted with information 
from a variety of sources, not only case specific information such as programme docu-
ments, evaluation reports or interviews, but also drawing on the literature review that has 
been carried out. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.1 discusses the effects of programme 
evaluation at the level of individual and composite actors as well as at the policy level. 
Section 6.2 approaches the conceptual framework from the perspective of conditioning 
factors and mechanisms, discussing findings across the various stages of an evaluation, 
including set-up, the evaluation process as such, and follow-up activities. Section 6.3 de-
scribes pathways of effects through which an evaluation may achieve its effects. Empirical 
findings are summarised and discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Effects of Policy Evaluation  
This section explores and describes the main effects in terms of policy learning at the level 
of individual and composite actors, the latter focusing on interactions in actor constella-
tions, changes in organisational practices, as well as, effects at the policy level. Attention is 
drawn to the fact that learning may not always manifest itself in documented practices. 
Learning may also occur in the form of changes in mind-sets, as well as, in undocumented 
processes or practices. This perspective builds on recent advances in evaluation research 
that challenge the notion of “evaluation use”, opening up a broader view on the effects and 
influence of evaluations, arguing that evaluations feed back into the decision making pro-
cess at many levels of policy making. 
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Effects at the Individual Actor Level 
Learning at the individual level is understood as the change of policy-related knowledge, 
skills or attitudes, which is the result of the evaluation under scrutiny. It is a reflection of 
an individual’s orientation and capabilities, i.e. their interests, positions, strategies and 
preferences, in the literature termed as “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006), 
meaning “codes of conduct” or “ways of doing things” that set out standards that are com-
monly shared (e.g. Barnes et al. 2003).  
In all cases all of the interviewees, including Ministry representatives, Agency staff, as 
well as, Evaluators and external stakeholders, were able to provide one or more examples 
for how they have learnt from the respective evaluation. Responses of interviewees were 
analysed and segmented into the following three categories: i) Learning about programme 
contents, ii) learning about the programme’s overall relevance, and iii) learning about 
evaluations as such. Tab. 2 summarises these learning effects. 
Tab. 2: Individual Level Effects across the Three Cases 
Learning about Programme 
Contents 
Learning about the Pro-
gramme’s Overall Relevance 
Learning about Evaluations 
 Learning about the industry 
or field targeted by the pro-
gramme 
Overview 
Reflection about past, 
current, and future devel-
opments 
Insights about details 
 Insights into beneficiaries’ 
perspectives 
 Reflection about routine pro-
gramme operations and about 
own work as a programme 
manager or programme of-
ficer 
 Overcome “blindness” to 
programme deficiencies 
 
 Strengthen already held opin-
ions about the programme’s 
(high or low) relevance 
 Provide orientation about 
how to develop the pro-
gramme in the future 
 
 More experience with evalua-
tions 
 Increased methodological 
knowledge about evaluations 
 Improved practical evalua-
tion skills  
 Increased knowledge about 
formulating goals and indica-
tors 
 
 Overall rather incremental 
learning (one input for work 
amongst many others, minor 
flashes of insight) 
 
 Refinement and further sub-
stantiation of already estab-
lished views 
 
 Continuous incremental 
learning, partly bordering on 
“evaluation fatigue” 
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It is noted that only in the most recent evaluation, in Case C, did the terms of reference 
state who the addressee of the evaluation may be, and who would thus be expected to learn 
from it. It specifically named policy decision makers and specific parts of the RTI commu-
nity, such as companies, as addressees. However, judging from the interviewees and other 
data sources for triangulation, it seems that stating the addressees made no discernible dif-
ference for the learning of actors. 
Learning about Programme Contents. Interviewees from all actor groups report that they 
have learnt new things, or got the opportunity to “think more deeply” about the industry or 
the field targeted by the evaluated programme. Across all cases, learning was linked to 
getting an overview of the respective industry and field, and to better understanding the 
status quo there (see Tab. 2). For example, in Case C, programme officers who were over-
seeing different programme lines stated that the evaluation provided them with a better 
understanding of each other’s lines, which all targeted the same field. Actors also report 
that they have reflected on what has been done and achieved in the industry or field, which 
developments are currently taking place there, and what could be expected for the future. 
This alertness to possible future developments also encouraged ideas about how to (poten-
tially) prepare for and develop future calls. Moreover, such as in Case B, evaluations    
enabled insights into details of the field or industry, for example, insights into the actual 
day-to-day operations of companies. 
Evaluations also provided insights into beneficiaries’ perspectives, how they engage in 
research at their home facility and with collaborative partners (icc14). Interviewees gained 
insights into the “factual reality” of companies (icc20) and how they work (icc24), another 
specifically valued the “critical remarks [from the interviews] that are typically not ex-
pressed [by beneficiaries] in everyday business” (icc08).  
Programme officers and managers reported that evaluations helped them to reflect on their 
routine operations, and on their own work, i.e. how they operate and manage the pro-
gramme. Case A showed a particular focus on individual learning with regard to how a 
programme is implemented and managed. However, only minor incidents of such learning 
were reported in all cases, typically following the suggestions for clarifications and adapta-
tions of the evaluation (see also composite actor level effects below). In all cases, respec-
tive managers and officers stated that the evaluation had practical value in this regard. 
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Some interviewees found that, in general, evaluations help to overcome the blindness to 
minor deficiencies that tends to arise when one is too deeply involved in overseeing or 
managing a programme. They stated that the evaluation heightened their awareness of 
room for improvement, and referred to the evaluation as an opportunity to improve things, 
and as an opportunity to engage in discussions about how to move the programme forward. 
Overall, as summarised in Tab. 2, the learning effects that occurred at the level of individ-
ual actors can be characterised as rather incremental. Interviewees stated that the evalua-
tions were but one input for their work, amongst others. They described the evaluations as 
inciting minor flashes of insight. For example, they noticed some details that they had pre-
viously overlooked, or they became secure about something that they had previously just 
assumed. One interviewee described these as “aha moments”, when little insights popped 
up in his mind and led to a small increase in knowledge. 
Learning about the Programme’s Overall Relevance. For Ministry and Agency represent-
atives, the evaluations contributed to a strengthening of their already held opinions about 
the programme’s relevance. In Case A and Case C, they had believed before the evaluation 
that they were running very well. The evaluation made them even more convinced that the 
programmes had a key role in the National Innovation System, were important for reaching 
socio-economic goals, and contributed to the realisation of related RTI strategies at the 
national and supranational level. 
In Case B, Ministry and Agency representatives had already harboured doubts about the 
programme before the evaluation. The evaluation confirmed these doubts. The actors, 
hence, did indeed change their courses of action after the evaluation, but not (just) because 
of the evaluation. The less affirmative evaluation findings did not substantially change 
their beliefs and attitudes about the programme, its background and implementation. Ra-
ther, the Ministry and Agency had already been somewhat critical beforehand, and the 
evaluation amplified this attitude. 
Ministry and Agency representatives understood affirmative evaluation results as an     
encouragement to move on with the present direction of the programme. For example, one 
interviewee referred to the evaluation findings as a “mandate for continuing”. In numerous 
interviews across cases, confirmation was equated to “demonstration” or “proof”, e.g. for 
the Federal Ministry of Finance, that the policy was worthwhile, even necessary, and had 
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to be further pursued. Confirmatory evaluations also fostered personal feelings of owner-
ship for the programmes. 
To sum up, learning about the programme’s overall relevance hardly occurred in the form 
of changing individual beliefs and attitudes (see Tab. 2). It rather took the form of refining 
and further substantiating the beliefs, or at least suspicions, that the actors already had. 
Learning about Evaluations. Some interviewees reported that participating in the evalua-
tion enabled them to further increase their competencies with regard to evaluations. Each 
evaluation definitely adds to the respective actors’ experience with evaluations. Some 
Agency representatives particularly highlighted that they had deepened their methodologi-
cal knowledge, for instance by conducting research in the Agency’s database following the 
requirements put forward by the Evaluators, and by discussing potential analytic applica-
tions for internal purposes with them. 
Actors also stated that they were able to improve their practical evaluation skills, for ex-
ample, how to better prepare for future evaluations, or how to provide better data for eval-
uations. In Case C, one ministry representative stated that participating in the evaluation 
had increased his knowledge about how to systematise goals and related indicators – in 
view of the expected Outcome-Oriented Ex-ante Impact Assessment, “which forces you at 
a much earlier stage to formulate [goals] more precisely” (icc11). This was also mentioned 
by one Evaluator, who reasoned that the evaluation may have contributed to a broader dis-
cussion in the Ministry about the systematisation of goals, objectives and related assess-
ment indicators (icc07).  
Altogether, these learning effects can be characterised as continuous and incremental. In 
many cases, the interviewees’ responses suggested that evaluations had become a routine 
for them (see Tab. 2). In some cases, their answers indicated that they were approaching 
somewhat of a stage of evaluation fatigue. For example, some interviewees pejoratively 
referred to current evaluation activities as “evaluitis” (a term also used by, for example, 
Frey [2008] to designate the proliferation and routine character of evaluations).  
The main learners were individuals who were directly responsible for the programme at the 
Ministry (i.e. officers and representatives of the department) and individuals who operated 
and managed the programme at the Agency. Both learnt not only about the developments 
of the programme and “what works”, its relevance, function and role, but also about evalu-
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ation methodologies and measurements. Also, some of the Evaluators reported instances of 
learning, because, for example, “you can always learn from evaluations” (icc22). 
Effects at the Composite Actor Level 
Learning at the level of composite actors occurs across individuals, and in organisations. It 
is reflected in changes of actor constellations, and in changes within the participating or-
ganisations. 
Effects on Actor Constellations. The evaluation processes and results affected actor con-
stellations in multiple ways. These effects can be divided into two groups: (1) From a fac-
tual perspective, the evaluations consolidated already existing differences and commonali-
ties, and (2) from a social dimension, the evaluations were opportunities to foster trust and 
continuity, especially amongst the Ministry, the Agency, and the Evaluators. 
Tab. 3: Effects at the Level of Actor Constellations across the Three Cases 
Consolidation of Shared and Different Views Promotion of Trust and Continuity 
 Highlighting issues of common concern, 
instigation of discussion about these issues 
 Deepening of shared understanding of  
confirmatory results 
 Persisting differences about controversial issues 
 
 Fostering cooperation, especially between  
Ministry, Agency, and Evaluators (bonding ex-
perience, fostering of established relationships) 
 [Rarely: Stirring up tensions with external 
stakeholders] 
 Mostly, issues were already known, and  
ensuing discussions were affirmative and  
conciliatory. 
 
 Evaluation processes provide an opportunity  
for fostering positive relationships, especially     
between Ministry, Agency and Evaluators. 
 
As shown in Tab. 3, the evaluations identified issues of common concern and instigated 
discussions about these issues. Mostly, such issues were no surprise for the participating 
actors. Some Ministry representatives felt that there was “not much to discuss” (icc11), 
considering the lack of new information or controversial issues. One Agency representative 
added that they had already been looking at making changes, and hence continued working 
(icc16). Most of the concerns and recommendations had apparently already been ad-
dressed, and potential (critical) issues might have already been discussed with the Evalua-
tors during the evaluation. 
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In case of confirmatory findings, the actors engaged in discussions where they mutually 
affirmed each other to further pursue the taken course of action. They had fairly unanimous 
views on the issue beforehand, and the evaluation process fostered the further deepening of 
their shared understandings. These instances can be described as what the literature calls 
“process use” (e.g. Patton 1997), meaning learning that takes place during the process of 
an evaluation. For example, one Agency representative described the evaluation as a 
“structured as well as discursive process, in which interim findings are discussed, and you 
get feedback from different perspectives. “These discussions can make a difference” 
(icc20).  
When evaluations pointed to controversial issues, animated debates or disputes ensued. 
However, from the available data it seems that widely diverging views were not brought 
into reconciliation by evaluation processes. In other words, in case of truly controversial 
issues, participating in the evaluation process did not prompt actors to change their       
attitudes. This was particularly visible in Case B. Here, evaluation findings stirred massive 
discussions and tensions, though largely after the evaluation had been finished, highlight-
ing the perceived importance of that single programme, and putting it in the centre of    
discussions around general approaches to RTI funding and support. In this light, external 
stakeholders stated that they could not simply be against such policies on principle, as 
funding R&D in companies, or funding in general, is considered to be important. 
As stated in Tab. 3, participating in the evaluations also had effects on the social relations 
between the various individual actors, and respectively between the organisations that they 
represented. Overwhelmingly, the evaluation process was an opportunity to foster coopera-
tion. Gathering in meetings and working together enabled experiences of solidarity, trust, 
bonding45 experiences, and even the emergence of some kind of team spirit. As outlined 
above, in most instances, discussions between actors led to enhancement of common un-
derstandings. Most actors had known each other personally for a long time, and their or-
ganisations could look back on a considerable history of collaboration. The evaluation pro-
                                                 
45  The term “bonding” was chosen to emphasise the elements of trust and commitment contained in situa-
tions during and after the evaluations. It aligns with Putnam’s (2000) classification of bonding (and bridg-
ing) social capital: Bonding social capital is defined as inward-looking ties and social norms that promote 
in-group solidarity and reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. In this study, this descrip-
tion fits well with the group consisting of the Ministry, the Agency and the Evaluator. Bridging social 
capital, on the other hand, refers to outward-looking ties that encompass diverse people and groups. In 
this study this includes stakeholders such as programme beneficiaries and interest groups. 
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cesses, thus, further contributed to the fostering of already existing relationships between 
various actor groups. In particular, between the Ministry and the Agency there are close 
historical ties and personal relationships that have developed over many years.  
It also needs to be stressed that, as far as the collaboration between Ministry and Agency is 
concerned, the evaluations were not distinctive in terms of their social aspects. The interac-
tions in the course of the evaluations did not differ substantially from other interactions 
between the Ministry and the Agency in terms of intensity or tone. For example, for 
Case B, which saw more preparation for and follow-up to the evaluation than the others, 
one agency representative claimed that interaction went “[as always] on the basis of good 
practice […] very open and uncomplicated [based on] very stable and well-functioning 
communication structures”, adding that “[…] this did also not change because of the eval-
uation” (icc24). 
This kind of set-up and handling of issues between Ministry and Agency was witnessed 
across all cases. Case B serves also as an example for an evaluation that did stir up tensions 
between actors, in particular between the Evaluators and external stakeholders. In this case, 
the term “bonding” does not apply to all of the actors’ experiences. However, the Ministry 
strove for a balance of the actors’ interests, thus adding to an impression of trust and soli-
darity, in particular between the Ministry and the Evaluators. While some of the external 
stakeholders argued that the evaluation might have benefited from a joint preparation of, 
e.g., evaluative questions and terms of reference, this did not find much favour with the 
Ministry and Agency. It was argued that external stakeholders were potential beneficiaries, 
which entails a conflict of interest, and that too much heterogeneity among the preparatory 
group might hamper the efficacy of evaluative questions. 
Effects at the Organisational Level. The evaluations had a number of effects on the     
organisations that were involved. On programme implementation, the evaluations had a   
legitimating effect, and also provided impulses for incremental improvements. Moreover, 
for organisations as a whole, notably the Agency and the Ministry, evaluations contributed 
to organisational change processes that were already underway, but not related to the par-
ticular programme alone, being more far-reaching. 
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Tab. 4: Effects at the Organisational Level across the Three Cases 
Legitimation of Programme 
Implementation 
Incremental Improvement of 
Programme Implementation 
Contribution to Organisational 
Change Processes in Agency 
and Ministry 
 Legitimation of current    
programme implementation 
processes 
 
 Improvement of programme 
implementation processes 
 
 Improvement of non-
programme related organisa-
tional practices 
 Establishment of organisa-
tional routines for evaluations 
 Strengthening of impact  
orientation 
 Direct effect 
 
 Cumulative effect 
 
 Additional impetus to  
organisational change 
processes already underway 
(cumulative, “trickle down”) 
 
As stated in Tab. 4, evaluations largely had a legitimating or confirmatory effect on pro-
gramme implementation processes inside the Agency: The ways of how programmes were 
implemented were largely found satisfactory. This can be characterised as a direct effect. 
Evaluations also provided impulses for incremental improvements of programme imple-
mentation (see Tab. 4). Altogether, these programme-related effects at the organisational 
level can be characterised as small. Some minor processes were adapted or newly created, 
for example, concerning the tender processes and calls. One Agency representative stated: 
“Small adaptations can always be made, but that usually happens on a personal level” 
(icc03). A Ministry representative felt that “evaluations […] are part of daily business and 
this particular one […] did not endorse changes to our principal procedures” (icc06). This 
can be characterised as a cumulative effect. 
Evaluations also had effects at the organisational level that were not restricted to the pro-
gramme in question (see Tab. 4). Most of these effects were reported for the Agency, be-
cause it administered the evaluated programmes. Also for the Ministry, general effects 
were reported. Overall, these effects were cumulative impulses for organisational change 
processes that were already underway in any case.  
The Agency also used learnings from the evaluation to improve organisational practices 
not exclusively related to the programme in question. Several operational processes were 
improved. For instance, in Case A, it was stated that the evaluation once again raised the 
issue of providing only little feedback to unsuccessful applicants, which was also a concern 
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voiced in other evaluations. Similarly, application forms were adapted following on-going 
complaints from candidates. The switch from programme lines to “thematic fields” in Case 
C was, according to the interviews, preceded by informal discussions between the Ministry 
and the Agency.  
The pervasive evaluations have also contributed to the improvement of communication 
within the Agency. The Agency has made increased efforts to encourage knowledge shar-
ing of Agency staff, for example, in the form of semi-annual meetings of programme man-
agers in order to exchange ideas and experiences. The driving force behind these meetings 
seems to be the Agency’s strategy department. These forms of knowledge exchange have 
already, as suggested by recent research (Landsteiner 2015), become institutionalised in 
the Agency. Interestingly, although the Ministry also participated in the policy-centred 
discussions and reflections of the evaluation processes, it had at the time of the interviews 
not developed a similar exchange of knowledge across units or departments. In this regard, 
one Ministry representative stated: “I am in charge of this programme, others have other 
programmes. I hear little about what is going on there” (icc21). 
The Ministry and the Agency have established organisational routines which enable them 
to efficiently handle every step of the set-up and process of an evaluation, as well as, fol-
low-up activities. Evaluations have become a standard procedure that relies on certain 
rules, regulations and forms that shape the evaluation process, from setting up the terms of 
reference and tendering the evaluation, to providing data to the Evaluators and monitoring 
progress, to preparing for dissemination and implementation.  
In the Ministry and the Agency, evaluations contributed to the further strengthening of 
impact orientation. Agency representatives stated that the evaluation processes, with their 
presentations and discussions, fostered “impact thinking”, e.g. “you see the aspects [from 
another perspective] and you start thinking about the impacts, how it has really been” 
(icc09). Also Ministry representatives stated that evaluations contributed to impact orienta-
tion. The evaluations investigated in this study were considered to be of a rather minor 
importance in this regard, while especially the 2009 systems evaluation, as well as, the 
public budgeting reform progresses was highlighted by one ministry representative as par-
ticularly effective in relation to this. The evaluations investigated in this study made a mi-
nor, cumulative contribution to this effect. 
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When looking at learning effects at the organisational level in synopsis, it appears that the 
Agency was the organisation that learned the most, followed by the Ministry. For the sake 
of completeness, it should be noted that the Evaluators did not consider evaluations as 
drivers of change within their organisations. They stated that, of course, evaluations were 
often the topic of formal and informal discussions in their respective organisations, but not 
drivers of change from an organisational development perspective. Also, external stake-
holders did not feel that the evaluations had incited any changes in their respective organi-
sations. 
Effects at the Policy Level 
The evaluations had repercussions at the policy level, leading to incremental adaptation 
and legitimation of the programmes. Effects on public debate were very limited. Links to 
high-level political decision making could not be discerned. 
Tab. 5: Effects at the Policy Level across the Three Cases 
Contribution to Incremental 
Improvement of Programmes 
Legitimation of Programmes Effects on Politics 
 Changes in the programme  
 Input for successor pro-
gramme in-the-making 
 
 Continuation of the  
programme 
 
 Evaluations generated little 
public debate 
 Evaluations had no discerni-
ble effects on high-level po-
litical decision making 
 Minor changes (“fine-
tuning”, incremental adapta-
tion) 
 
 All programmes were contin-
ued 
 
 Very limited political effects 
 
Contribution to Incremental Improvement of Programmes. Effects on the programme 
are what would come to mind first when thinking along the traditional lines of evaluation 
use: Evaluation results are used to decide whether or not a programme should be contin-
ued, and whether and how it should be modified. 
Assessment of the individual cases shows that recommendations prompted action, to a var-
ying degree, in all of the analysed cases, which lead to what could be termed as minor 
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changes to the programmes46 (see Tab. 5). Evaluation findings are referred to clearly and 
visibly in the post-evaluation programme documents. While respective documents were 
only available for Case B, interviewees gave examples for recommendations that were 
picked up from the evaluations and incorporated into the subsequent programme docu-
ments of Case A and Case C. In this light, one statement was that “they [the Evaluators] 
drafted conclusions and recommendations. That was a learning effect for us.” (icc21) 
In all cases, the Agency was asked by the Ministry to provide suggestions on how to, in 
light of the evaluation results, move on with the programme. Interviews from Case A and 
Case B indicated that the strategy department of the Agency was involved in follow-up 
activities and related discussions. While evaluation findings of Case A were reported to the 
strategy department, which apparently fed into internal discussions, in Case B, the pro-
gramme manager and the Agency’s strategy department jointly drew up a draft proposal on 
how to continue with the programme, particularly taking on the identified concerns, which 
was handed to and discussed with the Ministry. 
Consistent with the effects at the individual level, interviewees largely referred to the eval-
uation findings and subsequent recommendations as input for incremental adaptation or 
“fine tuning”, aiming to lift the programme to its next level. The biggest changes were 
made to the programme in Case C: Programme goals were aligned and re-structured into a 
hierarchy, ways of measuring goal attainment were introduced, and former programme 
lines were designed into “thematic fields”. The least apparent changes were made to the 
programme in Case A. These changes, for example, included modifications of wordings in 
the programme document, and adaptations of application forms and related documents. 
It is crucial to point out that the programme changes that followed the investigated evalua-
tions could not be fully ascribed to these specific evaluations alone. Often they were “trick-
le-down” effects that followed several evaluations (see e.g. Biegelbauer 2013). The evalua-
tions highlighted and illuminated problems that had already been known or suspected by 
Ministry and Agency actors. This is, to no small extent, a logical consequence of the way 
                                                 
46  It might be very well possible that minor changes in the programme and its underlying document or  
strategy result in major outcomes and impacts, e.g. the target groups have been expanded which may (or 
may not) raises the quantity and quality of R&D, thereby potentially contributing to the country’s inno-
vativeness. This may, however, only be judged by substantial (long-term) evidence of programme per-
formance, for instance on the basis of an evaluation. 
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of how the evaluations were conducted: Talking to Ministry and Agency staff, and asking 
them what they consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of the programme, was part of 
every examined evaluation. 
Legitimation of Programmes. In the end, in all three cases, the programme was continued 
(TAKE OFF, Headquarter Strategy and IV2Splus, the latter two under new names) as an-
ticipated (see Tab. 5), after adaptations to the programme had been made official and for-
mal. Programme objectives were largely left unchanged, budgets were released, and fol-
low-up calls were launched and subsequently managed.  
Effects on Politics. When looking at the wider political repercussions of the evaluations, it 
can be observed that the evaluations were followed by very little public debate. Effects on 
high-level policy making could not be discerned (see Tab. 5). 
To ascertain the number of media reports about the evaluations, relevant databases47 were 
searched for the evaluations carried out in Case A, Case B and Case C up to November 11, 
2015, using the (former and current) names of the programmes, the Ministry and the Agen-
cy, combined with various search terms48. In the vast majority of news articles, TAKE 
OFF, Headquarter Strategy and IV2Splus were described as instruments of RTI support. 
While the Headquarter Strategy programme generally received most media coverage, only 
a few newspaper articles and press releases by public institutions mentioned the re-design 
of the programme49, in some cases highlighting the decisive evaluation50. Also the inter-
viewees stated that the evaluations of the three programmes did not generate much public 
debate, thus corroborating the findings from the search of media databases. 
The evaluations were not found to have any effect on high-level policy making. None of 
the interviewees referred to any interactions or communications with high-level politicians, 
such as from the minister’s cabinet. All programme adaptations that followed the evalua-
tions were of a minor nature. They did not require changes of formal institutions, such as 
laws or regulations, except for the requirement that a new programme document has to be 
                                                 
47  WISO (http://www.wiso-net.de), FACTIVIA (https://global.factiva.com), APA (http://www.apa.at). 
48  They were evaluation, findings, results, learning, presentation. 
49  Format Nr. 33/11, 19.08.2011: “Fördern Quellen des Wachstums”. 
50  Press release of the agency: APA Notification, 30.03.2012. “FFG: Forschung wirkt”. 
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drafted or the existing one has to be modified, following routine budget discussions with 
the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
To understand this lack of effects on high-level political decision making, i.e. the lack of 
major changes to programmes or discontinuations of programmes that would have        
required high-level political decision making, it is helpful to bear in mind that there is a 
distinction between public administration and politics. Elected politicians are expected to 
act in the best general interest based on philosophical positions, ideological orientations, 
and thoughtful reasoning, and to set a political agenda. The administration is expected to 
implement this agenda, in cooperation with agencies, in the form of policies and pro-
grammes, usually with support from experts, policy advisors, and also evaluations. As sug-
gested by prior work (e.g. Biegelbauer 2013, Højlund 2015), high-level politics is some-
what detached from the so-called low-level policy making of administration, and in partic-
ular from evaluations. For example, none of the interviewees reported that political repre-
sentatives were involved in discussions about evaluation findings. 
Case B is particularly interesting with regard to its lack of major effects on the programme, 
and respectively on politics. The evaluation had suggested major changes or even a discon-
tinuation of the programme, which would have required extended political discussions, and 
– as some interviewees noted – considerable time and staff resources. It was decided not to 
follow the most radical recommendations of the evaluation, but to make some adjustments 
to the programme: Changes were made to programme formalities and procedures. For ex-
ample, cooperation between actors of the national RTI community is now obligatory and 
linked to a so-called cooperation bonus scheme. Notably, the programme was renamed to 
“Competence Headquarter”. Some interviewees stated that this helped to create a sharper 
differentiation from other programmes. Others saw it as a case of mere “re-labelling”. In-
terviewee comments suggested that such a lack of political consequences, even when an 
evaluation leads to politically sensitive results, is not uncommon, due to factors and mech-
anisms at the institutional level. These, as well as, factors and mechanisms related to actors 
and the evaluation itself, shall be the focus of the ensuing section. 
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6.2 Factors and Mechanisms that Condition Effects 
While Section 6.1 analysed the effects of evaluations on individual actors, on composite 
actors, and at the policy level, this section delineates the factors and mechanisms that were 
found to mediate and shape these effects. It builds on the conceptual framework outlined in 
Chapter 3, with the central assumption of actor-centred institutionalism that actors’ behav-
iour cannot be understood in isolation from the institutional context within which they ex-
ist and learn. 
Building on the portrayal of the specific policy field in Section 4.2, on the interviews, as 
well as, on the analysis of the general legal and policy framework, of actor features and of 
evaluation characteristics, the factors and mechanisms that condition the effects of these 
evaluations will be illuminated. As suggested by the conceptual framework (see in particu-
lar Fig. 4), three main groups of factors and mechanisms will be examined: Institutional, 
actor-related, and evaluation-related factors and mechanisms. Tab. 6 summarises the find-
ings. 
Tab. 6: Conditioning Factors and Mechanisms 
Institutional Factors and  
Mechanisms 
Actor-Related Factors and 
Mechanisms 
Evaluation-Related Factors and 
Mechanisms 
 Policy style 
Outcome-orientation 
Strategy-orientation 
 Evaluation culture 
Prescription of  
mandatory evaluations 
Formal and informal  
institutions that shape 
evaluations 
Lack of binding  
mechanism 
 Programme features (age, 
continuity) 
Linkages 
 
 Actors’ interest and  
preferences 
 Interaction orientation and 
continuity 
 
 Involvement of external 
stakeholders 
 Evaluation purpose 
 Evaluative questions 
 Opportunities for discussion 
(“safe space”) 
 Acceptance of the evaluation 
design 
 Publication of evaluation 
results 
 Surprise value of evaluation 
results 
 
Institutional Factors and Mechanisms 
This category concerns factors and mechanisms external to the actors and the evaluation 
that potentially shape the effects of the evaluation. The main groups of institutional factors 
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and mechanisms are: (1) Policy style, (2) evaluation culture and (3) features of the evaluat-
ed programme (see Tab. 6). 
Policy Style. Two aspects in particular have been found to have discernible effects on poli-
cy learning from evaluations: First, the institutionalisation of outcome-oriented public 
management approaches, and second, the institutionalised use of supranational or national 
strategies that link to the evaluated policies. 
The shift towards outcome-oriented public management approaches, and the accompany-
ing agencification of the policy system, has increased the demand for the monitoring and 
legitimating of policies, in many cases by means of evaluations. Outcome-orientation and 
agencification have been introduced with the intention to make better use of public funds, 
as RTI expenditures had risen, and so had concerns about value for money. Efforts have 
thus been made to set performance targets for policies. Impact assessments for new pro-
grammes are now compulsory, and evaluations are explicitly suggested as part of the Fed-
eral Budget Act. The 2011 Austrian RTI strategy puts it as follows: “All measures are ori-
ented first and foremost in terms of their impact. Initiatives and programmes that do not 
lead to the desired impact will be shut down or fundamentally reformed.” (BKA et al. 
2011, p. 11) The Agency is relatively autonomous in how it operates and manages pro-
grammes, but is expected to demonstrate the effectiveness of these programmes vis-à-vis 
the Ministry. Evaluations are an integral part of doing this.  
When looking at Case A, Case B and Case C in synopsis, the increasing shift towards out-
come-orientation is apparent. In the course of time, the questions stipulated in the terms of 
reference have become increasingly outcome-oriented: The 2008 evaluation of Case A 
entailed only a few questions with regard to impacts, as it focused more on conceptual as-
pects than on impacts. For instance, it was asked: “To what extent does TAKE OFF con-
tribute to the national and international networking in the aviation industry?” The 2011 
evaluation of Case B is more specific with regard to the programme’s impact. For example, 
it was asked: “What indicators can be used for the assessment of programme results?” 
“Which effects can be discerned, e.g. in terms of employment effects, collaborations, for-
mal qualifications, technological leap, new skills and competences, sustainable develop-
ment of R&D capacity or regional ties?” The 2012 evaluation of Case C was most specific 
in this regard. This evaluation focused on questions such as: “Is there evidence of effects 
that have been triggered by the implementation of projects?” “Have the funds been proper-
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ly and adequately used to tackle the (technical, organisational and societal) challenges in 
the traffic sector?” The anticipated Outcome-Oriented Ex-ante Impact Assessment guided 
the formulation of goals and indicators for future assessment purposes.  
The interviews and developments in the RTI policy field indicate that the engagement with 
these issues has been fruitful, as actors have become more aware of impact-related issues, 
and programmes have been modified to increase their outcome-orientation. For example, 
programme goals have been clarified, indicators have been improved, and funding        
requirements have been adjusted.  
The following conditioning factor can therefore be specified: 
1) The increased institutionalisation of outcome-oriented public management has shifted 
the effects of evaluation processes and results towards more learning about programme 
impacts. 
 
A possible flipside of increased outcome-orientation in RTI governance may be that evalu-
ations now pay less attention to the programme’s overall relevance or conceptual under-
pinnings. Case A may be exemplary for an evaluation that still pays relatively much atten-
tion to such aspects, because its context, the RTI aeronautics strategy, strongly requires it. 
In light of this, Austria, as other EU countries, has moved towards mission-led politics. 
Increasingly elaborated supranational (notably EU) and national strategies are stipulated. 
Having such strategies, with typical structures and components (e.g. long-term goals,    
priority areas, suggestions for measures), has become somewhat taken for granted. They, 
for instance, pinpoint society’s “Grand Challenges” (for example climate change and pov-
erty), and outline approaches of how to tackle them. Specific policies in all policy areas are 
expected to contribute to these efforts.  
RTI is definitely a field that enjoys high strategic importance in Austria and at the EU  
level, as it does in many countries worldwide. In Austria there is a strong consensus that 
RTI is crucial for the future development of the country, in particular for economic growth 
and welfare. An increasing number of policies relating to RTI is named in national policy 
agendas, and they are typically aligned with the visions and objectives set out by overarch-
ing strategies at the European level. RTI has a particularly high place on the European pol-
icy agenda, and related strategies construct narratives and priorities for a desired route to 
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e.g. “a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (Europe 2020 strategy) or, with more   
reference to RTI, to better respond to societal demands and concerns (i.e. “Innovation Un-
ion” as part of the Europe 2020 strategy). Also European strategies, in particular policy 
domains, add to this picture, for example, in the domains of energy, health and transporta-
tion. This is reflected in Austria’s RTI strategy from 2011 that envisions “becoming an 
Innovation Leader” by 2020, which has been an objective for quite some time and voiced, 
in one way or another, in key documents before. 
The development towards strategy-orientation interlinks with the shift towards outcome-
orientation discussed in the previous section, as supranational and national strategies pro-
vide the guidelines for what kind of outcomes the specific policies should aim. In RTI pol-
icy, strategy-orientation has mainly not taken the form of creating new and discontinuing 
existing programmes, but rather constantly aligning the historically evolved policy instru-
ments with new strategic visions and goals. The following interview statements illustrate 
this phenomenon: “[Political] expectations change every year or two […] and new catch-
words emerge. [Every few years] you have to achieve other objectives with the same pro-
gramme. [At] some point climate protection was suddenly extremely important, and we 
[the administration] had to prove that our technology programmes positively impact     
climate protection” (icc21). This also impacts implementation processes as “goals change, 
target groups change, selection criteria change […] and procedures have to be adapted to 
work based on the new criteria” (icc20). 
Strategy issues in the RTI policy field are further complicated by the fact that RTI policy is 
governed not only by the 2011 RTI strategy, which has been approved by Parliament and is 
thus binding for all ministries, but also by a growing amount of, partly overlapping, sub-
strategies in various RTI-related policy domains such as Open Innovation, Life Sciences or 
Intellectual Property Rights. The 2011 RTI strategy is the main reference point for the in-
vestigated programmes. Various advisory bodies of Austrian RTI governance can make 
recommendations concerning this strategy and monitor the activities pertaining to it. The 
responsibility for sub-strategies lies with the respective ministries. The wide spread of  
responsibility for RTI policy has led to on-going restructuring and re-design processes of 
national policies, in the attempt to foster priority setting. It is fair to say that even a kind of 
competition for “best policies” (Leibfritz and Janger 2007) and best sub-strategies has  
ensued amongst the various ministries involved with RTI programmes, potentially leading 
to, with reference to the strong variation of RTI policies, a strategy jungle. 
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All programmes analysed in this study link, in a top-down manner, to supranational and 
national strategies, which demand the promotion of particular research areas and specify 
directions for sector development. The programmes are explicitly anchored in key policy 
documents and governmental strategies, sometimes referred to as roadmaps, work and ac-
tion plans, which in turn are intertwined with strategies in other policy fields such as e.g. 
education, employment, energy and health, and link with efforts to tackle today's “Grand 
Challenges” as suggested by European agendas. 
In Case C, dealing with IV2Splus, this link to higher level strategies was least of an issue 
and problem. The programme is aligned with international transport, traffic, environment- 
and sustainability-related agendas and strategies. As one Agency representative explained, 
“the basic orientation [of the programme] has not fundamentally changed since it started; 
[it follows] a relatively stringent strategy” (icc23). 
In Case A, dealing with TAKE OFF, the evaluation particularly focused on the integration 
of higher level strategies. The programme had been implemented before the Austrian RTI 
aeronautics strategy was developed. The Austrian RTI aeronautics strategy was “inspired 
by European research agendas and related Technology Roadmaps [which] we try to trans-
fer to the national level” (icc15). The evaluation was particularly focused on the            
programme’s alignment with this strategy. To realise this focus, the evaluation questions 
even somewhat deviated from what had been envisaged in the programme document. 
Evaluation results showed that despite the reversed order of strategy and programme    
development, the programme was well aligned with the strategy. One Agency representa-
tive noted: “[T]he RTI aeronautics strategy has a large impact on the programme. The 
evaluation has less impact on topics [e.g. what kinds of projects are eligible for funding]. 
Topic-wise, the strategy is the biggest impact factor.” (icc16)  
In Case B, dealing with the programme Headquarter Strategy, the connection of the pro-
gramme to national strategy had important repercussions for the up-take of evaluation  
results. Headquarter Strategy is meant to attract research-intensive firms to Austria. The 
programme has a relatively large budget, and responsibilities for the programme were for a 
short time shared between two ministries. This increased the visibility of the programme. 
The programme is mentioned in several key governmental documents and location      
(sub-)strategies. As indicated by its name, the programme works as a strategy on its own, 
aiming to expand headquarter functions in Austria. This is believed to be “desirable for a 
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growth-oriented economy” (icc06). However, evaluation results provided evidence that the 
programme had low additionality, i.e. it did not make the expected contribution to econom-
ic growth, employment and national innovativeness. The evaluation recommended – in line 
with the above mentioned, though later published, call for outcome-orientation stated in the 
2011 Austrian RTI strategy – that the programme should therefore be discontinued in its 
current form. External stakeholders (i.e. the companies eligible for programme funding, as 
well as, industry representatives) contested the evaluation results and claimed that the pro-
gramme was actually crucial for the attractiveness of Austria as a business location. Minis-
try representatives then decided that it was impossible to follow the recommendation of the 
evaluation: “[Nobody attempted] to say ‘let’s abolish that’, because it has been quite clear 
that this is simply not possible” (icc19). It would have required large political efforts to 
push through the notion that a programme that has been so prominently mentioned in high-
level policy documents, and that even carries the name “Headquarter Strategy”, actually 
has none or only few of the effects that it had been stated to have in these documents. Poli-
cy decision makers therefore decided not to abolish, but rather to incrementally reform the 
programme. 
Summarising what has been said, the following conditioning mechanisms can be specified: 
2a) Because programmes are increasingly expected to contribute to higher level politi-
cal strategies, evaluations are increasingly focused on such strategies, thus enabling 
policy learning about this aspect. 
2b) When a programme has repeatedly been stated to contribute to higher level policies 
in important policy documents, it complicates the up-take of evaluation results con-
testing this claim. 
 
Evaluation Culture. Austria has developed a strong evaluation culture in recent years. RTI 
evaluations have become more defined, professional and institutionalised as an activity, 
and many actors rely on them. Formal and informal institutions provide prescriptions, with 
varying degrees of compulsion, for whether to conduct evaluations, how to conduct evalua-
tions, and how to deal with evaluation results. 
In all of the examined cases, the evaluations were required by formal institutions. Specifi-
cally, the evaluations were required by the programme documents. The Ministry had the 
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overall responsibility for the evaluations to be commissioned and carried out. This respon-
sibility is stipulated in several laws, such as the Research and Technology Promotion Act, 
the Research Organisation Act, and the so-called RTI guidelines, thus putting actors, in 
particular the Ministry and the Agency, into clear-cut roles. 
The fact that evaluations are increasingly formally required has led to a rise in the number 
of evaluations that have been conducted in recent years. Whether the increased quantity of 
evaluations has also led to more policy learning from evaluations is, however, somewhat 
doubtful. For the majority of interviewees, evaluations were a taken-for-granted part of the 
policy making process, or as one Agency representative put it: “Business as usual” (icc23). 
When asked Ministry and Agency representatives why evaluations in RTI are actually car-
ried out, the vast majority of interviewees stated that it was for formal reasons, because “it 
is mandatory” (icc02), “a formal must-be” (icc08), “a formal obligation” (icc11, icc14), “it 
was foreseen in the programme document” (icc03), “it is a pre-condition for the continua-
tion of the programme” (icc11)”, “the Federal Ministry of Finance requests it” (icc06).  
Only a few interviewees stated that the primary or central reasons were to foster policy 
learning, for example, “you need to confirm that what you did was good” (icc02) or “to 
secure and maintain a high quality service” (icc14). Some interviewees pejoratively      
referred to the proliferation of evaluation activities as “evaluitis” (see also above). These 
findings contradict traditional evaluation research (e.g. Weiss 1999) and support newer 
research, such as Lethonen (2005), which suggests that more evaluations, or a well-
established evaluation tradition, may not necessarily lead to more policy learning. The pro-
liferation of evaluations may actually decrease the learning effects from each single eval-
uation, as they no longer deliver substantial new information beyond what is already 
known, thus leading to evaluation fatigue. 
The following conditioning mechanism can therefore be specified: 
3) The increasing formal requirement of evaluations has led to an increase in the num-
ber of evaluations. This has, on the one hand, increased the number of opportunities for 
policy learning from evaluations, on the other hand, it might have decreased the intensi-
ty and magnitude of learning from each single evaluation. 
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While in all cases formal institutions clearly prescribed that evaluations had to be conduct-
ed, the rules concerning the timing and exact form of the evaluations were less formalised. 
The main orientation in this regard is provided by the standards published by the Platform 
Research and Technology Policy Evaluation (FTEVAL 2012). They have voluntarily been 
accepted as binding by all members of the Platform, including ministries and agencies. 
These composite actors use them as important guidelines when tendering evaluations. They 
are visibly used, and sometimes cited, in the respective terms of reference. 
Altogether, the legal and policy framework leave some room for interpretation about when 
and how to conduct evaluations. The Research and Technology Promotion Act puts for-
ward the principle of evaluation as a minimum requirement and points to the respective 
guidelines. They, however, relay the design and modalities of the evaluation to the respec-
tive programme, outlined in the programme document. Hence, the Ministry can decide 
when to evaluate, on what kind of information to focus, what questions are of interest, 
which indicators may be used, etc. These aspects varied noticeably across cases. 
Within the Ministry there is no evaluation unit or other body that would coordinate the 
timing and topical orientation of all programme evaluations. The programme officers 
commission, tender and supervise the evaluations of programmes under their agenda more 
or less independently. They initiate programme evaluations according to the rhythm of the 
policy cycle of the respective policy, and according to other requirements. For example, in 
Case C, the evaluation was postponed, and the IV2Splus programme document was legally 
extended, to cope with the preparations for an Outcome-Oriented Ex-ante Impact Assess-
ment. 
In all of the analysed cases, the evaluation process, from tendering to completion, took 
place in a highly routinised and formalised manner: The Ministry, as the programme own-
er, plans and sets up the evaluation. The responsible programme officer, who is also the 
main point of contact for the evaluation, triggers the evaluation. The set-up of the evalua-
tion builds, first, on the information put forward in the respective programme document. 
Second, the purpose and objective of the evaluation are further specified, including issues 
that may have changed since the programme document was set-up, that need further atten-
tion and require additional questions to be answered. 
All actor groups were very familiar with standard evaluation routines. The routines are 
transmitted through staff (e.g. at the Ministry, Agency), formalisation (e.g. laws, regula-
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tions, EU standards), socialisation (e.g. shared norms and understandings), education (e.g. 
FTEVAL trainings) and imitation (e.g. copying best practices). Altogether, evaluation 
practices and procedures have become highly institutionalised. They are rarely and only 
very incrementally updated. The more important form of policy learning in this regard is 
that some more junior or more peripheral individuals may gain a better understanding of 
already existing evaluation routines. 
The following conditioning mechanism can therefore be specified: 
4) The strong formal and informal institutions that govern the evaluation process imply 
that learning about evaluation processes rarely takes place in the form of collective 
learning to change evaluation routines, and mostly takes place in the form of individual 
learning about existing evaluation routines. 
 
While the entire process of planning, setting up and conducting an evaluation follows well-
established rules and procedures, this is hardly the case for the publication and use of  
evaluation results. Formal guidelines on how to deal with evaluation results do not exist. 
The FTEVAL standards only stipulate the general exhortation that: “Commissioning insti-
tutions must ensure that evaluation results are treated as highly binding. The extent to 
which they oblige depends on the context: The more definite the statements, the more 
binding the consequences could or should be.” (FTEVAL 2012, p. 14) 
At the Agency, the strategy department has established an internal knowledge exchange 
process to process and share evaluation findings amongst various units in the Agency. At 
the Ministry, evaluation findings are disseminated and processed on a case-by-case basis, 
largely depending on individual initiatives. Information is shared between departments and 
units based on individual and personal experience. As an informal institution, evaluation 
reports are published as soon as they are available in a publishable format on the Minis-
try’s website or the website of FTEVAL. This case-by-case handling of evaluation results 
enables flexibility. Ultimately, evaluation results are dealt with according to political    
rationales such as power relations, interests, budgetary concerns, etc. One interviewee put 
it as follows: “[It] depends on what the current cycle of the programme is […], what are 
the political and financial conditions that would allow to actually implement [the recom-
mendations]. For instance, if budgets [for programmes] are already set beforehand or […] 
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particular interests arise […] one may not strictly comply with these evaluation results” 
(icc08).  
The following conditioning mechanism can therefore be specified: 
5) The lack of strong institutions that would govern the use of evaluation results con-
tributes to the loose connection between evaluations and policy development. At this 
level, policy development, thus, ultimately remains a task for administration. 
 
Programme Features. A number of characteristics of the evaluated programme has been 
found to influence evaluation effects: The age and continuity of the programme, the densi-
ty of its connections with other programmes, and whether a successor programme was al-
ready in the making. 
All of the programmes studied here can be characterised as mature. They are de-facto insti-
tutionalised RTI support instruments. Sometimes they had been re-labelled, but essentially 
they have been in operation for more than a decade: IV2S was introduced in 2001, TAKE 
OFF in 2002 and Headquarter Strategy in 2004. Since their inception they have been con-
stantly reshaped, following on-going discussions, as well as, internal and external monitor-
ing and assessments. In the interviews, Ministry representatives often called the post-
evaluation programme a “new programme”, while the term “extended programme” was 
more common amongst the Evaluators and external stakeholders, emphasising the on-
going character of the programmes. Also, some interviewees remarked that the pro-
grammes had exhausted their development possibilities within the present legal frame-
work. 
The longer a programme exists, the more firmly it becomes entrenched in the administra-
tive structure, in terms of budgets, personnel, and concomitant power. Also, external 
stakeholders begin to take the programme for granted. As one external stakeholder argues: 
“Once you start with a programme like that [here: IV2Splus] it cannot simply be stopped” 
(icc28). It is therefore not completely surprising that for two of the analysed programmes 
(TAKE OFF in Case A and IV2Splus in Case C), the development of successor pro-
grammes had literally already been in the making when the evaluation was commissioned. 
This means that the continuation of the programme had basically already been secured and 
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planned, preparations were being made, and windows of opportunity to take up evaluation 
findings were very small. Fundamental changes were ruled out from the start.  
In Case C, the envisaged Outcome-Oriented Ex-ante Impact Assessment exerted pressure 
on the evaluation team, which had to come up with preliminary results early in the process, 
as they were required for preparations and internal policy making processes.  
The following conditioning factors can therefore be specified: 
6a) The longer a programme has been existing, the more it has already been fine-tuned 
within the bounds of existing limitations, the less are there opportunities for further in-
cremental policy learning from evaluations. 
6b) The longer a programme has been existing, the stronger is the drive towards pro-
gramme continuation, the smaller is the scope for taking up radical recommendations 
from evaluations. 
 
When a programme is connected to other policies, a major adaptation or downright abol-
ishment of the programme would affect these policies, potentially causing ripple effects or 
a chain reaction. To some extent, all evaluated programmes are not only institutionally 
anchored at various levels of governance and in different high level strategies, they are also 
linked with other programmes and initiatives. One interviewee explained that it is often 
more important to provide stability and orientation for the beneficiary community than to 
strictly follow recommendations from the evaluation and undertake sudden big changes 
(icc14).  
The following conditioning factor can therefore be specified: 
7) If a policy instrument is provided in connection with other instruments, this decreases 
the likelihood that radical recommendations from an evaluation are taken up, because 
doing so would lead to unpredictable effects. 
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Actor-Related Features and Mechanisms 
Two main groups of actor-related features and mechanisms have been found to condition 
the effects of evaluations: Actors’ interests and preferences, and actors’ interaction orienta-
tion and continuity (see Tab. 6). 
Actors’ Interests and Preferences. Actors’ interests and preferences indirectly condition 
evaluation effects: It is according to these interests and preferences that they decide about 
how evaluations are conducted. They thereby shape the evaluation-related factors and 
mechanisms to be outlined in Section 6.2, which in turn condition evaluation effects. 
The actors’ roles, interests and preferences are strongly conditioned by laws and other for-
mal institutional rules: The Ministry is responsible for strategic oversight and governance. 
The Agency is responsible for implementing and managing policies. An Agency repre-
sentative described the relationship as follows: “We are the glass, which can be touched by 
the researchers [i.e. the beneficiaries]; […] and the Ministry fills in the content” (icc03). 
The Ministry is mainly interested in the relevance of the policy, its outcome and impacts, 
e.g. assessing the achievement of programme objectives. The Agency is particularly inter-
ested in questions of efficiency, e.g. whether its procedures work well or need adaptation. 
The Evaluators did not show much preference for particular kinds of research questions or 
evaluation foci, but aim to satisfy the commissioning Ministry and deliver high quality 
work, to get invited to do further evaluations. Their role in the evaluations was described 
by Ministry and Agency representatives with terms such as “specialist”, “independent”, 
“professional”. The Evaluators described their profession as “detached”, “methodically-
focused”, “autonomous”, “answering narrow questions”, “not interested in influencing 
politics”. In light of this, one Evaluator argued: “I work for a customer […] and what the 
customer does with the study […] is not my business” (icc31). Ministry and Agency staff 
valued having an “outside” perspective. One interviewee described the evaluation process 
as “sparring” with experts, i.e. evaluators. The notion of evaluation as a threat or punish-
ment, as it is sometimes suggested in the evaluation literature, could not be discerned in the 
interviews. 
External stakeholders, finally, for better or worse, are usually not included in drafting pro-
gramme documents, terms of reference, or evaluation designs, and therefore have very 
little influence on how the evaluations are conducted. 
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The following conditioning mechanism can therefore be specified: 
8) Actors’ interests and preferences indirectly condition evaluation effects: These inter-
ests and preferences come into play when actors decide about how evaluations are con-
ducted. They thereby shape the evaluation-related factors and mechanisms to be outlined 
in Section 6.2, which in turn condition evaluation effects. 
In the case of Austrian RTI policy evaluations, this means that the Ministry’s interest in 
outcomes and the Agency’s interest in efficient programme management contribute to 
evaluations focusing on these aspects. 
 
Actors’ Interaction Orientation and Continuity. The interaction orientation amongst the 
Ministry, the Agency, and the Evaluators can be described as predominant solidarity. Only 
in rare cases does the Ministry proceed unilaterally, based on its hierarchical status and 
strategic imperatives. 
The relationship between the Ministry and the Agency is, obviously, essentially a princi-
pal-agency relationship. It is formally guided by several institutions, such as a framework 
contract, programme documents, and contracts for every single call of the programmes. 
Contracts delineate e.g. terms, conditions and objectives of the cooperation; roles and re-
sponsibilities; rules for feedback, reporting, and evaluation; as well as, the flow of funding. 
In addition to these formal institutions, there are strong informal institutions that foster 
solidaristic orientation. Interviewees from the Ministry, the Agency, and the Evaluators 
praised the working relationships and described them with features such as trust, shared 
understanding, high commitment, and open communication. In other words: A “well-
functioning partnership” (icc11), in which both “act in concert” (icc26). This led to a 
shared mind-set amongst members of the Ministry and Agency about the specific pro-
gramme, but also about more general matters such as the importance of RTI and its sup-
port. 
Notably, most of the actors from the Ministry, the Agency, but also the Evaluators, have 
known each other for a long time. The number of involved persons has been relatively 
small, and staff turnover is considered to be low. Actors are familiar with the other actors’ 
preferences and orientations, at the personal, as well as, at the organisational level. They 
acknowledge each other as experts who are familiar with the respective policies. Most of 
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the Ministry’s funding and programmes has been outsourced to the Agency or was, up un-
til 2004, provided by its predecessor organisations. From the interviews, it was found that 
the institutional memories of these predecessors are well intact. Most interviewees were 
still with the Ministry or Agency, even in the same position, as during the time of the eval-
uation or long before the evaluation, dating back to the introduction of the respective pro-
gramme. There was, thus, no problem with loss of “institutional memory” (e.g. Lethonen 
2005), which may arise when frequent changes in government structures coincide with a 
lack of continuity of the involved personnel. Such loss of “institutional memory” and con-
tinuity (due to staff changes) reduce the learning effects of evaluations. 
The high familiarity and solidarity orientation amongst actors from the Ministry, the Agen-
cy, and also the Evaluators, facilitated the planning of evaluations and conduct of evalua-
tions, encouraged trust in emerging and final evaluation results, and enabled constructive 
discussion about the results. 
Representatives of the Ministry and the Agency meet at regular intervals throughout the 
year to share relevant information about recent developments in the field and issues related 
to the programme, and also about evaluation findings. They also share information in mail-
ings, jour-fixe meetings, ad hoc meetings, working groups, workshops, trainings, and other 
events. Also, informal personal contacts are important channels of knowledge diffusion. 
This constant communication between the Ministry and the Agency strongly shapes the 
evaluation process in all of the examined cases. The Agency was involved in the evalua-
tion process from the beginning: It was involved formally, by providing data and time for 
interviews, and by participating in meetings where evaluation findings were presented and 
discussed. Informally, Agency representatives were approached by the Ministry to further 
comment on interim findings and were involved in the policy development process while 
the evaluation was carried out and afterwards. This stands in stark contrast to the role of 
external stakeholders, who were only involved in data gathering, final presentations and 
some follow-up meetings. 
As typical for a principal-agency relationship, the Agency possesses privileged access to 
information that is useful, even essential, for evaluations, such as data on calls, statistical 
information about beneficiaries, etc. Because of the trustful relationship between the Min-
istry and the Agency, this information could be accessed without major problems. More-
over, the Agency possesses important technical and management expertise, general experi-
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ence, and generally has a bigger workforce concerned with programme-related tasks than 
the Ministry. The Agency also maintains its own strategy department and is, by law,     
authorised to provide suggestions with regard to policy development. This enables the 
Agency to also make important contributions to the interpretation of evaluation results and 
to programme development, to some extent also to strategic issues, which is officially the 
domain of the Ministry. The Ministry, in all cases, invited the Agency to make suggestions 
on how to move on with the programme. 
The following conditioning factors can therefore be specified: 
9) High familiarity amongst actors and a solidarity orientation are conducive to policy 
learning based on evaluations, because they facilitate the planning and conduct of eval-
uations, encourage trust in emerging and final evaluation results, and enable construc-
tive discussion about these results and programme development options. 
 
Evaluation-Related Factors and Mechanisms 
This category concerns the overall features and procedures of evaluations that condition 
evaluation effects, namely the involvement of various external stakeholders, the purpose of 
the evaluation, the research questions, opportunities for discussion, the acceptance of the 
evaluation design, the quality and timeliness of the evaluation, the publication of evalua-
tion results, and the surprise value of evaluation results (see Tab. 6). 
Involvement of External Stakeholders. Which actors were involved in which stages of the 
evaluation definitely had an impact on the kinds of effects that this evaluation could have. 
Especially the inclusion, or respectively exclusion, of external stakeholders in decisive 
phases of the evaluation process made a difference. Tab. 7 provides an overview of the 
involvement of various actor groups throughout the stages of the evaluation process. 
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Tab. 7: Involvement of Actor Groups in the Evaluation Process 
Main 
Phase 
Step Included Actor Group 
  
Ministry Agency Evaluator 
External 
Stake-
holders 
Planning 
and Setup 
General preparation X X   
Defining the terms of reference X X   
Tendering X  X  
Selection of successful bid X    
Evaluation 
Process 
 
Kick-off event X X X  
Mailings  X X X  
Data collection activities (e.g. interviews) X X X X 
Telephone or Voice over Internet Protocol system 
sessions 
X X X  
Meetings X X X  
Presentations or workshops (e.g. interim, final 
presentations) 
X X X  
Reporting (e.g. delivering the interim, final report)   X  
Follow-up 
Activities 
Jour-fixe, status meetings, internal discussion  
processes, coordination meetings 
X X   
Mailings, selective dissemination of presentation 
material and the report 
X X  X 
Report made available on the internet X    
Discussion in working groups (here: Advisors on 
the Austrian RTI Aeronautics Strategy, Agencies’ 
In-house advisory committee of the aeronautics and 
space agency) 
X X X X 
Targeted presentation for specific stakeholders 
(here: Agencies’ advisory committee for general  
programmes) 
X X X X 
Joint reflection processes with experts from  
research institutes 
X   X 
 
In the examined evaluations, external stakeholders were involved very little in the evalua-
tion process. This is interesting, because previous research suggests that engagement and 
interaction are important for better terms of reference and the use of evaluations (e.g. John-
son et al. 2009). In the analysed cases, external stakeholders were visibly only involved in 
data collection (as interview partners), and in follow-up presentations and discussions after 
the evaluation had been concluded. The evaluations were, thus, not participatory, but con-
sistent with a top-down policy approach. The majority of the external stakeholders learned 
about the evaluation only when they were approached for interviews. 
Perhaps not quite surprisingly, when interviewed for this study, external stakeholders did 
not show much interest in the evaluations that had been conducted, and in their results. It 
was, therefore, very difficult, within the scope of this study, to extract information about 
evaluation effects from the interviews with stakeholders. Most of them had been inter-
viewed as experts for at least one of the three examined evaluations and read the final   
report. Some had been invited to discuss the results, such as in Case A and Case C, via 
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participation in the advisory committee of the Agency. However, they did not talk about 
the evaluations very much in the interviews for this study. Their answers pointed rather 
towards the general context of RTI, the importance of the respective programme and to-
wards general support measures for the industry and the higher education sector. 
It seems plausible that this lack of awareness of and interest in evaluations was due to the 
fact that external stakeholders were not included in deciding the purpose, evaluative    
questions and methodology of the evaluations. To a large extent, the evaluation results 
were simply not relevant for them, because they touched only very peripherally on the is-
sues they cared about, for example, eligibility criteria and the amount of available funding. 
The following conditioning factor can therefore be stipulated: 
10) The exclusion of stakeholders from the planning and set-up of the evaluation con-
tributed to a definition of evaluation purposes and questions of low relevance to external 
stakeholders, as well as to a choice of methodologies not always fully accepted by stake-
holders. It thereby decreased the extent to which external stakeholders were willing and 
able to learn from the evaluations. 
 
Evaluation Purpose. In each of the examined evaluations, the purpose of the evaluation 
was laid down in the terms of reference. The terms of reference are basically a written 
document that constitutes the main reference point for the evaluation. Besides the general 
purpose of the evaluation, it also outlines the goals and objectives of the evaluation,      
research questions, as well as, responsibilities and time lines. The Evaluators deemed it 
very important to adhere to the requirements stipulated in the terms of reference. All of the 
analysed evaluations were basically formative interim evaluations of single policies, 
though with some summative elements. 
To some extent, policy learning was apparent as an aim or objective of the evaluations. 
Case A’s terms of reference referred to the evaluation as an assessment of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the programme “to learn” from the experiences that have been made 
so far. The evaluation of Case B was meant to “reflect” on the development of the pro-
gramme to draw conclusions and find recommendations for the future development of the 
programme. In Case C, the evaluation should serve the purpose of “learning” in order to 
allow for critical reflection amongst the programme owner and relevant policy decision 
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makers. Apart from these references, detailed objectives of learning from the evaluation 
were neither defined in the any of the terms of reference, nor formulated later during the 
evaluation process. 
The purpose of these evaluations revolved around providing an assessment of the design 
and implementation of the programme as it has developed so far, to assess the effective-
ness and efficiency of service provision, and thus to provide accountability, as well as, 
suggestions and recommendations for future developments. In Case A, the focus was laid 
on the concept, in Case B and Case C on goal attainment and impacts. As one might ex-
pect, interviewees reported that in Case A they attained a better understanding of the con-
cept, and in Case B and Case C more of an understanding of goal attainment and impacts. 
The following conditioning factor can therefore be specified: 
11) The purpose of the evaluation shapes which kinds of new knowledge individuals can 
gain from the evaluation. 
 
Evaluative Questions. Which questions were addressed had a big impact on the kinds of 
learning enabled by evaluations. The Evaluators formulated the evaluation questions ac-
cording to the terms of reference, around which the evaluation design was built. The terms 
of reference, in turn, were developed by the Ministry, with – as has been shown in the 
analysis – support from the Agency. Ministry and Agency representatives already had con-
sistent pictures about the programme in mind when the terms of reference were drafted. 
They also already had suspicions about what might be sensitive issues with the respective 
programmes. In Case A, the evaluative questions deviated from the suggestions made in 
the programme document, and were more oriented towards the programme’s alignment 
with the strategy. 
In all cases, the Ministry invited the Agency to propose evaluative questions or provide 
other inputs during the preparation phase. This was particularly highlighted in Case B, be-
cause Headquarter Strategy is provided by the Agency as part of its own general pro-
grammes. It was claimed that, as addressee, the Agency had a “legitimate interest” (icc03, 
icc20, icc02) in the evaluation. Also, in Case A, some questions were suggested by selected 
members of the working groups of the RTI aeronautics strategy. 
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In none of the cases did the questions of the evaluations touch on the very existence of the 
programme. Although this might not seem necessary due to the set evaluation purpose, it is 
noteworthy because it somewhat contradicts FTEVAL standards51. In view of the long-
standing history of the programmes, some interviewees, in particular from the Agency, 
remarked upon the lack of questions concerning the general purpose and relevance of the 
policy. Ministry representatives and external stakeholders, however, were quite unanimous 
in their views that these types of question are usually not asked in interim evaluations 
(icc14, icc15). An external stakeholder reasoned that “evaluations like that do not question 
support measures” (icc28). The absence of fundamentally challenging research questions 
means that if an evaluation still reaches the conclusion that the programme should be dis-
continued (as in Case B), this recommendation is virtually impossible to implement, for 
political reasons. 
The following conditioning factor can therefore be specified: 
12) The questions asked in the evaluation set the limit for the kind of changes that will be 
made to programmes as a consequence of the evaluation. 
 
Opportunities for Discussion. During the evaluation process, many events and channels of 
dialogue and interaction with the opportunity for discussion emerged, such as kick-off 
meetings, data collection activities, meetings, presentations, and workshops (see Tab. 7). 
The meetings and presentations during the evaluation process provided learning opportuni-
ties, as they offered the opportunity to discuss findings and potential concerns with the 
Evaluators and other actors. Mostly, opportunities for discussion included the Ministry, the 
Evaluators, the Agency, but not external stakeholders. In other words, the evaluations were 
quite participatory with regard to the Agency, but not as much for other stakeholders, with 
the exception of interviews. This kind of partly participatory approach was realised based 
on informal rules. It was not called for explicitly in the terms of reference. 
Each of the three cases saw three key communication events during the evaluation process. 
First, a kick-off meeting in which programme officials from the Ministry and the Agency 
                                                 
51  Consequences of interim evaluations might be: “Changes in organisation and management of the pro-
gramme change in focus and financing (stopping the programme if appropriate).” (FTEVAL 2012, p. 28) 
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discussed details of the proposed evaluation design and approach with the Evaluators.   
According to the interviews, this event provided room for dialogue and discussion, typical-
ly supporting the establishment of clarity and transparency of upcoming steps in the evalu-
ation process, but also to develop commitment to and engagement with the upcoming eval-
uation of relevant actors. 
Second, the interim presentation around the middle of the evaluation activities, supported 
by a so-called interim or mid-term report on which the presentation builds. This report is 
typically disseminated by the Evaluators some days prior to the presentation. Interim 
presentations are, like the kick-off, almost exclusively gatherings of Ministry and Agency 
representatives. While the interim meetings were mainly debriefings concerning what had 
been found so far, they were also venues for dialogue, discussion and reflection. Partici-
pants were invited to provide feedback and suggestions, thoughts, comments, etc. that were 
used for mutual reflection and sharing of perspectives.  
The final key event across all cases was the presentation of the evaluation findings. It 
brings the investigation to a conclusion. The final report has been provided in advance or is 
delivered soon after, potentially incorporating inputs from the discussions of this final 
meeting. Interviews indicated, in particular in Case C, that there were also subsequent ad 
hoc meetings to provide further input from the Evaluators’ side to the Ministry.  
These key events were, according to the interviews in all three cases, generally perceived 
as useful, albeit some Agency representatives were unsure about actually having learned 
something, referring to the situation as “more of a presentation, less of a discussion” 
(icc03, icc08). This perception is widely shared amongst those who were approached for 
interviews during the evaluation, including external stakeholders, or, in case of the latter, 
also attended follow-up meetings.  
Due to the informal atmosphere and the shared understanding amongst actors, these meet-
ings during the evaluation process provided a kind of “safe space” in which matters could 
be given deeper thought and consideration, in particular with regard to sensitive and     
controversial topics, and different points of view. One interviewed Evaluator indicated that 
this might have implications for the final evaluation report: When critical issues had al-
ready been brought to attention and thoroughly discussed in the interim presentation, they 
were incorporated into the final evaluation report, but did not have to be flagged as espe-
cially critical. While this indication needs to be verified further, it adds to the picture of 
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overly affirmative evaluation reports that have been published in recent years in Austrian 
RTI policy making, and highlights the importance of the evaluation process for learning. 
The following conditioning mechanisms can therefore be outlined: 
13a) Opportunities for discussion in the course of an evaluation encourage the learning 
of participating actors. 
13b) Opportunities to discuss critical issues with key actors before the final evaluation 
report may lead to a more moderate portrayal of these issues in the final report. 
 
Acceptance of the Evaluation Design. In Case A and Case B, the terms of reference did 
not call for a particular evaluation design. In Case C, basic requirements for the evaluation 
design, including approach and methodology, were stipulated in the terms of reference. 
Eventually, in all cases, Ministry and Agency representatives considered the chosen      
designs appropriate, and felt that the resulting evaluations were comprehensive, profes-
sionally executed, timely and insightful. Altogether, it is fair to say that the methodological 
quality of all evaluations was high, and actors took this high quality level completely for 
granted. 
In Case B, problems arose with regard to acceptance of the evaluation design by external 
stakeholders: In this case, the evaluation used an almost purely qualitative approach, which 
is somewhat unusual, because most evaluations use more balanced mixed method ap-
proaches. In this case, the design was crucially based on in-depth interviews with the heads 
of the research departments of those companies that had received funding under the Head-
quarter Strategy programme. Obviously, the Ministry and the Agency had chosen this ap-
proach as appropriate. It indeed turned out to be quite effective for unearthing sensitive 
information about the additionality of the programme, as heads of research talked very 
frankly about the reasons for locating R&D departments in Austria. When such, in part 
somewhat explosive, findings were published, external stakeholders, i.e. industry          
representatives and the companies eligible for funding from Headquarter Strategy, raised 
concerns. They claimed that the methods were unreliable, because they were purely quali-
tative. The Ministry and the Agency trusted the methodology and the findings, but quite 
heated debates with external stakeholders ensued, and in the end it was, as already ex-
plained, decided that a discontinuation of the programme was politically not feasible. 
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The following factor can therefore be outlined: 
14) Unusual evaluation designs, although trusted by the commissioning actor and oth-
ers, make it easier for external stakeholders to contest the evaluation findings and argue 
against the implementation of recommendations from the evaluation. 
 
Publication of Evaluation Results. The final evaluation reports were published online, 
which has become an informal institution in recent years in the Ministry, in order to pro-
vide visibility, transparency and authenticity. The public availability helped the discussion 
of the evaluation findings. In the literature it is often suggested that evaluations may     
disappear or are forgotten, and thus may have no effect at all, if results are unfavourable. 
For instance, the evaluation of Headquarter Strategy (Case B) might easily fit into this de-
scription. Despite the less affirmative results, it was decided to make the findings accessi-
ble and visible to the public, which, in the end, caught the attention of external stakehold-
ers, and was followed by debates and arguments about the findings in general and the eval-
uation design in particular. It is noted that some of the Evaluators also welcome the publi-
cation of evaluations, but made it clear that it is the right of the client, for whom the evalu-
ation was conducted, to do so.  
Besides the Ministry, the FTEVAL platform also hosts evaluation results and related re-
ports, which are made publicly available on its website (see also Dinges and Schmidmayer 
2010). While some interviewees argued that this has enhanced the conditions for engage-
ment in RTI policy making, others pointed to the fact that findings have not been discussed 
in depth publicly. One interviewee brought up the growing trend of writing and publishing 
comments on evaluation findings by the commissioning authority, i.e. the Ministry, a prac-
tice that has been adopted by another larger public agency in Austria, the Austrian Science 
Fund.  
The following factor can therefore be outlined: 
15) Publication of evaluation results – no matter the nature of the actual findings – pro-
vides public access to policy-related information, and creates transparency and authen-
ticity. 
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Surprise Value of Evaluation Results. In all of the examined cases, the evaluation find-
ings were largely as expected, i.e. they had little surprise value. This was also true for Case 
B, where the evaluation results were rather critical, because the Ministry and Agency had 
already suspected the programme’s lack of additionality that was confirmed by the evalua-
tion. Two main reasons can be given for this apparent lack of surprising evaluation results: 
 First, Ministry and Agency staff was indeed very familiar with the programmes and 
had quite a good understanding of their strengths and weaknesses, even before the 
evaluation. The Agency collects, processes and analyses various types of information 
related to the policy for internal purposes, allowing it real-time insights. This infor-
mation is also formally and informally shared and discussed with the Ministry (see, for 
instance, Section 6.2). The same data is also provided to the Evaluators for analysis and 
is later displayed in the report. As one Ministry representative argued: “Deve-loping a 
new programme document would have been possible, in principle, without the use of 
an evaluation” (icc14). 
 Second, Ministry and Agency staff also took part in the evaluation process, e.g. in de-
fining the evaluation purpose and questions, during interviews, or in discussions at in-
terim-presentations. Their views, therefore, fed into the evaluation design, as well as, 
into the analysis and interpretation of findings. To some extent, the evaluations, there-
fore, echoed their pre-existing preferences and perceptions. 
Altogether, the evaluation results, thus, largely confirmed existing beliefs, whether positive 
(Case A, Case C) or less so (Case B), and did not contain much new information about 
matters that needed urgent attention. In some cases, Ministry and Agency representatives 
suggested that they were approaching somewhat of a stage of evaluation fatigue, where 
additional evaluations were not expected to lead to substantial new insights. “It can be 
frustrating when evaluations are delivered that are not quite spectacular.” (icc06) “But you 
should not expect big surprises. You usually know for yourself how the programme is run-
ning, and how it has developed.” (icc23) “We get confirmation […] not only about our 
work, but also about what we suspected or what we already knew anyway.” (icc09) In the 
end “it is official […] and we might should think about how we can use the evaluation” 
(icc06).  
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The following mechanism can therefore be outlined: 
16) When evaluation results contain little new information for the addressees, this leads 
to a confirmation of existing beliefs, and to incremental learning at best. It lowers the 
likelihood of transformational learning from the evaluation. 
6.3 Pathways of Effects 
Following Section 6.1 about the effects of policy evaluation and Section 6.2 about the fac-
tors and mechanisms that may condition these effects, this section discusses the pathways 
through which policy evaluations may exert their effects on policy making. In this study, 
pathways are understood as patterns of interactions and communications concerning a par-
ticular evaluation. The analysis up to this point has shown that evaluations entail intensive 
communication amongst actors, first and foremost amongst the Ministry, the Agency, the 
Evaluators and external stakeholders.  
In light of these findings, three types of pathways of effects are introduced as new concep-
tual elements which put emphasis on the processes through which evaluations achieve in-
fluence in policy making: Additive, cumulative and circular pathways (see Tab. 8). They 
are outlined and discussed in the following. The pathways of effects extend the conceptual 
framework that has been used to study the effects of evaluations beyond the notions of 
actors, institutions and evaluations. This study explores the experiences of policy actors 
with evaluations under the condition of existing institutions and tracked pathways of ef-
fects through different stages. 
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Tab. 8: Pathways of Effects 
Type of Pathways Level of Effects Types of Effects Description 
Additive Individual  
actors 
 Learning about pro-
gramme contents 
 Learning about pro-
gramme’s overall rele-
vance 
 Learning about evalua-
tions 
 
 
With each evaluation, the actors 
deepen their expertise and make 
improvements within their imme-
diate sphere of influence. Like-
wise, with each evaluation, the 
actor constellation becomes more 
solidaristic and stable. 
Composite  
actors: 
Organisations 
 Incremental improve-
ment of programme 
implementation 
Composite  
actors: 
Actor constella-
tion 
 Consolidation of 
shared and different 
views 
 Promotion of trust and 
continuity 
Cumulative Composite  
actors: 
Organisations 
 Contribution to organi-
sational change pro-
cesses in Agency and 
Ministry 
Evaluation findings may lead to 
organisational change processes, 
and to incremental improvements 
of programmes, when they occur 
in combination with other impulses 
for change. 
Policy level: 
Programmes 
 Contribution to incre-
mental improvement 
of programmes 
Circular Composite  
actors: 
Organisations 
 Legitimation of pro-
gramme implementa-
tion 
Evaluations have a legitimating, 
stabilising effect on programmes 
and programme implementation, 
when their questions and methods 
preclude evaluation results that 
would fundamentally contradict 
the expectations of the Ministry 
and the Agency. 
Policy level: 
Programmes 
 Legitimation of pro-
grammes 
 
Additive Pathways of Effects 
As shown in Tab. 8, additive pathways of effects consist of many minor changes, resulting 
immediately and directly from the evaluation process and evaluation results: By participat-
ing in the evaluation process, individual actors increasingly approximate the shared ideal 
type of an expert. They put their individual learning into practice by making those changes 
that are feasible within their immediate sphere of influence. Mainly this concerns pro-
gramme officers at the Ministry, and, in part, programme managers at the Agency, who 
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make minor adaptations to programme implementation. The evaluation results provide 
them with feedback on how to become better at doing their job.  
Participating in the evaluation process leads to a deepening of shared views, trust and fa-
miliarity. Existing knowledge is enriched. At the same time, fundamental differences root-
ed in the actors’ varying institutional roles persist. Altogether, additive pathways of effects 
may be characterised with the proverb: “The more it changes, the more it is the same 
thing.” 
Cumulative Pathways of Effects 
Cumulative pathways of effects consist of many impulses for change, including evaluation 
results, which all point into the same direction and eventually, in combination, cause this 
change (see Tab. 8). They slowly build up over time towards a specific direction. Ideas and 
suggestions may take time to diffuse, often through indirect, complex routes, and actors 
may gradually consider (or discard) a need to change practices or policies. Findings do not 
necessarily have to be revolutionary or radical: In fact, even if recommendations are reject-
ed, the discussion and debate over findings, or dispute such as in Case B, can generate 
pressure on policy development and implementation. A single issue may finally lead to 
reaching the “tipping point” through cumulative effects. In the literature, this has also been 
referred to as “trickle-down” effect (Biegelbauer 2013), “knowledge creep” (e.g. Radaelli 
1995, Weiss 1980) or “enlightenment” (Weiss 1977). “Policy learning” may also be seen 
as cumulative effect of multiple evaluations in combination with other sources of influence 
(Lethonen 2005, p. 111, note 90). Cumulative pathways of effects are commonly associat-
ed with collective actors, i.e. organisations, but also policy making itself. 
As has been shown, cumulative pathways of effects may induce incremental improvements 
of programmes, as well as, fairly significant changes of organisational practices going be-
yond particular programmes. They added to further accumulation of knowledge, and fos-
tered thinking about impacts. For example, approaches such as outcome-orientation and 
strategy-orientation have been substantiated in recent years by evaluations, and have also 
led to organisational change. Continuous incremental learning processes following repeat-
edly conduced (interim) evaluations also entail cumulative effects, and may cause unin-
tended effects such as “evaluation fatigue”. In light of this, one may get the impression that 
small adaptions are seen as the only option available when it comes to programme devel-
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opment. Major changes seem less feasible, unless there are political or strategic considera-
tions at work. 
Compared to additive pathways, cumulative pathways of effects may lead to results that 
differ substantially from the status quo ante. While this entails aspects of uncertainty as it 
is often unclear which issues take priority, it may also heighten the status of the findings, 
making them more credible and valid. Cumulative pathways of effects may, thus, be char-
acterised with the proverb: “Little strokes fell big oaks.” 
Circular Pathways of Effects 
Evaluations have a legitimating, stabilising effect on programmes and programme imple-
mentation, when their questions and methods preclude evaluation results that would con-
tradict the expectations of the Ministry and, in part, also of the Agency (see Tab. 8). The 
Ministry is in charge of the preparation of the evaluation and monitors the entire process. 
However, evaluation is not institutionalised in the structure of the Ministry or any other 
composite actor. The legal and policy framework provide some leeway for ministry repre-
sentatives to decide about when and how the evaluation has to be carried out, and what 
kind of information is needed. Questions on the general purpose or existence of the policy 
are typically not put forward in what is called an “interim evaluation”. Nevertheless, there 
is some room for probing into these issues, considering the programmes’ age and long-
standing continuity, the suggestions made in the evaluation standards (termination might 
be an option), and the often stated perspective of arriving at a “new programme” after the 
evaluation. However, these issues are usually not explored intensively. The circular path-
ways of effects may, thus, be characterised with the principle: “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” 
This links to what seems to be a methodological issue: A considerable share of the inter-
views conducted for the evaluations in this study was carried out with programme repre-
sentatives, i.e. the Ministry and the Agency. This focal point suggests a somewhat circular 
way of knowledge creation and fortification: By articulating their views as part of the eval-
uation process, Ministry as well as Agency representatives had their views elevated to the 
status of presumably objective and scientific evaluation results. This seems particularly 
relevant with regard to learning about the programme’s overall relevance, e.g. for the Na-
tional Innovation System.  
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7 Summary and Closing Remarks 
This chapter presents the summary and conclusion of this study, its contributions, possible 
limitations and paths for further research. Section 7.1 summarises the key findings from 
the cross-case analysis. Section 7.2 discusses main conclusions, followed by Section 7.3 
which presents implications for theory and practice. The final Section 7.4 discusses limita-
tions and potential directions for future research. 
7.1 Key Findings 
Evaluations are increasingly used in public policy making, such as research, technology 
and innovation (RTI) policy, as a source of scientific advice and policy intelligence. Major 
reasons for this development are the increasing complexity in certain high-tech areas, the 
continuing interest in innovation and technology as key factors for economic growth and 
job creation, and New Public Management approaches that promote efficiency and effec-
tiveness through evidence-based decision making. In light of this, RTI policy has shifted 
from simple R&D support to setting research priorities and offering a variety of structured 
instruments. 
While the frequency and quality of evaluations have increased in recent years, concerns 
have been raised about their effectiveness to fuel change in policy making. Research sug-
gests that evaluations are predominantly carried out as ex-post exercises for instrumental 
and legitimating reasons to inform policy makers, whereas the learning from and effects of 
evaluations have been found somewhat unsatisfying. Newer studies that explore the conse-
quences of evaluations contend that the focus on the evaluation and its attributes, as well 
as, the narrow category of “use” that has been analysed in previous work, may overlook 
effects that are broader and deeper. Less prevalent, but increasingly considered, are expla-
nations of evaluation use that consider context-related factors, the role of actors and inter-
actions between them, as well as institutionalised rules. This study has attempted to      
address this shortcoming by investigating how actors, as well as, the policy itself are af-
fected by policy evaluations, drawing attention to the factors and mechanisms that shape 
evaluation effects. 
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Empirical case analysis indicates that evaluation processes and results generate effects at 
the individual level and the composite actor level, i.e. actor constellations and respective 
organisations, as well as, at the policy level. Main forms of effects include individual level 
learning about the programme contents, about the overall relevance of the programme, and 
about the evaluation itself, e.g. about methodology. At the composite actor level, actor 
constellations experience a consolidation of shared and different views and a fostering of 
positive relationships between the various individual actors, and respectively between the 
organisations that they represent. One effect at the organisational level is the legitimation 
of programme implementation. Evaluations may also contribute to incremental improve-
ments of programme implementation, and to other organisational change processes. At the 
policy level, the main forms of effects are contributions to the incremental improvement of 
the programmes and their legitimation, whereas effects on high-level policy making could 
not be discerned. 
As has been found in other studies, evaluations in the analysed cases are largely used in-
strumentally, for maintaining and developing public policy. Evaluation findings are em-
ployed to strengthen arguments in discussions and to legitimise the policy prior to or – due 
to short windows of opportunity – during the evaluation. Evaluations are tightly woven 
into formal (e.g. laws, regulations and framework contracts) and informal (e.g. customs, 
conventions, expectations) institutions. They are, however, not institutionalised in the 
structure of the Ministry, as a composite actor, leaving room for interpretation about the 
set-up and direction of evaluations.  
Institutional factors and mechanisms that condition evaluation effects are linked with the 
prevalent policy style and the evaluation culture, as well as, with programme features such 
as its age, continuity, and connection to other policies. Actor-related factors and mecha-
nisms encompass aspects such as interests and preferences, as well as, interaction orienta-
tions and the continuity of relationships. Evaluation-related factors and mechanisms con-
cern the (lack of) involvement of external stakeholders, the purpose of the evaluation and 
related questions, opportunities for discussion, the acceptance of the evaluation design, the 
quality and timeliness of the evaluation, the publication of results, and the surprise value of 
results. 
In the analysed cases, most of the issues and concerns that came up during the evaluation 
process and were set out in the findings, had apparently been addressed before the       
  Evaluations, Actors and Institutions 
151 
evaluation actually started. The highly formalised evaluation process provides events and 
channels of dialogue and exchange, referred to as “safe spaces”, in which critical issues 
may be discussed. In light of this, several instances of learning as a result of involvement 
in an evaluation (i.e. process use, Patton 1997) were detected, in particular amongst Minis-
try and Agency representatives. Public participation did not generally take place in the pol-
icy development processes. External stakeholders were approached for interviews, and 
some were invited to follow-up processes, in which findings were presented and discussed. 
Pathways of effects, which had been introduced as new conceptual element into studying 
evaluation effects, may be “additive”, meaning that actors deepen their expertise and make 
improvements within their immediate sphere of influence, arriving at an even more solidar-
istic and stable actor constellation. They may also be “cumulative”: Findings may lead to 
organisational change processes, and to incremental improvements of programmes, when 
they occur in combination with other impulses for change. Compared to additive pathways, 
cumulative pathways of effects eventually led to results that are of a different quality then 
the status quo ante, i.e., not just of a different intensity. Having a “circular” pathway of 
effect refers to the legitimating, stabilising effect of evaluations on programmes and pro-
gramme implementation, precluding findings that would fundamentally contradict expecta-
tions. 
Notably, the entire process of planning, setting up and conducting an evaluation is formally 
well established, but respective guidelines on how to move on with the findings are absent. 
While some informal approaches exist, evaluations are rather loosely connected to policy 
development. Programmes evolve through incremental adaptation, and current practices 
are the result of cumulative responses. 
7.2 Conclusions 
The analysis in this study is consistent with the literature that emphasises the need for a 
comprehensive approach to understand the use and influence of, and hence the learning 
from evaluations. It pursued the way of examining the whole breadth of change, and has 
identified and discussed numerous factors and mechanisms that condition the effects of 
evaluations. Evaluations have been found to actually generate a range of effects, beyond 
individual learning, and to clearly and visibly impact policy development. 
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Evaluations have led to the development of a common view on things, and have, in most 
cases, fostered shared understandings. They, hence, can be characterised as a bonding ex-
perience for core participant groups: programme owner (the Ministry), programme manag-
er (the Agency), and the Evaluators. Evaluation findings, generally speaking, were hardly 
surprising, and mainly led to a confirmation of existing beliefs. They seldomly generated 
changes in attitudes, rather amplified them. Interestingly, the Agency has been involved in 
the evaluations right from the start, e.g. by discussing evaluative questions. Learning took 
place particularly with regard to technical issues and operations of the programme, and 
when an individual or composite actor had a prior suspicion about room for improvement. 
This suspicion was then translated into the overall purpose of the evaluation and the evalu-
ative questions put forward in the terms of reference, which shape which kinds of new 
knowledge individuals gain, and which changes might be made as consequence of the 
evaluation. 
Context matters for evaluation effects, in many ways and at various levels. There is poten-
tially more than one context to consider. Important aspects of context include, for example, 
the drive towards outcome-orientation in New Public Management, and the increasing im-
portance of what this study terms as “strategy-orientation”, which determines the relevance 
of policy fields and their long-term future. These contextual aspects cast “shadows” on 
evaluations, akin to what Scharpf (1997) has called the “shadow of hierarchy”: Policy de-
velopment and implementation operate in a “shadow of hierarchy”, with the administration 
as the decision making authority that works in concert with the Ministry of Finance and 
budget principles that request output control. An additional “shadow of strategy” is cast by 
national and international visions and objectives set out by overarching policy strategies, 
which are mainly driven by technical experts, and not so much by – but also not entirely 
decoupled from – high-level political decision making, e.g. the minister and his or her cab-
inet. Furthermore, it goes without saying, hierarchies and strategies cast their “shadows” 
on all the actors within their realm of influence, e.g. respective ministries and agencies. 
They do not only affect the actors which this study examines in depth. 
The current structures and practices endorse evaluations as a routine, which entails two 
sides of a coin: While there are a broad acceptance amongst actors, a well-developed eval-
uation capacity, and established patterns for how to run and follow-up on evaluations, it is 
also a standardised, instrumental approach which puts accountability and legitimation at 
the forefront. In the analysed cases, evaluations primarily addressed the fulfilment of the 
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programme’s purpose and outcome, and less so its overall relevance or conceptual under-
pinnings – unless the context specifically required it.  
The institutions that govern the evaluation process imply that learning about evaluation 
processes rarely takes place in the form of collective learning to change evaluation rou-
tines, and mostly takes place in the form of individual learning about existing evaluation 
routines. The legal structures and the high degree of formalisation are geared towards in-
cremental learning, as is the subsequent improvement of programme implementation. 
The number of evaluations has increased, driven by formal requirements. While this has 
potentially increased the number of opportunities for policy learning from evaluations, it 
might also have decreased the intensity and magnitude of learning from each single evalua-
tion. More evaluations do not necessarily mean more learning or more development. The 
investigated evaluations focused on the immediate utility for incremental policy improve-
ment. They did not focus on the major objectives of the programme, its history and its wid-
er impact on society. The lack of strong institutions that would govern the use of evalua-
tion results contributes to the loose connection between evaluations and policy develop-
ment. At this level, policy development, thus, remains ultimately a task for administration. 
This corroborates recent research in this field that finds a de-facto “de-politicisation” of 
programme evaluation (Højlund 2015). Institutionalised evaluation primarily seems to 
serve the administration, and does not challenge the policy in question. 
In sum, evaluations mainly serve accountability purposes in the RTI policy field, which is 
considered as crucial for welfare and jobs, and which requires learning to cope with the 
“Grand Challenges” ahead at a national and international level. The routinisation of eval-
uations, becoming formal exercises and legal obligations, may have several drawbacks in 
this regard. First, the chances of learning that occur during the evaluation may be further 
limited by the formal requirements and structures. Second, this might distance the evalua-
tion and the possibility to learn from it from an interested audience. The evaluations dis-
cussed here are basically contractual relationships between a client and an evaluator. Little 
attention is paid to engaging wider audiences, e.g. the RTI community, in the policy devel-
opment process. Third, while routinisation and the pressure for accountability may reduce 
the chances of learning from evaluations, it may also lead to an increase in unintended ef-
fects such as evaluation fatigue or dialogue and disputes about aspects that e.g. was not 
within the scope of the evaluation.  
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Subsequently, there might be a point in time when evaluations cannot provide (considera-
ble) new information for policy development anymore. The longer a programme has exist-
ed, the more it has already been fine-tuned within the bounds of existing limitations, the 
less are there opportunities for further incremental policy learning from evaluations. This 
adds to programme continuation, leaving little scope for taking up radical recommenda-
tions from evaluations. Hence, the term “evidence-based policy making” seems to be mis-
placed in this context: Evaluations of this type may be more aptly characterised as a part of 
professional programme management. Because much is already known and well-
established, and participants of evaluation processes have also become experts of their own 
on the subject matter over time, alternative approaches or methods may be better suited to 
assess innovation-related support programmes, systems and applications. 
7.3 Implications 
In light of the aforementioned conclusions, the results of this study entail several implica-
tions for theory and practice in public policy making that could be addressed directly to 
enhance policy learning from evaluations. 
This study extends previous empirical research on evaluation effects by conceptually iden-
tifying and empirically examining effects not only at the individual and composite actor 
level, but also at the policy level. Unlike most previous studies, it shifts attention from the 
evaluation itself to the involved actors and the institutional context and examines those 
factors and mechanisms that condition evaluation effects. The study provides insights that 
contribute to a better understanding of how, at which points and under what circumstances 
evaluations affect actor behaviour and policy making, and which factors and mechanisms 
may matter for the processing of knowledge generated from evaluation processes or re-
sults. It also adds to the conceptual understanding of pathways through which policy eval-
uations may exert their effects on policy making. 
Research findings contribute to the existing literature in public policy and evaluation    
research, as well as, to some extent, to institutional theory. The main contribution of this 
work lies in the systematic investigation of the effects of evaluations, also introducing as-
sumptions about conditioning factors and mechanisms. Study results show that the effects 
of evaluations, as suggested by Kirkhart (2000) and by recent work in evaluation research, 
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are broader and deeper when looking beyond findings use. Besides attributes of an evalua-
tion such as timing, credibility and clarity of findings, also strategic priorities and institu-
tionally based considerations may shape evaluation effects. The results add to current re-
search on evaluation use und influence (e.g. Højlund 2015) that calls for a deeper explora-
tion of non-use, instead of explaining use from an evaluation research perspective.  
The practical value of this work lies in highlighting aspects and questions of how evalua-
tion practice might be enhanced, and of how evaluations might be better linked to policy 
improvement: 
 First, it might be an option to expand the scope of evaluative questions, also in interim 
evaluations, in particular for policies with a long lifespan, to more deeply cover aspects 
concerning the programme’s history and continued existence. The role and purpose of 
the evaluation, as well as, the targeted audience, including intended users such as the 
Federal Ministry of Finance, should be made clear in terms of reference. If possible, 
different views, such as those of external stakeholders, should be explored beforehand 
in order to develop awareness and a sense of ownership. 
 Second, evaluations of long-standing programmes should either become more elaborate 
and broader in scope, or much simpler and focused on immediate impacts. A broader 
scope would entail assessing the relevance and conceptual underpinnings of policies, as 
well as, examining impacts on science, industry, and society, thus resorting to a more 
systemic perspective. Such research could be supported by earmarking a part of the 
budget for unrestricted research, to address interesting questions that come up during 
the evaluation and have not been asked in the terms of reference. The other sensible al-
ternative would be to conduct less elaborate evaluations, focusing only on immediate, 
tangible programme outcomes and impacts. 
 Third, if an organisation often commissions evaluations, it might make sense for this 
organisation to establish an organisational unit, or intelligence hub, that bundles evalu-
ation competences. This unit could streamline evaluation preparation and set-up pro-
cesses (e.g. setting the scope of questions, asking a similar set of questions in other 
programme evaluations). It could also systematically review and synthesise evaluation 
findings. 
 Fourth, it might be worthwhile to enhance the dissemination process, for instance by 
providing mandatory statements alongside the evaluation report in which programme 
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stakeholders comment on the evaluation, or by organising seminars in which further 
implementation steps are presented and discussed. 
Following these suggestions would entail the creation of more formal structures for evalua-
tion, for instance formalised follow-up processes. It should be noted that this may also in-
volve drawbacks. Formalised routines can be cumbersome or even counter-productive, as 
they can add to information-overload and evaluation fatigue. Institutions such as coordina-
tion bodies and follow-up guidelines may end up at what has been termed as “evaluation 
system”52 in the literature (e.g. Højlund 2014b), and may push even more into the direction 
of securing accountability, and less so to facilitating broader learning. Also, inviting exter-
nal stakeholders to joint preparations of evaluative questions and terms of reference might 
not come without its own problems. All external stakeholders interviewed in this study 
suggested, at least in part, that the evaluation under scrutiny would have benefited from 
(more) joint preparation activities. However, this was not viewed very favourably by the 
Ministry and the Agency, who argued that most external stakeholders were potential bene-
ficiaries of the respective policies, who, therefore, naturally had vested interests in these 
policies. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research Paths 
Some limitations of the study need to be considered. First, there are limitations connected 
to relying on a small number of cases for determining the relevance of various evaluation 
effects and conditioning factors and mechanisms. However, the advantage of carrying out 
an in-depth analysis of the particularities of the cases justified this choice. Collecting data 
from different sources helped to substantiate and supplement claims, also circumventing 
the problem of single-informant data and common-method bias. Second, learning is a pro-
cess that is difficult to observe and assess empirically, in particular its translation into ac-
tion. Third, change depends on many different factors, thus, capturing all events and data 
about one case is impossible. Finally, policy processes are complex phenomena. Clearly, 
there might be other factors and mechanisms that shape evaluations effects, such as politi-
                                                 
52  Building on Leeuw and Furubo (2008), Højlund (2015, p. 46; see also Højlund 2014b) defines an evalua-
tion system as “permanent and systematic evaluation practices taking place and institutionalised in several 
interdependent organisational entities with the purpose of generating accountability and informing deci-
sion making”. 
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cal power or the role of the media. Due to conceptual reasons, they have not been a focus 
of this study. Results are influenced by the specific institutional setting in which Austrian 
RTI policy is embedded. It is, therefore, not possible to extrapolate the findings from this 
analysis mechanically to other cases.  
However, as Lukka and Kasanen (1995) explain, the epistemological basis for generalising 
from high quality case studies of complex social phenomena is not essentially inferior to 
that for quantitative methods. This is because quantitative methods also have their distinc-
tive limitations, and both kinds of methods include the fundamental problem of induction. 
To the extent that the study at hand is thoroughly crafted, transparently documented, and 
persuasively argued, which will be up to the reader to judge, it is epistemologically permis-
sible to take the insights that it generates, and to use them as a basis for thinking about and 
dealing with evaluations more generally. 
Although this study employs a multidimensional conceptual framework for evaluation ef-
fects, pathways of these effects, and factors and mechanisms that condition these effects, 
more theoretical development and empirical testing is needed to adequately conceptualise 
and operationalise the relationships between conditioning factors and mechanisms. This 
might also help to determine not just why and how evaluations have effects, but also the 
potential intent of these effects, and to what extent effects contribute to policy development 
and actor behaviour. This would, for instance, require a specific set of measurement indica-
tors. In this light, attention should be paid to the size of the underlying policy or pro-
gramme, e.g. in terms of budget or target audience. Large policies or evaluations, in this 
study the cited “systems evaluation”, may tend to lean more towards accountability and 
legitimation, whereas smaller programmes and evaluations (in terms of scope) may tend to 
support policy improvement. 
Hence, further research is needed to investigate whether the obtained results as presented 
here can be fine-tuned, replicated and further generalised. The conceptual framework de-
veloped in this study could be used to guide research on the effects of evaluations in other 
contexts, for instance in other countries or in a wider variety of organisations. The pressure 
for accountability and legitimation could be higher in larger countries, e.g. in terms of 
population or economic power, or in countries that have embraced the decentralisation of 
public services (“agencification”) compared to, for instance, smaller countries with central-
ised service provision. Also, institutional memory and the continuity of programmes may 
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also play an important role. The development of field-specific rhetorical patterns of argu-
mentation and what has influenced them might be taken into consideration. Certain parts of 
the findings and conclusions may also be applied to assess the effects of evaluations in 
other policy fields. Investigations in this regard may address the perceived importance of 
policy fields such as health or education as well as the existing (or non-existing) pressure 
for legitimation in these fields and compare them to, for instance, policy fields such as se-
curity or defence policies. 
Future research may also aim to develop concepts for how to better distinguish between 
different types of potentially interested stakeholders, and for how to involve a wider audi-
ence in the evaluations, particularly in the set-up and preparation phase. A focal point 
could be laid on what an evaluation (process) should look like so that it provides better 
opportunities to learn. Finally, further work is needed that tracks long-term effects, and 
which factors and mechanisms are responsible for shaping these types of effects.  
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Appendix 
This appendix presents additional information on the institutional logics in the Austrian 
Public Sector and a tabulated summary of the number of interviewed persons as well as 
related organisations. Finally, the interview guidelines used in the present study is listed.  
Tab. A1: Institutional Logics in the Austrian Public Sector 
 Legalistic-Bureaucratic Logic Managerial Logic 
Rationality Bureaucratic, legalistic, professional Economic (causal means-end rela-
tions, rational action) 
Legitimacy Procedural Result-based 
Vision and Mission State as sovereign (superior position 
in society) 
Public sector as service provider 
Serving society and the public interest Achieving objectives/targets and serv-
ing clients/customers 
Core Values Legality, correctness, political  
neutrality, objectivity, equity, loyalty, 
security, secrecy 
Performance, effectiveness and  
efficiency, prudence 
Continuity, stability Change, flexibility, innovation 
Evaluation Criteria and 
Focus of Attention 
Rules, inputs, responsibilities, duties 
and rights 
Organisational and individual goals, 
results (i.e. output and outcome) 
Focus on appropriateness of action Focus on consequentiality of action 
Mode of Governance Bureaucratic governance based on 
laws, rules, and directives with strict 
accountability towards the sovereign; 
tight and multiple controls 
Contractual governance based on 
objectives/targets, results, perfor-
mance measures, and management 
tools in a competitive environment 
Hierarchical, centralised, and united 
system 
Decentralised and fragmented system 
with strong managerial autonomy 
Employment Status Sector-specific, highly regulated, 
special status (life-time tenure) in 
order to guarantee neutrality 
Sectoral openness based on private 
sector employment law 
Closed recruitment and career paths 
based on seniority (with little mobili-
ty) 
Flexible and open career paths based 
on performance 
Source: Meyer et al. (2013, p. 6); see also: Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006, p. 102) 
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Tab. A2: Number of Interviewed Persons and Related Organisations 
Number of Interviewees Organisation 
5 Austrian Interest Group Representatives and Industry Experts 
8 Austrian Research Promotion Agency  
8 Evaluators (Austrian Institute for SME Research, PROGNOS AG Germany, 
Technopolis Austria) 
7 Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology, Austria 
3 Representatives of Austrian Non-University Research Organisations 
 
The following interview guidelines for this study was developed and designed around the 
conceptual framework, the literature and other secondary sources, and piloted among    
representatives of the Austrian RTI community. Following the pilot phase, the guideline 
was refined and designed to have one format to be used for all relevant actors. 
Tab. A3: Interview Guidelines 
Study Background 
The study is about developments in the area of evaluations in Austria (in general and in research, technol-
ogy and innovation policy [RTI]), the handling and use of evaluation results, and the effects of evaluations 
on decisions and measures. A particular focus is put on actors, institutions (i.e. formal and informal rules), 
and characteristics of evaluations as such. 
On data collection and analysis: Data will be rendered anonymous. I would be happy to inform you about 
the results of this study, which may be relevant for further programme development or administration. 
Introductory Questions 
Questions for All Actors 
 Please tell me briefly about yourself and your professional background. 
Questions for Ministry/Agency Representatives 
 When did you start working here? How did you become responsible for this programme? 
 What other programmes are you involved in, and in what role? 
Case-Centred Questions 
Questions for Ministry/Agency Representatives 
 Could you briefly describe the programme? 
o What are the main aims of the programme? 
  Evaluations, Actors and Institutions 
161 
 Can you tell me about the division of roles and responsibilities in the programme? 
o Which actors are/were involved? 
o Are there any general rules that govern this aspect? 
 After this evaluation, did you have any further important internal or external assessments or evalua-
tions of this programme? 
Questions for Evaluators 
 In what role were you involved in this evaluation? Which tasks did you carry out? 
 Which main topics were investigated in the course of this evaluation? 
o How was the evaluation design developed? Could you please briefly describe the design? 
o How much freedom did you have in designing the evaluation? 
 How many reports were expected? Who received these reports? 
 Did the evaluation involve any stakeholder participation? If so, in what ways? 
 Did the evaluation address specific interests over others? 
 How did the communication with the commissioner (respectively the Agency) work? 
Questions for All Actors 
 Can you tell me about the background or the events leading up to this evaluation? 
o Background, involvements 
o Important: Chronology of actor involvements 
 Who initiated the commissioning of this evaluation? 
o Were there any attempts to integrate the interests (e.g. questions of concern) of various actors in 
the evaluation? 
o Which actors had the opportunity to comment on or co-decide about the evaluation design? 
 What was your role (the role of your organisation) or contribution (of your organisation) in the evalua-
tion process? 
o Were you kept up to date about the process? 
o Did you attend related meetings? 
 Did you notice that the various actors had any particular expectations, interests, orientations or initia-
tives concerning the evaluation (before/during the evaluation)? 
o Which ones were central/dominant? 
o What about the Federal Ministry of Finance? 
 What do you think about the potential for conflict on the side of the Austrian Research Promotion 
Agency vis-à-vis the Federal Ministry of Traffic, Innovation and Technology? 
 Generally speaking, what do you think about this evaluation? 
o What was your experience?  
o Was there anything special about it, the process, etc.? 
o What was different to the evaluations that you know? 
 Did the evaluation confirm your expectations? Did you agree with the results? 
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 If you know: What did other actors think about the evaluation and its results? 
o Was the evaluation especially welcome to any particular actors? 
o Did the evaluation support or undermine the interests of any particular stakeholder? 
 Did the experience with this evaluation make any difference or changes for you personally, for your 
department, or for your organisation (Ministry/Agency/Evaluator organisation)? 
o During or after the evaluation? 
o Did the evaluation influence or have an effect on your attitude/behaviour or, if you know, that of 
other actors? 
o Were there any effects on interactions between actors? 
o Were there any changes at the organisational/institutional level? 
 If yes, please explain: 
o Who or what enabled these changes? How/why did they happen? 
o What were the drivers/inhibitors of change? 
o Which factors mattered? (for instance, resources, formal authority, experience, assertiveness, prob-
lem definitions, agenda-setting, …) 
 If not, please explain: 
o Is the potential influence or effect of evaluations so limited? 
o Is it even the purpose of evaluations to stimulate change? 
 When it comes to enabling or not enabling change, of what importance is the evaluation as such, e.g. 
its characteristics in terms of design, methodology, and quality? 
 What is your opinion on the overall design and approach of the evaluation? 
 What happened after the evaluation was completed? 
o Were the results published? 
o Did you read the report? 
 Does the current programme reflect the events during the evaluation (process), the recommendations 
of the evaluation (results), or elements thereof? 
o If not, please explain: Why not? 
o If yes: Where in the current programme can these elements be found? How did they get into the 
programme? 
 Did the changes at the institutional/organisational level contribute in any way to programme develop-
ment? Or were the changes in the programme made irrespective of the evaluation? 
 Did you notice any changes of your attitude/behaviour or, if you know, that of other actors, which may 
result from this evaluation? 
 What would the programme look like if the evaluation had not taken place? 
 What do you think is your personal influence or that of your organisation on the political decisions in 
this particular case? How relevant were the evaluation results in this regard? 
 Are there any other factors, beyond the immediate context of the programme, which could determine 
the effects of this evaluation? 
General Questions 
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Questions for Ministry/Agency Representatives 
 What is your personal view on evaluations? Would you say that this view is any different from the 
usual view in your department? 
 How do you usually handle evaluations (before, during and after) in your department/organisation? 
 What conditions need to be in place so that an evaluation is not put on the proverbial shelf to gather 
dust? Or the other way around: So that it is shelved? 
Questions for Evaluators 
 What did you take home from this evaluation? 
 What, in your personal opinion, is usually the objective of an evaluation? 
 Is this objective always met? 
 What usually happens after an evaluation project has been completed?  
Questions for All Actors 
 How would you characterise the state of evidence-based policy making in international and in Austrian 
RTI policy? 
 What does an evaluation mean for you, your department, your organisation? 
 How do you know that an evaluation had effects? What would you consider as indicators that evalua-
tions have effects? 
 What determines what happens during an evaluation and with the evaluation results? What are the 
decisive factors and mechanisms in this regard? 
Concluding Questions 
 Is there anything important that I have overlooked? 
 Can you recommend any other persons that I should talk to about this issue? 
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